Mécanismes de Marché et Évaluation des Biens Publics Environnementaux by Dragicevic, Arnaud
Market Mechanisms and Valuation of Environmental
Public Goods
Arnaud Dragicevic
To cite this version:
Arnaud Dragicevic. Market Mechanisms and Valuation of Environmental Public Goods.
Economies and finances. Ecole Polytechnique X, 2009. English. <tel-00630027>
HAL Id: tel-00630027
https://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00630027
Submitted on 7 Oct 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
THÈSE 
 
Pour l‟obtention du grade de 
Docteur de l‟École Polytechnique 
Spécialité : Sciences économiques 
 
 
Présentée et soutenue publiquement par  
 
Arnaud Z. Dragicevic 
 
Le 4 Décembre 2009 
 
 
MARKET MECHANISMS AND VALUATION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS 
 
 
MÉCANISMES DE MARCHÉ ET ÉVALUATION 
DES BIENS PUBLICS ENVIRONNEMENTAUX 
 
 
Directeur de thèse : Bernard Sinclair–Desgagné 
 
 
 
Membres du jury 
 
Pr. Bureau, D., École Polytechnique et Conseil économique pour le développement durable (président) 
Pr. Shogren, J., Université du Wyoming et Académie royale des sciences de Suède (rapporteur) 
Pr. Sinclair-Desgagné, B., École Polytechnique, HEC Montréal et CIRANO (directeur) 
Pr. Willinger, M., Université de Montpellier 1, Institut universitaire de France et LAMETA (rapporteur)
L'École Polytechnique n’entend donner aucune approbation, 
 ni improbation, aux opinions émises dans les thèses.  
Ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leur auteur. 
 
Table des Matières 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapitre 0 .......................................................... 7 
 
Introduction Générale 
 
0.1. Le préambule .................................................................................................... 8 
0.2. L‟approche économique .................................................................................... 9 
0.3. Les méthodes d‟élicitation .............................................................................. 13 
0.4. Les enchères expérimentales ........................................................................... 14 
0.5. Le résumé de la thèse ...................................................................................... 16 
0.6. Les recommandations de politique publique .................................................. 19 
0.7. Références ....................................................................................................... 19 
 
 
Chapter 1 ......................................................... 23 
 
Imperfect Substitutability in Standard 
and Reference-Dependence Models 
 
1.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 24 
1.2. The standard model ......................................................................................... 25 
1.3. The substitution effect..................................................................................... 34 
1.4. Imperfect substitutability and the endowment effect ...................................... 36 
1.5. Imperfect substitutability and loss aversion .................................................... 40 
1.6. Imperfect substitutability and boundedness .................................................... 43 
1.7. Concluding remarks ........................................................................................ 47 
1.8. References ....................................................................................................... 48 
1.9. Appendix ......................................................................................................... 51 
 
Chapter 2 ........................................................ 57 
 
Private Valuation of a Public Good 
in Three Auction Mechanisms 
 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 58 
2.2. The experimental design ................................................................................ 62 
2.3. The results ...................................................................................................... 65 
2.4. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 71 
2.5. Concluding remarks ....................................................................................... 74 
2.6. References ...................................................................................................... 75 
2.7. Appendix ........................................................................................................ 79 
 
 
Chapter 3 ........................................................ 85 
 
Endogenous Market-Clearing Prices 
and Reference Point Adaptation 
 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 86 
3.2. Auctions and incentive-compatibility ............................................................ 89 
3.3. Interactive incentive-compatibility ................................................................ 94 
3.4. The behavioral model ..................................................................................... 99 
3.5. The empirical study ...................................................................................... 109 
3.6. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 117 
3.7. References .................................................................................................... 118 
3.8. Appendix ...................................................................................................... 123 
 
 
Chapter 4 ...................................................... 129 
 
Competitive Private Supply of Public Goods 
 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 130 
4.2. The public good game .................................................................................. 132 
4.3. The explicit logarithmic model .................................................................... 139 
4.4. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 149 
4.5. References .................................................................................................... 150 
4.6. Appendix ...................................................................................................... 152 
 
Table des Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. A change in q  and imperfect substitution with the x ‟s .............................. 35 
Fig. 1.2. Reference-dependent preferences ................................................................. 39 
Fig. 1.3. Loss aversion in welfare measures ............................................................... 40 
Fig. 1.4. Unboundedness of the compensation demanded .......................................... 44 
Fig. 1.5. Comparison between reference-dependent indifference curves ................... 47 
 
Fig. 2.1. WTA / WTP  disparity from trial 1 to trial 10 ............................................. 68 
Fig. 2.2. Exponential regression of WTA / WTP  disparity ....................................... 69 
Fig. 2.3. Exponential regression of WTA / WTP  disparity ....................................... 69 
 
Fig. 3.1. The sequential price weighting function ..................................................... 107 
 
Fig. 4.1. Agents i‟s and j‟s best-response functions .................................................. 143 
Fig. 4.2. Income transfer with strategic substitutes ................................................... 147 
Fig. 4.3. Income transfer with strategic complements .............................................. 147 
Fig. 4.4. The aggregate level of provisions ............................................................... 148 
 
 
Table des Tableaux 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1. Four welfare indices ................................................................................... 30 
Table 1.2. Welfare indices and context-dependence ................................................... 37 
Table 1.3. Welfare indices in a gain and loss perspective ........................................... 41 
 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics of the BDM, SPA and NPA mechanisms ................... 66 
Table 2.2. Exponential regression statistics ................................................................ 70 
 
Table 3.1. Unitary sequential weight coefficients ..................................................... 110 
Table 3.2. Summary statistics of the uniform and s-shaped theoretical estimates .... 111 
Table 3.3.  -factors statistics ................................................................................... 114 
Table 3.4. Comparison between extra expected and real winners from deviation .... 116 
Table 3.5. Comparison between extra expected and real gains from deviation ........ 117 
 
 
7 
Chapitre 0 
 
 
 
Introduction Générale 
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"La nature n‟est ni morale ni immorale, 
elle est radieusement, glorieusement, 
amorale." Théodore Monod 
 
0.1. Le préambule 
 
L‟évaluation économique des biens et services publics environnementaux 
répond à un double objectif : en premier lieu, produire un ordre de grandeur, en 
des termes monétaires, des services rendus par l‟environnement afin qu‟ils soient 
incorporés dans les décisions publiques à leur juste valeur ; en second lieu, 
apporter des éléments qui permettent de bâtir des politiques de l‟environnement 
tout en prenant en compte les préférences des agents économiques. 
La thèse publique en évaluation économique développée dans ce manuscrit 
se compose de quatre essais. Le premier interroge la nature des préférences des 
agents économiques pour les biens publics sur un marché hypothétique. Le 
deuxième examine le bien-fondé des mécanismes d‟enchères pour révéler les 
préférences environnementales. Le troisième considère la question de la sincérité 
des valeurs révélées en enchères répétées. Enfin, le quatrième appréhende ce qui 
motive les agents à financer un bien public, le financement et la valeur qu‟ils 
attribuent au bien publique étant des corrélatives, en dépit de l‟intérêt rationnel à 
se comporter en passager clandestin. 
La démarche scientifique transdisciplinaire qui consiste à mettre des 
concepts d‟horizons divers en relation les uns avec les autres – démarche que nous 
nous sommes efforcés d‟entreprendre tout au long de cette recherche – apporte des 
propositions à des questions soulevées en économie de l‟environnement et plus 
généralement celle des biens publics. Les essais n‟édifient pas de lois de la nature 
(quitte à y divertir d‟éventuels détracteurs des sciences économiques) et ouvrent 
autant de débats qu‟ils n‟en closent. Toutefois, nous espérons qu‟ils donnent une 
plus grande compréhension du comportement individuel vis-à-vis d‟un bien public 
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en contexte d‟échange marchand, et portent à la connaissance ce qui constitue la 
valeur économique de l‟environnement1. 
 
0.2. L’approche économique 
 
L‟environnement et les ressources naturelles fournissent aux agents des 
services essentiels tous les jours. Les pouvoirs publics ont nécessité de les évaluer 
pour budgéter les politiques environnementales. Si l‟environnement a une valeur, 
il n‟a pas de prix. Dès lors, comment justifier les montants d‟investissements 
inhérents à sa gestion ainsi que les dépenses pour la mise à disposition des biens 
publics ? L‟analyse économique permet de comparer les coûts et les bénéfices 
d‟actions envers l‟environnement, ce qui en fait un outil de décision robuste pour 
évaluer les politiques et mieux légiférer. Appliquée à l‟environnement, l‟approche 
économique se divise en régulation et évaluation. Elle observe et modélise les 
préférences des agents (eux-mêmes présumés conscients de leurs préférences) par 
rapport à leur cadre de vie, le milieu naturel dans le cas présent. 
La régulation représente l‟ensemble des règles qui ont pour but de 
maintenir l‟équilibre du marché. L‟absence de marché des biens publics implique 
l‟intervention de l‟État. La régulation devient alors la mise en place de règles de 
conduite qui permettent de maximiser le bien-être social. Les politiques s‟appuient 
généralement sur la régulation, à travers la taxation des pollueurs imaginée par 
Pigou en 1929 ainsi que les compensations monétaires fixées par le droit commun. 
Cependant, l‟absence de marché induit l‟absence de prix, lequel est un vecteur 
d‟information sur la valeur du bien. Il en résulte distorsions de valeur, coûts de 
transactions et asymétries d‟information très coûteuses en efficacité. En effet, peu 
de politiques environnementales se basent sur le critère d‟efficacité, notamment 
parce que les décideurs publics ont d‟autres objectifs que l‟efficacité économique, 
tels que l‟équité ou bien la soutenabilité des systèmes de ressources (Freeman 
                                                 
1
 S‟agissant d‟une thèse publique, malgré des efforts de vulgarisation, les quatre chapitres qui 
composent cette thèse comportent quelques passages techniques difficiles. Nous sollicitons 
l‟indulgence du lecteur intéressé mais non-initié. 
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2003). Pourtant, l‟analyse économique se propose justement d‟éclairer le décideur 
sur les critères a minima lesquels permettent le développement durable ; et 
développement durable ne signifie pas développement souhaitable (Sinclair-
Desgagné 2007a) qui relève d‟autres grilles de lecture sociétales. 
L‟évaluation économique consiste à montrer que l‟environnement a une 
valeur d‟usage. Préserver cet usage intact revient à s‟exprimer sur des projets qui 
impactent, positivement et négativement, le niveau de qualité environnementale, 
puis à arbitrer entre coûts et bénéfices. Il s‟agit de l‟analyse coût-bénéfice, basée 
sur la prise en compte des équivalents monétaires que les individus considèrent 
pertinents pour refléter leurs préférences (Gatzweiler et Volkmann 2007). Par 
exemple, cela signifie que les individus sont capables d‟associer des valeurs 
monétaires à des niveaux de préservation d‟un milieu naturel. Cette capacité 
d‟association est la pierre angulaire de l‟analyse économique sur les questions 
environnementales. Sans celle-ci, il apparaît impossible d‟appliquer des principes 
économiques développés en théorie du bien-être. L‟environnement naturel a donc 
une valeur économique, mais il n‟y a toujours pas de consensus sur la nature de 
cette valeur ou sur les meilleurs outils pour la mesurer. 
D‟un côté, les économistes néoclassiques lient la valeur d‟un bien ou 
service à l‟utilité, ou la satisfaction des préférences, qu‟il procure. Selon ce mode 
de pensée qu‟on peut définir comme anthropocentrique, l‟environnement a une 
valeur instrumentale, laquelle dépend des préférences des agents qui le 
considèrent comme un moyen et non comme une fin en soi (même un parc naturel 
est un moyen qui rend possibles la contemplation de la vie sauvage et la 
randonnée en milieu naturel). En effet, le socle de l‟analyse coût-bénéfice repose 
sur la logique instrumentale. La somme qu‟un individu est disposé à dépenser 
pour satisfaire ses préférences reflète la valeur qu‟il accorde au bien. Il est donc 
possible de révéler la valeur du bien à travers sa demande (Bateman et al. 2002). 
Les économistes calculent ensuite le taux auquel un agent est prêt à substituer ce 
bien pour un autre (en l‟occurrence, cet autre bien est le numéraire dans lequel 
sont mesurés les prix). Ce taux est capté par les indices de consentement-à-payer 
maximal (le CAP) et de consentement-à-recevoir minimal (le CAR). Les valeurs 
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économiques sont d‟ordinaire révélées dans le cadre d‟une institution fondée sur 
l‟échange. Le principe est que tous les agents possèdent la même quantité 
d‟informations sur le bien à valoriser, soit l‟absence d‟asymétrie d‟information. 
De l‟autre côté, les environnementalistes accordent au milieu naturel une 
valeur de non-usage, c‟est-à-dire une valeur intrinsèque ou  per se. Or la valeur de 
non-usage est indépendante des prix du marché, si bien qu‟elle ne peut pas être 
approximée autrement que par l‟évaluation hors-marché. Sachant que les 
différentes natures de la valeur sont imbriquées dans ce qui serait la vraie valeur 
d‟un bien ou service, O‟Neill (1993) considère simplificateur d‟utiliser un outil 
d‟évaluation basé sur la commensurabilité et la représentation monétaire. 
Diamond et Hausman (1994) affirment même que les agents n‟ont pas de 
préférences dites environnementales. Toutefois, les individus sont d‟expérience 
disposés à payer ou recevoir une valeur monétaire pour un bien ou service 
environnemental, prouvant ainsi qu‟ils sont prêts à substituer des biens entre eux, 
et donc à rendre comparables des biens privés avec des biens publics. Si la 
conversion monétaire était irrecevable, son refus serait observable quel que soit le 
contexte, ce qui n‟est pas le cas. C‟est pourquoi ont été introduits les marchés 
hypothétiques tels que l‟évaluation contingente initiée par Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1947). 
L‟autre problème concerne la nature publique des biens et services 
environnementaux. En effet, ils sont des biens publics, donc par définition non 
exclusifs, c‟est-à-dire qu‟aucun agent ne peut être exclu de leur consommation, et 
non rivaux, à savoir que l‟usage d‟un agent n‟entrave pas celle d‟un autre agent. 
Comme les biens publics ne s‟échangent pas sur un marché, il en résulte absence 
du taux de substitution et du prix d‟échange. Néanmoins, grâce aux marchés 
hypothétiques, l‟agrégation des valeurs privées permet de construire une courbe 
de demande pour le bien public. Il est donc raisonnablement possible de baser les 
politiques environnementales sur les évaluations privées issues des enquêtes 
montées à cet effet. 
Il est argué que les problèmes liés à l‟environnement sont dus à l‟absence 
de définition adéquate des droits de propriété. Le prétexte juridique a souvent 
12 
déplacé le débat des biens publics en dehors du sentier économique, par le fait que 
le CAP place l‟agent en position d‟acquéreur tandis que le CAR place l‟agent en 
situation de propriétaire ; alors que le bien public correspond au statut 
intermédiaire de copropriété. De fait ou par défaut, les normes juridiques sont 
devenues l‟instrument utilisé par les pouvoirs publics. Pourtant, les autorités 
régulatrices pourraient rétablir la logique du marché en régulant via des prix. 
L‟idée que l‟évaluation économique ne peut pas résoudre les questions de biens 
publics en raison de la logique marchande – qui serait inapte à traduire leur valeur 
sociale –, et que seul l‟aménagement juridique des droits individuels à l‟usage des 
biens publics en est capable, est sans véritable fondement. D‟abord, si les prix 
sont incomplets, comme le montrent les externalités négatives souvent citées en 
exemple pour justifier l‟échec des marchés, la juridiction l‟est autant. Créer des 
marchés hypothétiques pour l‟environnement, c‟est ni plus ni moins prendre en 
compte ces externalités, et la surveillance des parties prenantes peut se substituer à 
l‟autorité publique. Ensuite, la mise en place d‟un arsenal juridique est onéreuse, 
et il appartient aux autorités régulatrices de minimiser les coûts d‟administration, 
parce que d‟autres politiques publiques peuvent être initiées et rétribuées par la 
réalisation de ces économies.  
L‟ère est à la rationalisation des dépenses publiques qui ont trop longtemps 
manqué dans les finances publiques, entraînant des gaspillages dont les coûts sont 
supportés par la société civile. Ainsi, Montgomery (1972) a démontré que le coût 
d‟implémentation d‟une politique environnementale par les instruments de marché 
tels que les droits d‟émission était minimisé à l‟équilibre. Également, d‟après 
Sinclair-Desgagné (2007b), "il incombe à l‟État de veiller au bon fonctionnement 
du mécanisme des prix [e]n réduisant le nombre de biens collectifs par 
l‟instauration de conditions propices à la naissance et au fonctionnement de 
marchés efficaces." Rappelons qu‟en situation de copropriété, de nombreuses 
décisions sont prises à la majorité, évitant le piège de l‟unanimité qui ne peut 
exister en analyse économique compte tenu de l‟hétérogénéité des préférences. 
Enfin, la démarche qui consiste à aller directement interroger les citoyens sur les 
questions environnementales n‟est-elle pas la plus démocratique qui soit ? 
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0.3. Les méthodes d’élicitation 
 
La méthode des préférences révélées déduit la valeur de l‟environnement à 
partir des décisions prises par les agents économiques. Son ambition est 
d‟observer le comportement effectif de l‟agent, sensé traduire ses préférences et la 
valeur qu‟il accorde à l‟environnement. Cette méthode utilise les données du 
marché existantes pour extraire la valeur implicite d‟un bien. De la sorte, 
Hotelling (1949) a proposé la méthode indirecte des coûts de transport pour 
évaluer la demande pour les loisirs dans les milieux naturels. Cependant, les 
préférences révélées ne fonctionnent que si on dispose de données du marché. 
Il est souvent difficile d‟obtenir des données du marché relatives aux 
questions environnementales, aussi une part importante des études repose-t-elle 
sur les préférences déclarées, à l‟égal de l‟évaluation contingente. L‟évaluation 
contingente prend la forme d‟une enquête d‟opinion dans laquelle on demande 
aux individus de déclarer combien ils sont disposés à payer pour éviter une 
dégradation de l‟environnement ou bien combien ils sont disposés à recevoir en 
compensation pour laisser faire cette dégradation. Les valeurs – assimilées aux 
prix du marché hypothétique – sont ensuite agrégées pour calculer la valeur 
monétaire globale. Le but de l‟évaluation contingente a d‟abord été de mesurer la 
disposition à payer pour assurer la disponibilité d‟un service environnemental. 
Mais, la dégradation accrue de l‟environnement a fait basculer cette littérature 
vers des études portant sur des dommages subis par le milieu naturel (voir Carson 
et al. 1992). 
Même si la méthode permet de prendre en compte la valeur de non-usage 
(Walsh et al. 1984) défendue par les environnementalistes, sa limite réside dans le 
fait qu‟elle est source de nombreux biais : risque de questions mal formulées qui 
orienteraient les réponses ; mauvaise perception du bien à évaluer ; réponse 
stratégique plutôt que sincère ; apparition de biais cognitifs incompatibles avec la 
rationalité. En effet, les individus valorisent un scénario hypothétique. L‟absence 
des incitations du marché, qui prennent la forme des contraintes budgétaires et de 
mise en disponibilité des substituts, produit donc des données contestables. Par 
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exemple, les agents peuvent promettre des sommes destinées à la protection de 
l‟environnement largement supérieures à celles qu‟ils sont réellement prêts à 
payer (Diamond et Hausmann 1994, Hanemann 1994, Neill et al. 1994). Rien 
n‟incite donc l‟individu à donner sa vraie valeur lors d‟une déclaration. Les 
préférences déclarées ont ainsi été accueillies avec pyrrhonisme, voire hostilité. 
Lorsque les agents considèrent leurs déclarations inconséquentialistes, 
toutes les réponses se valent. Même en vertu de la sincérité des agents (ce qui 
demeure hypothétique), ceux-ci n‟ont pas incitation à engager d‟efforts cognitifs 
importants lorsqu‟ils doivent formuler une déclaration, ce qui rend les valeurs 
déclarées potentiellement bruyantes ou biaisées. Dans le cas où les agents 
considèrent leurs déclarations conséquentialistes, ils sont incités à donner des 
réponses fictives, comme minimiser leurs CAP s‟ils s‟aperçoivent que le projet 
porte sur la création d‟une nouvelle taxe, afin d‟influencer les décideurs publics 
qui peuvent être dans la projection d‟une réélection et donc dans l‟opportunisme. 
 
0.4. Les enchères expérimentales 
 
 Puisque les économistes doivent en tout état de cause éliciter des valeurs 
pour mener à bien des analyses coût-bénéfice et estimer les effets d‟une politique 
publique sur le bien-être des agents (Boardman et al. 2005) pourquoi ne pas 
utiliser les mécanismes d‟enchères ? En effet, les économistes s‟intéressent aux 
enchères expérimentales depuis un certain temps déjà : Bohm (1972), Brookshire 
et Coursey (1987), Hoffman et al. (1993), Shogren et al. (1994), Shogren et al. 
(2001), Rozan et al. (2004), Lusk et al. (2007). La seule méthode capable à ce 
jour de combiner les avantages des préférences révélées avec la possibilité de 
construire un marché simulé est le mécanisme de ventes aux enchères. Simuler un 
marché en laboratoire, c‟est créer un marché qui n‟existe pas, pour quelques 
heures et avec quelques individus recrutés à cette fin. Cette création temporaire 
n‟a pas d‟autre finalité que d‟observer le comportement des agents sur le marché, 
seul capable de révéler les CAP (Robin et al. 2007). 
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La valeur ajoutée des enchères expérimentales réside dans le fait qu‟elles 
peuvent s‟appliquer à n‟importe quel type de bien non-marchand, ou évaluer les 
programmes sociaux enclins aux divergences d‟intérêts (Heckman 2001). Bien 
que les mécanismes de marché de type ventes aux enchères aient initialement été 
conçus pour éliciter la valeur des loteries et tester la validité de l‟utilité espérée 
(Becker et al. 1964), ils ont depuis été largement repris pour des biens réels, 
notamment la protection de l‟environnement (Cummings et al. 1986). 
Les enchères expérimentales mettent les individus en situation d‟échange 
actif. Quand bien même ils prendraient en compte les données du marché et 
réviseraient leurs préférences en fonction de celles-ci, la compatibilité avec les 
incitations des mécanismes d‟enchères induit un coût désincitatif à dévier des 
préférences sincères ; rappelons que toutes les conséquences monétaires issues des 
décisions sont réelles. Par ailleurs, les chercheurs peuvent y observer la manière 
dont les agents réagissent aux signaux publics tels que les prix de compensation. 
Ils ont à disposition des données directes – par opposition aux données indirectes 
à l‟exemple des coûts de transport – afin de révéler la valeur économique d‟un 
bien. Les problématiques résolues par des expériences d‟évaluation sont 
nombreuses (Willinger 2001) mais nous nous contenterons de citer la différence 
entre le CAP et le CAR (Knetsch et Sinden 1984, Brookshire et Coursey 1987, 
Shogren et al. 1994, Shogren et al. 2001, Horowitz et McConnell 2003) ou encore 
l‟effet de dotation (Samuelson et Zeckhauser 1988, Kahneman et al. 1990, 
Horowitz et al. 2005, Bischoff 2008). 
Néanmoins, la validité externe des données de laboratoire est souvent 
remise en question. On accuse les expériences de simplisme ; on leur reproche 
l‟effet de contexte éloigné de la réalité, c‟est-à-dire un manque de reproduction 
fidèle des comportements des individus, comme dans une épicerie par exemple. 
Pour autant, le décideur public doit s‟accommoder de l‟absence du marché de 
référence. Il est inutile d‟essayer de répliquer le marché réel en laboratoire, car la 
simplicité permet d‟isoler de nombreux paramètres noyés dans la complexité du 
monde réel, ce qui améliore le contrôle de l‟étude (Friedman et Sunder 1994). En 
effet, le marché simulé en laboratoire permet de contrôler les variables 
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décisionnelles qui pèsent sur le CAP et d‟étudier l‟impact d‟une variation à la 
marge de l‟une de ces variables décisionnelles, toutes choses étant égales par 
ailleurs (Robin et al. 2007). L‟expérimentation en laboratoire doit donc être jugée 
sur la qualité de la compréhension des préférences qu‟elle produit, non sur la 
qualité du facsimilé.  
 
0.5. Le résumé de la thèse 
 
Après ce bref chapitre introductif, nous aborderons dans un premier 
chapitre la question de l‟équivalence entre le CAP et le CAR. La disparité entre 
les deux indices a de profondes conséquences sur les prises de décision 
environnementales. Brown et Gregory (1999) mentionnent la formation des 
politiques de développement durable et l‟allocation des droits. Tout autant, on 
peut se demander comment baser les décisions publiques si les valeurs sont 
qualifiées d‟inconsistantes par rapport au choix rationnel ? Si la disparité était au 
départ associée aux carences de la méthode de mise en œuvre des enquêtes, les 
racines du problème s‟avèrent être sensiblement plus profondes. Eu égard à 
l‟évaluation des biens publics, nous pensons que la disparité est due à la 
substituabilité imparfaite entre les biens privés et publiques, ainsi qu‟en raison de 
perceptions différenciées des agents économiques entre gains et pertes. C‟est à 
cette problématique que le premier chapitre se consacre. 
Ainsi, le Chapitre 1 traite de la disparité entre les indices CAP et CAR 
dans l‟évaluation hors-marché. Dans la littérature, l‟effet de substitution et l‟effet 
de dotation sont tenus responsables de l‟existence des disparités. Nous montrons 
que la substituabilité imparfaite dans la fonction d‟utilité indirecte peut provoquer 
la disparité soit entre le CAP et le CAR – en raison du coût d‟opportunité –, soit 
entre les gains et les pertes, où il s‟agit d‟évaluer une perte sèche. La mesure en 
termes relatifs accentue la substituabilité imparfaite, mais l‟effet de substitution 
est borné dans le modèle d‟aversion aux pertes. 
Ce premier chapitre prépare le terrain pour le Chapitre 2, où nous évaluons 
un vrai bien public dans un contexte d‟enchères expérimentales. Les offres d‟achat 
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et de vente reflètent le CAP et le CAR, d‟où leur importance. L‟effet de dotation 
et le choix du meilleur mécanisme d‟enchères y sont examinés. Les études en 
enchères expérimentales jusqu‟ici menées ont porté sur des biens privés non 
marchands ; elles sont supposées divulguer ce qui se passerait en présence de 
biens publics, car il est a priori difficile d‟envisager une expérience où le bien 
public est échangé (Robin et al. 2007). Nous y parvenons. Nous n‟employons pas 
de valeurs induites mais laissons libre cours aux valeurs autoproduites par les 
sujets d‟étude recrutés pour l‟occasion. L‟étude nous permet de vérifier si, sur des 
marchés simulés, bien privé non marchand et bien public sont évalués de manière 
identique. 
Ainsi, nous évaluons l‟impact de trois mécanismes d‟enchère – le 
mécanisme Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM), l‟enchère au deuxième prix, et 
l‟enchère aléatoire au nième prix – dans l‟évaluation des CAP et CAR privés d‟un 
bien public pur. Nos résultats montrent que l‟effet de dotation peut être éliminé en 
répétant le mécanisme BDM. Néanmoins, à l‟échelle logarithmique, l‟enchère 
aléatoire au nième prix donne la vitesse de convergence vers l‟égalité des indices 
de bien-être la plus élevée. Plus généralement, nous observons que les sujets 
d‟étude évaluent les biens publics en se référant à l‟avantage privé et subjectif qui 
résulte du financement du bien public. 
Par la suite, le Chapitre 3 discute de la sincérité des préférences en 
enchères expérimentales répétées et traite des propriétés incitatives des 
mécanismes BDM et l‟enchère aléatoire au nième prix. Une propriété des 
mécanismes d‟enchères est la compatibilité avec les incitations, dans laquelle un 
offreur a une stratégie faiblement dominante de soumettre une offre égale à sa 
valeur. Il a été prouvé que les deux mécanismes sont compatibles avec les 
incitations. En évaluation, on répète des sessions d‟enchères pour donner aux 
offreurs l‟opportunité d‟apprendre le mécanisme de marché : leur donner du temps 
pour révéler leurs préférences. Or, ce procédé les contre-incite à adapter leurs 
préférences en fonction des prix publiquement signalés, si bien qu‟il crée un 
risque de licitation stratégique (par opposition aux offres sincères). Si les offreurs 
s‟engagent dans des stratégies déviantes pour faire face à l‟incertitude sur la 
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valeur du bien public, les mécanismes d‟enchères perdent leur propriété de 
compatibilité avec les incitations et révèlent de fausses préférences. 
Lorsque les prix dépendent des offres soumises, c‟est-à-dire en présence de 
mécanismes de marché répétés avec prix de compensation endogènes, l‟hypothèse 
de l‟indépendance des valeurs privées – sous-jacente à la compatibilité avec les 
incitations – est remise en question ; même si ce type de mécanismes fournit une 
participation active et un apprentissage du marché. Dans sa vision orthodoxe, le 
comportement marchand d‟adaptation met en péril la compatibilité avec les 
incitations. Nous introduisons un modèle qui montre que les enchérisseurs licitent 
suivant l‟heuristique d‟ancrage et d‟ajustement, dépendante d‟une fonction de 
pondération séquentielle, laquelle prend en compte les contraintes de compatibilité 
avec les incitations sans rejeter les prix signalés issus des autres offres. En déviant 
de leur ancrage dans le sens du signal public, les enchérisseurs opèrent dans un 
équilibre corrélé. 
En dernier lieu, Vatn (2005) estime que les préférences environnementales 
dépendent des normes sociales intériorisées : elles sont socialement contingentes. 
Comme le prouve l‟expérience du Chapitre 2, les contributions privées aux biens 
publics sont issues d‟une démarche d‟évaluation. Elles sont conduites aussi bien 
par des incitations asociales que sociales. Si l‟offre privée du bien public est 
stimulée à la fois par une rationalité qui dicte de ne pas contribuer au bien public 
et de profiter de l‟effort fourni par la collectivité, et par l‟appétit pour la 
reconnaissance sociale qui incite à se faire publiquement connaître en tant que 
généreux donateur, laquelle des deux motivations domine ? 
Le Chapitre 4 fait ainsi la comparaison entre déculpabilisation et 
compétition pour le statut social dans la provision privée des biens publics. 
Lorsque les agents sont intrinsèquement impulsés, c‟est-à-dire qu‟ils contribuent 
essentiellement aux biens publics dans le but de soulager leur culpabilité d‟avoir 
indirectement participé à leur dégradation, ils tendent à se comporter en passagers 
clandestins. En revanche, lorsque les agents sont extrinsèquement impulsés et se 
mettent en compétition pour atteindre du statut social qu‟ils visent par le 
financement des biens publics à titre privé, leurs contributions deviennent des 
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compléments stratégiques. Dans ce cas, le niveau agrégé des biens publics croît 
avec la réduction des écarts de revenus entre les agents. Injecter de la compétition 
pour le statut social dans des fonctions d‟utilité augmente les contributions aux 
biens publics, et donc leur niveau global, faisant de la concurrence une incitation 
féconde pour résoudre le problème du passager clandestin. 
 
0.6. Les recommandations de politique publique 
 
Quatre recommandations découlent de ce travail de recherche, à savoir que 
nous suggérons de : (1) conduire des expériences de marchés simulés et répéter 
des sessions de marché pour évaluer les préférences environnementales ; évaluer 
à la fois les deux indices de bien-être ; (2) privilégier les mécanismes d’enchères 
tels que BDM et l’enchère aléatoire au nième prix, pour la raison qu’ils sont 
capables de réduire, voire supprimer, l’écart initial entre les indices en sessions 
répétées ; si l’écart persiste, considérer les valeurs comme une fourchette révélée 
par l’ensemble des individus ; (3) tolérer l’influence des prix de compensation 
signalés sur la licitation, celle-ci révélant la rationalité limitée des individus 
plutôt que leur imposture ; (4) inciter à la provision privée des biens publics, et 
encourager la compétition pour le statut social par la mise en valeur de ce type 
d’actions, tout en s’assurant de transferts de revenu des individus à haut revenu 
vers des individus à bas revenu afin que la compétition existe. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Imperfect Substitutability in Standard 
and Reference-Dependence Models 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept indices in nonmarket valuation. In the literature, the substitution effect and the 
endowment effect are presumed to cause the disparities. We show that imperfect 
substitutability in the indirect utility function can lead to disparity either between 
WTA and WTP – due to the opportunity loss – or between gains and losses, which 
reflects a net loss. Context-dependent valuation accentuates the imperfect 
substitutability, but the substitution effect is bounded inside the behavioral model of 
loss aversion. 
 
Keywords: contingent valuation, WTP-WTA disparity, substitution effect, loss 
aversion 
JEL Classification: D61, D81, Q51 
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"A thing does not have value because it costs, 
as people suppose; instead it costs because it 
has a value." Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The debate on how policy-makers compare the benefits derived from one 
public plan against another has been led by the cost-benefit analysis. In this debate, 
the quest for revealing nonmarket values induced the direct contingent valuation 
method based on the Hicksian C  and E , i.e. the individual‟s maximum willingness-
to-pay (or best offer) to guarantee the change and the minimum willingness-to-accept 
(or reservation price) to sacrifice the change. 
Empirical and experimental studies have given evidence of large disparity 
between WTP and WTA, which makes impractical the use of values estimates 
derived from the contingent valuation. Experimental laboratory markets confirmed 
persistency in disparities (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Brookshire and Coursey 1987). 
To justify the disparity, theorists invoked the substitution effect or the context-
dependent endowment effect, and oriented the effects in rivalry. The substitution 
effect results from the agent‟s imperfect trade-off between private goods and public 
goods. The loss aversion output, that is, the endowment effect, makes agents value 
losses higher than equivalent gains. Morrison (1997) asserts that the endowment 
effect and the substitution effect play a combined role in the disparity. 
To be loss averse, an agent has to consider herself an owner of the public 
good. In general, dealing with substitution rather than endowment allows to study the 
consumers‟ behavior without the constraint of the initial allocation of property rights. 
As Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) emphasizes, the property rights remain difficult to 
establish, guarantee, or to legitimate in public policies, whereas in a market, the price 
of a good or service signals the value of the resources; agents adjust their preferences 
and make necessary substitutions. We consider a gain in the environmental level as a 
non-essential right. In reverse, a compensation for a loss of the environmental level is 
an essential right that agents express by means of high valuation statements. This 
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distinction explains the difference between the standard disparity and the gain and 
loss disparity in terms of the property rights. 
This chapter brings out three elements. First, through convex preferences or 
quasi-concave utility functions, where agents prefer mixed over extreme consumption 
bundles of private and public goods, we show that, akin to the standard disparity 
between WTP and WTA, the gain and loss disparity is prone to imperfect 
substitutability. Second, the nature of the disparities is different, simply because 
agents do not tolerate a loss in the same way they bear a foregone gain. Inside the 
neoclassical paradigm, the substitution effect works as an opportunity loss
2
: the lower 
the substitutability, the higher the opportunity loss. But the utility of an agent does not 
change along the indifference curve. At worst, an agent faces the status quo. On the 
contrary, when an agent is asked to value the loss of the public good and to weigh this 
loss against an equivalent gain, the opportunity loss becomes a net loss. The net loss 
is a critical change, for agents attach a high value to the goods or services they cannot 
regain. They use the status quo as a reference point to switch to a steeper indifference 
curve. This would be the endowment effect, or what Kahneman and Tversky refer to 
as loss aversion in their behavioral model. Finally, we emphasize that the substitution 
effect – proved to be infinite in the Hicksian context – is bounded inside the 
behavioral model of loss aversion. 
We recall the basic account of the neoclassical model in Section 1.2, we 
provide clarifications of the substitution effect in Section 1.3 and the endowment 
effect in Section 1.4. We scrutinize loss aversion through imperfect substitutability in 
Section 1.5, and we study boundedness within imperfect substitutability in Section 
1.6. Concluding comments are given in Section 1.7. 
 
1.2. The standard model 
 
According to Hicksian theory, an agent has preferences over nonnegative 
quantities of goods and her preference ordering is transitive, continuous, 
                                                 
2
 By analogy to finance, consider the foregone opportunity to improve the level of the public as an 
opportunity cost of an interest in a bank account. 
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nondecreasing and convex
3
. Assume an agent has convex preferences for market 
private goods x  and some public good such as the environmental quality q . She can 
vary the quantity of consumption of the x ‟s, whereas the quantity of q  is taken to be 
fixed to her. Her preferences are quasi-concave in utility
4
 of the x ‟s and represented 
by a continuous and nondecreasing utility function  ,u u x q  which is twice 
differentiable
5
. The agent faces a budget constraint based on her income y  and the 
prices of the private goods p . She maximizes her utility subject to a budget 
constraint:  
 
 max , subject to i i
x
u x q p x y          [1] 
 
According to [1], the program yields the Marshallian ordinary direct demand 
functions ix . Substituting them as functions of  ,p y  gives the indirect utility 
functions which represent agent‟s preference ordering.  v   is continuous, decreasing, 
and quasi-convex: 
 
 , ,iix h p q y  for 1,...,i n          [1a] 
    , , , , ,u h p q y q v p q y          [1b] 
 
                                                 
3
 The completeness of preferences implies that utility is complete. When preferences satisfy 
completeness and transitivity, preferences are considered to be rational. In addition, when they satisfy 
continuity, the utility function is continuous. At last, when preferences are monotonic, utility is 
nondecreasing. 
4
 A quasi-concave utility function means that preferences are convex, that is: for all x  and q , and any 
 , 0 1  ,        1 min ,u x q u x u q    . It ensures the preference ordering. 
5
 This assumption eliminates kinks in the indifference curves. 
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The agent‟s consumption of  qx,  can also be obtained through a program 
that minimizes her expenditures  i ii p x  based on her utility level constraint 
 qxu , : 
 
  min subject to ,i i
x
p x u u x q          [2] 
 
Its resolution gives the expenditure or cost function
6
 or the minimum amount 
of income necessary to achieve an attainable utility level at least as high as u , given 
the price vector p : 
  
   , , , ,iie p q u p g p q u  for 1,...,i n        [2a] 
 
The expenditure function is jointly continuous in  , ,p q u , strictly increasing 
in u , positively linear homogenous, and concave in  ,p q . Its derivative with respect 
to y  gives the cost-minimizing demand function or the Hicksian compensated 
demand function that delivers optimal quantities at various prices. Moreover, the 
income is compensated in such a way as to leave utility unchanged: 
 
 , ,iix g p q u  for 1,...,i n          [2b] 
 
So far, preferences are just as well represented by both the indirect utility 
function and the expenditure function: 
 
 , , , ,u v p q e p q u                [3] 
 , , , ,y e p q v p q y               [4] 
                                                 
6
 The expenditure function is twice differentiable due to the assumption that the utility function is 
differentiable. 
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The standard Hicksian welfare measures deal with changes in prices (from 0p  
to 1p ) while q  and y  are left unchanged. These changes have an impact on the 
indirect utility functions. The compensating variation C is the maximum amount of 
income that could be taken from an agent who gains from a particular change while 
leaving her no worse-off than before the change. The equivalent variation E is the 
minimum amount that an agent who gains from a particular change would be willing 
to accept to forego the change after it has taken place. 
 
Definition 1.1.: C and E are implicitly and explicitly defined by: 
   0 1, , , ,v p q y v p q y C   and  0, ,C y e p q u   
   1 0, , , ,v p q y v p q y E   and  1, ,E e p q u y   
 
Now assume changes occur in the levels of the environmental quantity
7
. If q  
changes from 0q  to 1q , the agent‟s utility changes from 0u  to 1u :  
 
 0 0, ,u v p q y  
 1 1, ,u v p q y  
 
These changes will also have an impact on the expenditure functions. The 
welfare measure is the change in expenditure necessary to hold the utility constant, at 
the two quantity sets. We can write C and E as the difference between the minimal 
expenditure before the change and minimal expenditure after the change given utility 
levels 0u  and 1u : 
 
                                                 
7
 This model does not consider irreversible environmental damages. Therefore, the individual can 
always increase the level of the environmental quality and then recover some utility level. 
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     
 1
0
0
0 1 0 0 1 0
, ,
, , , , , , ,
q
q
e p q u
C C q q p y e p q u e p q u dq
q

    

   [3a] 
     
 1
0
1
0 1 0 1 1 1
, ,
, , , , , , ,
q
q
e p q u
E E q q p y e p q u e p q u dq
q

    

   [3b] 
 
The superscripts 0 and 1 indicate the situation before and after the change. C 
equals the maximum amount of money an agent could give up in situation 1 without 
being worse-off than in situation 0. E equals the minimum amount of money an agent 
would require in situation 0 to attain the utility in situation 1. C and E depend on the 
starting and ending values of q , and the value of  ,p y  at which the change takes 
places.  
In terms of the indirect utility function, C and E are plugged as follows: 
 
   0 0 1, , , ,u v p q y v p q y C           [4a] 
   1 1 0, , , ,u v p q y v p q y E           [4b] 
 
Be it with indirect utility function or expenditure function, the concepts of 
WTP and WTA can be derived from the Hicksian paradigm. Depending on the 
direction of the change, C and E may be positive or negative. When the change 
improves utility or 0u  , C  is the agent‟s maximum willingness-to-pay to 
guarantee the improvement and E  is the agent‟s minimum willingness-to-accept to 
forego the improvement. When the change deteriorates utility or 0u  , C  is the 
agent‟s minimum willingness-to-accept to tolerate the deterioration and E  is the 
agent‟s maximum willingness-to-pay to avoid it. This property is obtained by 
reversing the initial and final levels (see Table 1.1.) Indeed, Ebert (1984) proves that 
the welfare measures possess the property of circularity. Therefore, C  and E  are 
symmetric or    0 1 1 0, ,C q q E q q  . From [4a] and [4b], we get: 
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    0 1 1 0, , , , , ,C q q p y E q q p y   
   0 1 1 0, , , , , ,E q q p y C q q p y  . 
 
Table 1.1. Four welfare indices 
 
decline ( 1 0 0u u  ) growth ( 1 0 0u u  ) 
WTAC   WTPC   
WTPE   WTAE   
 
As pioneered by Mäler (1974) and taken over by Hanemann (1991), suppose 
now an agent can pay for the environmental quality as if it were marketed. She thus 
pays for q  in this hypothetical market at some implicit price  . The standard price 
flexibility of income can be interpreted as the income elasticity of demand for the 
environmental quality. We then fix the following programs: 
 
 max , subject to i i
x
u x q p x q y           [5] 
 
,
min subject to ,i i
x q
p x q u u x q           [6] 
 
From which we obtain the following indirect utility function and expenditure 
function: 
 
     ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , ,v p q y v p p q u u p q u q             [5a] 
     ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , ,i qie p u p g p u g p u            [6a] 
 
The derivative of the Marshallian demand function with respect to  , ,p q y  
gives the indirect utility function. Inverted, it gives  , i.e. the inverse demand 
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function to obtain q  supplied at  ˆ  . In this case, the agent‟s income must be 
supplemented so she can both afford q  and the x ‟s: 
 
 ˆ , ,qix h p q y q            [5b] 
 ˆ , ,p q y            [5c] 
 
The derivative of the expenditure function with respect to  , ,p q u  gives the 
Hicksian compensated demand function ix . Inverted, it gives the inverse 
compensated demand price  ˆ  , that is, the price that would induce her to purchase 
q  units if her income were increased: 
 
 ˆ , ,qix g p u           [6b] 
 ˆ , ,p q u            [6c] 
 
The two inverse demand functions are: 
 
   ˆ ˆ, , , , , ,p q y p q v p q y             [5'c] 
   ˆ ˆ, , , , , ,p q u p q e p q u             [6'c] 
 
From [5'c] and [6'c] it follows that:  
 
   0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , ,p q u p q y            [7a] 
 1 1 1ˆ , ,p q u     1ˆ , ,p q y         [7b] 
 
[5] differs with [1] on  ˆ , ,p q u q  . The expenditure function and the 
compensated demand function are equal, thus the inverse compensated demand 
function for q  becomes: 
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   ˆ, , , , , ,q
e
e p q u p q e p q u
q


     
          [8] 
 
The inverse demand  ˆ   measures shadow or virtual prices, or marginal 
valuation, or marginal WTP or WTA to pay for a unit of q  by the agent, i.e. the 
marginal rate of substitution between the x ‟s and q . As the inverse of indirect utility 
functions yields the expenditures functions, the inverse of direct utility functions 
gives indirect expenditure functions. Combining [5'c] and [6'c] with [4a] and [4b] and 
using Shepard‟s Lemma yields the following: 
 
 
 
 
1 1
0 0
0
0 1 0
, ,
ˆ, , , , ,
q q
q q
e p q u
C C q q p y dq p q u dq
q


   
 
    [9a] 
 
 
 
1 1
0 0
1
0 1 1
, ,
ˆ, , , , ,
q q
q q
e p q u
E E q q p y dq p q u dq
q


   
 
    [9b] 
 
 Thus WTP and WTA can be expressed by way of the integral of inverse 
compensated demand curves for a change in quantities from 0q  to 1q . The distinction 
between WTP and WTA is the level of utility the compensation is designed to reach: 
0u  and 1u  respectively. 
 
Welfare measures can also be defined by a distance function (Ebert 1984). 
The distance function is a utility function normalized by monetary income, i.e. a 
monotonic transformation of the direct utility function for fixed quantities: 
 
( , , )d d x q u                     [10a] 
 
 d   is continuous, decreasing in u , increasing and positively linear 
homogenous, and concave in x . The Shephard‟s input distance function has been 
introduced to consumer theory and defined in terms of the utility function (Deaton 
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1979). The derivatives of  d   with respect to  ,x q  give a set of inverse 
compensated demand functions:  
 
  , , , ,iix a x q d x q u  for 1,...,i n                  [10b] 
 
ia  is the normalized price of q  with respect to income. The distance function 
can be interpreted as an indirect expenditure function. Indeed, duality results show 
that the expenditure (cost) function is a distance function derived from the indirect 
utility function (Blackorby et al. 1978). Apart from the monotonicity and definition 
over different arguments, the expenditure function and the distance function share the 
same properties. If we consider the distance function for quantity changes, it is a dual 
to the expenditure function for fixed quantities and can be used to examine the 
welfare effects of quantity changes. To recover (non-normalized) monetary measures, 
the welfare measures must be multiplied by income. Thus, C and E are defined by: 
 
    0 0 1 0, , , ,C y d x q u d x q u                   [11a] 
    0 1 1 1, , , ,E y d x q u d x q u                   [11b] 
 
Using Shepard‟s Lemma, the latter reduces to: 
 
  
1
0
0, , , ,
q
q
C a x q yd x q u dq                   [12a] 
  
1
0
1, , , ,
q
q
E a x q yd x q u dq                   [12b] 
 
 C and E are measured by the area under the compensated inverse demand 
curves from 0q  to 1q  with the old and new utility levels, respectively. 
 Let us now compare those areas in order to see whether positive and negative 
changes induce the same consumer behavior. 
 
34 
1.3. The substitution effect 
  
When goods are available in a market at no cost, there is a regular 
intermediate monetary exchange of commodities, which involves a linear indifference 
curve for the x ‟s and q . If there is disparity, it depends on the constant price 
flexibility of income, i.e. the elasticity of the marginal valuation of q  with respect to 
the x ‟s (or y  that buys the x ‟s):  
 
   
1
0
0 0ˆ, , , ,
q
y y u
q
C
C v p q y p q u dq
y


 
 
                [13a] 
   
1
0
1 1ˆ, , , ,
q
y y u
q
E
E v p q y p q u dq
y


 
 
               [13b] 
 
If 0y yC E   and if  2 0que e q u     , E C . Indeed, the second cross-
partial derivative que  reflects the substitution effect. A null substitution effect 
involves linear indifference curves and null opportunity loss. Due to perfect 
substitutability, agents are indifferent to the variations of the public good, because 
they can always adjust the level of the x ‟s to maintain their utility constant. One 
interpretation could be that they feel unconcerned by the changes in the level of the 
public good. Another interpretation could be that they are unconditionally ready to 
substitute the public good with some private good. The usual proposition results from 
the above. 
 
Proposition 1.1.: When the welfare change is induced by q , due to imperfect 
substitutability or low elasticity of substitution between q  and the x ‟s, there is values 
disparity. It can be infinite in the limit. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
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 The substitution effect reflects the convex curvature of the indifference curve 
between q  and the x ‟s and the convexity of the expenditure function in q . Ebert 
(1993) claims that quasi-concavity of the indirect utility function  v  , jointly with 
the normality of the public good, is necessary and sufficient to obtain WTA superior 
to WTP. If the combinations of  ,x q  lead to the same level of utility, it is in the 
interest of an agent to have a convex mixture of goods, for it never decreases utility.  
Fig. 1.1. illustrates a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between the 
x ‟s and q  with quasi-concave utility functions. As q  rises from 0q  to 1q , utility 
increases from 0u  to 
1u . Displacements of the indifference curves reflect unitary 
income elasticity. As can be seen, WTA WTP . The trade-off between 
environmental quality and the private good turns out to be less and less attractive: the 
marginal utility from environmental quality upgrading is diminishing. Vice versa, it 
means that the marginal loss of environmental quality is increasing. In any case, the 
lower the elasticity of substitution between q  and the x ‟s – or to be more accurate, 
between q  and the x ‟s that y  buys – the broader the disparity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. A change in q  and imperfect substitution with the x ’s 
 
q 
q
1
 q
0
 0 
y 
 0 0, ,u v p q y
 1 1, ,u v p q y
WTP
WTA
y 
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Regarding the distance function, in presence of a normal good, the inverse 
compensated demand curve  0, ,a x q u  lies below the inverse compensated demand 
curve  1, ,a x q u  for the reason that scale effects depend on the elasticity of 
substitution between q  and the x ‟s. In the presence of two goods, Park (1997) finds 
that the Hicks elasticity of substitution equals the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of 
substitution. The difference between WTP and WTA thus arises whenever 
substitutability is imperfect. 
What happens to the consumer‟s behavior if we now distinguish foregone 
gains from real losses? 
 
1.4. Imperfect substitutability and the endowment effect 
 
 Hanemann (1991) points out in his footnote 25 that Kahneman and Tversky‟s 
(1979) loss aversion, observed from some reference point, differs from the standard 
disparity. Indeed, in the Hicksian framework, preferences over consumption bundles 
are independent of initial endowments. In reference to the gain and loss perspective, 
Thaler (1980) proposed the term endowment effect. When an agent is endowed with a 
good, her reference point changes, she shifts her position on the map, and the shape of 
her indifference curve is altered. 
If we adapt the standard framework to the loss aversion idea, a gain or a loss 
in q  can be written 1 0q q    and 
1 0q q   , with 0 . Assume agent‟s utility is 
affected by variations of the environmental quality level q . In this case, her utility 
 0 0, ,u v p q y , which now involves a single indifference curve, changes either to 
u  in a case of a gain or to u  in case of a loss:  
 
 0, ,u v p q y                      [14a] 
 0, ,u v p q y                      [14b] 
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Bateman et al. (1997) define two additional measures, identified with some 
reference point. Regarding the first measure, the question is what additional amount 
of private consumption is as preferable as an increase in the environmental quality. 
This is the equivalent gain, equal to WTA. Regarding the second measure, the 
question is what loss of private consumption would be just as preferable as a decrease 
in the environmental quality. This is the equivalent loss, equal to WTP. 
When the agent is endowed, fixing a gain and a loss in [3a] and [3b] or [4a] 
and [4b] gives the following relationships: C  or compensating gain is the maximum 
amount she would pay to secure the gain; E  or equivalent gain is the minimum 
amount she would accept to sacrifice the gain; E  or equivalent loss is the 
maximum amount she would give up to avoid the loss; C  or compensating loss is 
the minimum amount she would accept to tolerate the loss. The summary is 
recapitulated in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2. Welfare indices and context-dependence 
 
loss (
1 0q q   ) gain (
1 0q q   ) 
WTAC    0  WTPC   0  
WTPE    0  WTAE   0  
 
 Unlike the standard disparity alias  WTA WTP   or  WTA WTP  , where 
changes go in the same direction, a gain and loss disparity is computed differently, 
simply because we observe changes that depart in opposite directions from some 
reference point. Here, we subtract WTA to tolerate the loss and WTP to guarantee the 
gain or  WTA WTP  . From [3a] and [3b], it follows: 
 
       1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0, , , , , , , ,C C e p q u e p q u e p q u e p q u                            [15a] 
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 Since the utility function  qxu ,  is quasi-concave in  qx, , when q  increases 
the expenditure function  0, ,e p q u  decreases, i.e. is convex in q , since less income 
is necessary to attain the fixed utility level. The second reaction is that the indirect 
utility function  yqpv ,,  is quasi-concave in  yq, , which means that the cross-
partial derivative only implies the substitution effect  2 2qqe e q   . As a matter of 
fact, the income effect – the spacing of the indifference curves – does not count, for 
gain and loss perspective involves a single indifference curve 0u  observed from some 
positive and negative change, thus: 
  
WTA WTP 0                      [15b] 
 
Proposition 1.2.: Imperfect substitutability between q  and the x ‟s in the indirect 
utility function causes disparity either between WTP and WTA or between gain and 
loss, independently from the reference. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
Fig. 1.2. illustrates the four measures, observed from some reference 
coordinates  0 ,q y . Grey curves depict the same pre-endowed utility 0u  observed 
from two reference points. Through the incursion of context-dependence, the utility 
changes from 0u  to either u  (a gain in utility) or u  (a loss in utility). The reference 
point for WTA  and WTP  is G. Viewed from G, the distance from 0q  to 1 0q q    
is a gain in level of the environmental quality. For WTA  and WTP  the reference 
point is L. Viewed from L, the distance from 0q  to 1 0q q    is perceived as a loss 
in level of the environmental quality. The endowment effect induces the pivoting of 
the indifference curve from the reference point, which illustrates the discontinuity in 
the slope from 
0u  to u  or u . The steeper the indifference curve, the less the 
substitutability between q  and the x ‟s that y  buys. 
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 The difference between WTA  and WTA , which is essential to distinguish 
the standard disparity from the gain and loss disparity, lies in the way the loss is 
perceived. In the first case, the agent is asked to state her value to give up a gain from 
an increase in the environmental quality. This is an opportunity loss. This cannot be a 
right. In the second case, the agent is asked to state her value to suffer a loss from a 
decrease in environmental quality. 
 
.  
 
Fig. 1.2. Reference-dependent preferences 
 
This is a net loss and it differs from the former. The difference is due to imperfect 
substitutability, for agents take more account of the goods they can not regain. When 
agents are asked to value their losses in monetary terms, the behavioral effect of loss 
aversion arises and they shift their indifference curves. They know they have the right 
to be compensated for the loss and claim this right in form of high WTA  statements. 
 Transitivity implies that whenever WTA > WTA   and WTA > WTP  , 
WTA > WTP  . 
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1.5. Imperfect substitutability and loss aversion 
 
 In their 1991 article, Tversky and Kahneman propose the behavioral 
reference-dependent theory as an alternative to the Hicksian theory of preferences. 
Outcomes are now valued using a value (utility) function where agents have 
preferences over goods relative to some reference level  ,x qr r  seen as the status quo. 
According to them, (i) all is perceived as a gain or a loss; (ii) losses are weighted 
more heavily than gains or agents are loss averse; and (iii) the marginal value of gains 
or losses exhibits diminishing sensitivity. They assume that preferences are transitive, 
continuous and nondecreasing (but not convex).  
 If  ,x qr r  stands for the reference points for consuming  qx, , the utility 
function changes to  , , ,x qu u x q r r ; the demand functions take the form of 
 , , , ,ii x qx h p q y r r  and  , , , ,ii x qx h p q u r r ; the indirect utility is now 
 , , , ,x qv p q y r r  just as is the expenditure function  , , , ,x qe p q y r r . These new 
functions are discontinuous at the reference point (Putler 1992). Fig. 1.3. shows a 
typical loss aversion curve observed within the context of welfare measurement. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3. Loss aversion in welfare measures 
q 
0 
WTA
– 
WTP
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qq r
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 The additive formulation of the constant loss aversion model used by Tversky 
and Kahneman gives the following indirect utility function: 
 
     , R q yi q i yu v q y q r y r               [16] 
  
with R' 0 . Parameters qi  and 
y
i , for 1,2i   and 1i  , are defined as coefficients 
of loss aversion for dimensions qr  and yr . They magnify the disutility of losing some 
environmental quality. When the agent perceives a change as a gain, this coefficient 
amounts to 1 1  , which means that the agent has neoclassical utility. When she 
perceives a loss, this coefficient amounts to 2 >1 . We can see that  2 1> 1
q q    and 
 2 1> 1
y y   .  
 
Definition 1.2.: The change from the reference level qr  to either a gain qr
  or a loss 
qr
 , while yr y , gives the following: 
1 1
2 2
if 0 and if 0
if < 0 and if 0
q q y y
i q i y
q q y y
i q i y
q r y r
q r y r
   
   
      

    
 
  
 In terms of coefficients of loss aversion, the welfare measures matrix becomes 
what is shown in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3. Welfare indices in a gain and loss perspective 
 
loss ( q qr r
   ) gain ( q qr r
   ) 
2 1 WTA
q y     1 2 WTP
q y     
2 2 WTP
q y     1 1 WTA
q y     
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 Since 1 1 1
q y   , 2
2
< q
y



  or +WTP < WTA .  If we invert the function 
 R  , i.e.  ,y e q u  is the inverse of  ,u v q y  with  R yi yy r  , and 
differentiate it with respect to u , the following disparity arises: 
 
 
     
 
   
2
' if
, '
if <
q
i q
u
q
i qy
u u q r
e q u u
u q r
  

 

  

 


       [17] 
 
where    1R     and ' 0  . 
 
The indirect utility function is quasi-concave because of the monotone 
transformation  R   in [16]. Moreover,  qi qq r   is a concave function of q , which 
illustrates the gain and loss disparity with decreasing sensitivity to losses. Since 
2 >1
y , when q  increases ue  decreases, which implies the negativity of the derivative 
que  from changes in q . As a result, we get back to the standard disparity between 
WTP and WTA. 
Recall that the curvature of the indifference curves shows diminishing 
marginal utility between the consumption bundles, and thus the standard WTA-WTP 
disparity. Furthermore, it generates disparity between gain and loss because of the 
imperfect substitution in the indirect utility function between y  and some function of 
the environmental quality q . Through the discontinuity in the slope at the reference 
point, loss aversion theory implies convex indifference curves. On that subject, 
Hanemann (1999) argues that the assumption of quasi-concave utility function 
suffices to observe convexity. Quasi-concavity with inversely proportional disparity 
to the substitution effect can explain the disparity between gain and loss. The 
endowment effect within loss aversion can be explained through less than perfect 
substitutability. 
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The behavioral theory of loss aversion also works with distance effects. In 
terms of the distance function, it is a matter of distance between coordinates of some 
level of y  or q  and the agent‟s reference point. In this case, the function becomes 
 , , , ,x qd x q u r r . Adding coefficients of loss aversion into the distance function yields 
now a weighted distance function of the form:  
 
     , , R
p p
q y
i q i yd d x q u q r y r 
     
  
      [18] 
 
where 1p   denotes the metric. When 1p  , the distance is measured as the sum of 
weighted absolute differences. We then fall on [16]. The distance function recovers 
from the expenditure function. Therefore, imperfect substitutability can once again 
explain the gain and loss disparity. 
 
1.6. Imperfect substitutability and boundedness 
  
 Randall and Stoll (1980) demonstrate that the disparity between WTP and 
WTA is bounded by the ratio between the price flexibility of income and endowment. 
Cook and Graham (1977) assert that the compensation demanded for irreplaceable 
commodities, which we can assume to be imperfectly substitutable, depends on the 
initial level of wealth or endowment. As the probability of loss 1p  , WTA, 
dependent on the income that buys the x‟s, tends to infinity as the indifference curve 
is asymptotic to the vertical line at 1p  . This is what Amiran and Hagen (2003) also 
suggest in a slightly different manner: in presence of asymptomatically bounded 
utility functions, there exists an initial level of wealth sufficiently high to produce an 
infinite WTA
–
. Nevertheless, the substitution effect still plays a capital role, for it 
induces frictional trade-off between public and private goods. In terms of elasticity, 
the authors show that the income elasticity of the inverse compensated demand is 
bounded above and below by positive values independent of the amounts of public 
goods.  
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 In case of reference-dependent preferences, we believe that imperfect 
substitutability accentuates the pivoting of the indifference curve, which in turn can 
produce infinite compensation demanded. We replace the nonsatiation assumption by 
the assumption that for each level of income y, the status quo 1q  is strictly preferred 
to the net loss of the public good 0q  or    0 1, < ,u q y u q y  with 0 1<q q . A double 
outcome arises. The first outcome lies in the convex curvature of the indifference 
curve. In point of fact, imperfect substitutability induces a steeper slope for higher 
opportunity losses (see Fig. 1.4.: grey segment and arrow 1). The second outcome 
results from the enlargement of the substitution effect due to aversion of net losses, 
yielding clockwise rotation and, accordingly, a steeper slope of the initial indifference 
curve (see Fig. 1.4.: black segment and arrow 2).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4. Unboundedness of the compensation demanded 
 
Beyond some level of loss of the public good in view of their reference point, i.e. 
1 0q q  , standard agents ask for an infinite monetary compensation. Formally, this 
yields a level of monetary compensation s strictly inferior to the disutility of the loss: 
 
     1 0 0, > > ,u q y z q s u q y          [19] 
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Proposition 1.3.: In case of reference-dependent preferences and imperfect 
substitutability between q and the x‟s that y buys, large net losses of the public good 
can be infinitely uncompensated. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
 Hanemann (1999) points out that the wealth effect in Cook and Graham is not 
the income effect typically considered in consumer demand theory. While being true, 
let us recall that the income effect does not count within context-dependence. We 
therefore explain the infinite limit of WTA
–
 by the pivoting of the indifference curve 
from the reference (endowed) level of the public good. Again, this is a net loss 
perception magnifying the substitution effect. Contrary to Cook and Graham who find 
infinite WTA
–
 as the probability of losses moves towards one, our indifference curve 
is asymptotic to the vertical line at 0q , which shows infinite WTA
–
 when losses are 
severe and approach 0q . Unlike the previous models – which unquestionably 
consider substitutability as the mainspring for infinite monetary compensation – our 
design neither depends on the initial level of wealth or the initial endowment in 
market goods nor on the boundedness of the utility function. It rather depends on the 
severity of loss of the public goods combined with their unfeasibility to be perfectly 
substitutable. 
 In the behavioral loss aversion model, when an agent stands at  ,q xr r , that is, 
at the kink point, q  and y  are perfect substitutes, for she is equidistant to both 
references points and indifferent between the level of environmental quality and her 
income. Except these coordinates, any other point along the curve exhibits imperfect 
substitutability. As can be noticed in terms of distance minimization, above the kink 
point she substitutes the loss of the environmental quality with monetary 
compensation. Below is the opposite. Because of loss aversion, as   <0qq r   we 
have   0q qq r u r    . When q   goes farther from qr , additional decreases in 
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q  lead to smaller changes in utility, which yields 2 2 0u q   . In other terms, 
diminishing sensitivity implies a lower substitution effect in both gains and losses. 
Conversely to the standard model, the marginal disutility from environmental quality 
downgrading is decreasing as the agent moves from the reference point, implying a 
bounded value for compensation. 
 
Proposition 1.4.: Inside the behavioral theory of loss aversion, given constant 
diminishing sensitivity towards losses, the substitution effect is bounded. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
Hence, there is a difference between the Hicksian standard paradigm and loss 
aversion in the representation of context-dependence. If we superpose the 
indifference curves illustrating the willingness-to-accept to tolerate a loss, their 
respective curvatures reveal two types of behavior on the subject of losses. The grey 
segment represents the standard theory context-dependence. The black segment 
stands for the behavioral model of loss aversion (see Fig. 1.5.). 
 Inside the standard model, agents show increasing marginal disutility as 
1q   tends towards 0q . Inside the behavioral model, agents exhibit high loss 
aversion with small changes as regards their reference point, but they turn out to be 
less and less sensitive as 1 0q q  . Diminishing sensitivity of the marginal value of 
losses clarifies this phenomenon. The farther something moves from a reference 
point, the less additional changes should matter, which in our case surprisingly means 
increasing substitutability. This counter effect appears because agents are myopic, 
which makes them feel unconcerned by changes out of their visual field. As a 
consequence, they end up asking for a bounded amount of compensation, no matter 
the additional degradation of the environment. 
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Fig. 1.5. Comparison between reference-dependent indifference curves 
 
 The significance of it is non-negligible. In case of irreversible damages to the 
environment or high losses of public goods with regards to their initial level – 
commodities that we know to be imperfectly substitutable –, standard agents which 
turn out to be far-sighted will ask for an infinite monetary compensation, whereas loss 
aversion agents will ask for a bounded amount of compensation, and neither can 
adapt their reference points. While economists have long considered loss aversion to 
degenerate agents‟ rational preferences, we see that past some level of changes in q, it 
limits their proclivity towards abnormal valuation. 
 
1.7. Concluding remarks 
 
Applied to market valuation of the public goods, this chapter dealt with 
imperfect substitutability in both standard welfare and reference-dependence theories. 
Imperfect substitutability in the indirect utility function can provoke disparity either 
between WTA and WTP or between gain and loss. Further, the same quasi-concave 
utility functions can explain the endowment effect. 
What is the point of finding that imperfect substitutability plays a role in both 
the WTA and WTP disparity and the gain and loss disparity? According to the above, 
q 
0 
WTA
– 
y 
1
qq r
xy r
q
0–Δ 
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it basically means that agents‟ unwillingness to substitute an environmental good or 
service increases with its defective substitutability. When agents substitute a public 
good for a private good, an opportunity loss appears and induces the standard 
disparity. In case the scenario to price is a loss instead of a foregone gain, loss 
aversion transforms the opportunity loss in a net loss, which enlarges the initial 
disparity, for people heavily value things they cannot regain. Experimental findings 
from Boyce et al. (1992) and Chapman (1998) support this conclusion. At last, the 
substitution effect observed from some reference point has a bound inside the 
behavioral model of loss aversion. Whether agents should have infinite values for 
severe or irreversible losses might be the topic that decides which model better values 
environmental preferences. 
Yet, these common findings must be toned down. Valuing environmental 
goods or services calls for an understanding of the public and private benefits derived 
from the public good. This is partially ensured, as environmental commodities are 
unfamiliar to agents and their benefits for utility obscure in most cases. The risk of 
having naïve valuations is existent. Only an interactive market-like setting permits to 
surmount these limits, and hypothetical markets remain devoid of market interactions. 
Experimental markets are thus essential in the contingent valuation. In 
experimentation, the early disparity between welfare measures is redundant, 
supporting either of the two effects. But their confrontation occults the market 
efficiency which rules the economic valuation. Indeed, markets bound anomalies by 
means of ad hoc incentives, for they aid agents to correct their untruthful or naïve 
valuations. The next step consists in identifying, by probing into auction mechanisms, 
why some of them reduce the disparity better than others. As well, studying agents‟ 
context-dependent behavior faced with irreversible environmental damages and 
ambiguity – when they can adapt their reference points – is a matter of future 
research. 
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1.9. Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.1. 
 
The demonstration is as follows. After Randall and Stoll (1980), WTP and WTA for 
changes in public goods should not differ with small income effects. They bound 
 E C  via the income elasticity of demand (or income elasticity of willingness-to-
pay) of the public good. For example, when the price of a certain good one changes, 
the disparity amounts:  
 
   
1
1
0 1 1
1
1 0
1, , , ,
p
p p
p
E C e p q u e p q u dp   
   
 
or 
 
        
1
1 1, , , , , , , , , ,p u u y uE C e p q u g p q u g p q e p q u e p q u      
 
The income effect associated with good one – the second cross-partial derivative 
1
2
1p ue e p u     – establishes the size of the disparity, the limit being the 
individual‟s income. The bounding method carries over to welfare measures of the 
quantity changes. The analogous result for a change in q  gives the cross-partial 
derivative 
2
que e q u    , i.e. the substitutability of the nonmarket good by means of 
market goods: 
 
     
1
0
0 1, , , , , ,
q
q q qu
q
E C e p q u e p q u dq e p q u     
   
 
For a change in the public good‟s level, Hanemann (1991) demonstrates that the 
second cross-partial derivative que  reflects the substitution effect. Indeed, from [8] 
and the differentiation of the compensating demand function for q , we hold the 
derivative involved in changes in q  that impact on u : 
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    
 
 
By the Hicks decomposition, the precedent becomes:  
 
 
 
 
ˆ , ,
, , =
ˆ , ,
q
u
qu q
g p u
e p q u
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

        
 
This difference between WTP and WTA depends on the price flexibility of income 
and thus the ratio of the income elasticity of the ordinary demand function for q  to 
the elasticity of substitution between q  and the x ‟s8. The numerator represents the 
income effect of q  in the hypothetical market, established from the derivative of the 
demand function with respect to income. The denominator is the own-price derivative 
of the compensated demand function for q  and gives the aggregate Allen-Uzawa 
elasticity of substitution between q  and the private goods weighted by the budget 
share of the same private goods.  
 
Changes in prices and changes in q  both vary with income and depend on a cross-
partial derivative of the expenditure function. And when <0que , WTA is superior to 
WTP, for  ,u x q  being quasi-concave in  ,x q . The disparity is more influenced by 
the substitution effect because of the Engel adding-up restriction, which requires that 
the sum of the income elasticities of demand for the x ‟s and q , weighted by their 
budget shares, equals unity: limiting the magnitude of the income effect.       
 
Proof of Proposition 1.2. 
 
We focus on the disparity between gain and loss.  
                                                 
8
 That is Hanneman‟s (1991) equation 17. 
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the disparity between gain and loss to occur, 
i.e. WTA > WTP  , is that  yqpv ,,  is quasi-concave in  yp,  or that  0, ,e p q u  is a 
convex function of q . In this case, the second partial derivative qqe  must be strictly 
positive. Let us look at the expenditure function. 
 
The disparity arises because of the convexity of the initial indifference curve 0u . It 
follows from [3a] and [3b] that: 
 
       1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0, , , , , , , ,C C e p q u e p q u e p q u e p q u                
 
Which gives: 
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In parallel,  0 0, ,e p q u  can be rewritten as: 
 
    0 0 01, ,
2
e p q q u
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Substituting the precedent into the general inequality gives:  
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From which directly follows the convexity of the expenditure function of q . The 
expenditure function being convex, we have >0qqe . 
 
There is a disparity between gain and loss.           
 
Proof of Proposition 1.3. 
 
For 0 1q q   with >0 , we have  0 ,u u q y  and     , ,u q y u q y
   . Let us 
set      sup , ,z q y u q y u q y     for a level of monetary compensation such 
that the utility remains constant. For each 0q   we have    ,u q y z q . The 
supremum  z q  is increasing in q. This says that for each level of income y and for 
0 1<q q  we have    0 1, < ,u q y u q y  because the status quo is always preferred to the 
net loss of the public good.  
 
Let us set    1 1 =z q z q s   with > 0s  being the compensation equal to WTA. 
With  1z q  being the supremum for  1,u q y  and  1z q   being the supremum for 
 1u q   is there y  that gives    1 1, >u q y z q   or    1 1, >u q y z q s  ?  
 
We know that 0 1q q   so for any q and y we have    0 1z q z q  . By 
definition    1 1z q z q s    and    0 1z q s z q  . Moreover, we also know that 
   0 0 ,z q u q y  because    ,u q y z q  so    0 0, <u q y z q s .  
 
As    0 1z q s z q   we have    0 1,z q s u q y   and    0 1< ,z q s u q y  .  
 
From the above we see that      0 0 1, < < ,u q y z q s u q y         
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Proof of Proposition 1.4. 
 
Let us now prove that WTA is bounded within the behavioral model of loss aversion.  
 
One way comes directly from the construction of the model: according to diminishing 
sensitivity, smaller changes in   should be accompanied by smaller increases in y , 
the utility being constant, thus 2 2 0u q   .  
 
Another way is to look for a bound on the losses‟ side of the value function. 
  0, qq r      and some value function  
*Rv C   on 0, qr   which is concave 
and nonincreasing,  one has:       ' q q qv q v r q r v r    . The right-hand 
expression of the weak inequality is the tangent of v  at qr . When 0q   it gives 
      ' q q qv q v r r v r     which is independent of q  . Hence, the losses‟ side 
of the value function is bounded.            
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Private Valuation of a Public Good 
in Three Auction Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price 
auction – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept 
for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect can be eliminated 
with repetitions of the BDM mechanism. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-
price auction yields the highest speed of convergence to welfare indices‟ equality. 
Overall, we observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private 
subjective benefit derived from the public good funding. 
 
Keywords: contingent valuation, WTP-WTA gap, auctions, public good private 
provision 
JEL classification: C91, D44, Q53 
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"I have never known much good done 
by those who affected to trade for the 
public good." Adam Smith 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The experimental private provision of public goods based on the contingent 
valuation method is often used to value public goods such as health, safety or 
environment. Estimating preferences for public goods is however laborious, for 
individuals reveal behavioral biases during their valuation process. 
In accordance with the Coase theorem (Coase 1960), neoclassical theory 
postulates that with null income effect and close substitutes, the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP), which is the price at which an individual is ready to buy a commodity, and 
the willingness-to-accept (WTA), which is the price at which an individual is ready to 
sell the same commodity, should be equal (Randall and Stoll 1980, Hanemann 1991). 
If the good is available in an active market at the market price, an individual‟s WTP 
and WTA should be similar. And if people face similar transaction costs, WTP and 
WTA should be similar among people as well. Yet, experimental research that 
stemmed from contingent valuation studies has found large disparities between the 
WTP and WTA. The endowment effect, or loss aversion, as a behavioral feature is 
often invoked to explain the disparity. It occurs when people offer to sell a commonly 
available good in their possession at a substantially higher rate than they will pay for 
the identical good not in their possession. The other effect, promoted to explain the 
disparity, is imperfect substitutability. 
Two remedies help remove the initial disparity. The first corresponds to 
market settings. Market institutions serve as social tools that induce and reinforce 
individual rationality (Smith 1991). Gode and Sunder (1993) assert that an auction 
market exerts a powerful constraining force on individual behavior. Cherry et al. 
(2003) suggest that a dynamic market environment with repeated exposure to 
discipline is necessary to achieve rationality. When they act rationally, individuals 
refine their statements of value. List (2003a) provides evidence consistent with the 
notion that experience in bidding with an incentive-compatible auction can remove 
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the WTA/WTP gap. The second corresponds to market repetition. The motive for 
repeating auctions that are incentive-compatible is that individuals require experience 
to understand that sincere bidding is the dominant strategy (Coppinger et al. 1980) 
and to realize their true valuation of unfamiliar products (Shogren et al. 2000). Plott 
(1996) advances a discovered preference hypothesis argument, positing that 
responses reflect a type of internal search process in which subjects use practice 
rounds to discover their preferences. The experience they gain is reflected in their 
bidding behavior. Hence, the imperfect substitutability effect disappears when the 
value of the unfamiliar good is perfectly revealed. 
 Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are widely studied as a means of 
buying and selling resources. Auctions took part in the environmental valuation to 
answer two questions: (1) which effect counts the most in the WTP and WTA 
disparity? and (2) which of the auction mechanisms best removes this disparity? 
At first, Kahneman et al. (1990) report experimental evidence of the 
endowment effect. They perform an experiment on WTP and WTA by way of 
hypothetical telephone inquiry, trading environmental improvements and 
preparedness for disasters. They find that randomly assigned owners of an item 
require more money to separate from their possession than random buyers are willing 
to pay to acquire it. To elicit individuals‟ estimates, they use a Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak mechanism (BDM) – described later on – with random exogenous price 
feedback. According to their results, preferences are dependent on endowments, even 
in market settings. 
 Shogren et al. (1994) assert that Kahneman et al.‟s experiment creates 
artificial scarcity. They find no evidence of the endowment effect on trading candy 
bars, for the values converge over time. But, in the experiment with contaminated 
food – a good with imperfect substitutes that can be considered as nonmarketed – 
they show that the discrepancy remains significant after iteration. 
 Later on, Shogren et al. (2001) test three auction mechanisms to trade candy 
bars and mugs and suggest that the auction mechanism can itself account for the 
conflicting observations in experiments. In their experiments, they show that the 
common early disparity between WTP and WTA in auctions is not to be called into 
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question. However, the gap ebbs away under the Vickrey‟s second price auction 
(SPA) and random nth-price auction (NPA) – see Section 2 for further details – while 
it lasts under the BDM mechanism, implying that the endowment effect can be 
eliminated with repetitions of some market mechanisms. 
Horowitz (2006a) states that the BDM framework could be used to assess 
public WTP for public projects, with the distribution of costs equal to the project 
costs; and other valuation mechanism should be used if the behavioral evidence 
shows that mechanisms are equivalent. Lusk and Rousu (2006) suggest that NPA is 
preferable to BDM if the researcher is looking for true valuation above all. Lusk et al. 
(2007) conclude in their study of payoff functions that BDM and NPA "provide 
relatively strong incentives for truthful bidding for all individuals regardless of the 
magnitude of their true WTP". 
Seeing that findings suggest that the auction mechanism per se accounts for 
the conflicting observations across market settings, Plott and Zeiler‟s (2005) 
conclusion that the results differ from unsound experimental procedures is 
incomplete. 
This chapter builds on Shogren et al.‟s (2001) results. Which auction 
mechanism is the best and fastest at reducing the gap? Which mechanism should be 
preferred over another? While Shogren et al. (1994) support Hanneman‟s results, 
assuming that the low substitution elasticity for the nonmarket good explains the 
WTA/WTP gap, they do not advocate the institution capable of properly valuing 
nonmarket goods. Likewise, Shogren et al. (2001) use only private goods to compare 
the influence of auction mechanisms. Only List (2003b) gives credit to the use of the 
random nth-price auction in valuing nonmarket private goods, but he does not state 
whether his results carry over to public goods. 
We aim at studying private valuation of public goods without direct 
substitutes, so we put realistic public goods such as the carbon offset, which can be 
attained via tree planting, into auctioning. Public goods have two defining 
characteristics: non-excludability and non-rivalry. Offsetting carbon emission helps 
prevent the effects of climate change; it is considered as a public good because, once 
provided, everyone can enjoy the benefits without adversely affecting anyone else‟s 
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ability to do the same
9
. Rather then compulsory carbon trade, we institute voluntary 
trade to approach truthful valuation on both the bidder‟s (buyer‟s) and the offerer‟s 
(seller‟s) sides. On account of the common bias of nescience10 in valuing unfamiliar 
or public goods, we remind the subjects that they are part of the milieu, which makes 
them indirectly and partly accountable for the current level of greenhouse gases, as 
they solicit industries to produce goods they are willing to consume at some 
environmental cost; in our case, it is the paper and energy used by students to achieve 
their education
11
. 
By means of repetitive auction mechanisms, the initial disparity between WTP 
and WTA can be removed. Nevertheless, we obtain different results from preceding 
studies, in a sense that only the BDM mechanism is able to remove the gap in later 
bidding rounds. SPA and NPA, which are also incentive-compatible, do not succeed 
in removing the disparity between bids and offers. Still, when we submit our 
experimental results to the exponential regression, we notice that in spite of a large 
early gap, NPA yields the highest speed of convergence to welfare indices‟ equality, 
suggesting that it contains strong incentives for rational behavior. In addition, we 
observe that subjects are strongly motivated by the subjective private benefit from 
funding the public good (either due to warm-glow
12
 or to a concern for being 
formally identified as a contributor of the public good).  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
experimental design. Section 2.3 presents results and the analysis of data through 
standard and novel statistical tools. Section 2.4 provides discussion on how our 
results relate with existing work and present a new line of reasoning. We give some 
concluding remarks in Section 2.5.  
                                                 
9
 We insured the public good characteristic by providing to every subject, after couple of weeks, an 
email feedback on the aggregate offset achievement. 
10
 It reflects the absence of knowledge or the consideration that things are unknowable.  
11
 The money released from trading (buying and non-selling) was sent to a non-governmental 
organization that launched a plantation of 1,404 Mangrove trees in Sumatra, Indonesia. 
12
 Utility derived from the warm-glow (see Andreoni 1990) arises when the act itself of giving 
generates utility. It contrasts with the usual case where the individual only cares about the total amount 
of the carbon offset. 
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2.2. The experimental design 
 
We want to evaluate the impact of three incentive-compatible auction 
mechanisms in the measurement of WTP and WTA for a public good without 
substitutes. Our experiments were conducted during three sessions at the École 
Polytechnique. Different subjects took part in each of the three sessions (three types 
of auction mechanism) for a total of 102 participants, divided in three groups of 
subjects, which in turn were arbitrarily divided into two subgroups of buyers and 
sellers. Each subject received an identification number she filled in on each bid or 
offer, enabling her to be tracked whilst preserving her anonymity. The initial 
endowment distributed to the buyers was put forward to fund tree planting. On the 
WTP market-side, each buyer received EUR 15 and was asked to state her bid for a 
certificate of one ton of carbon offset (≤ EUR 15). If she won the bid, trees were 
planted in her name (this was acknowledged by a certificate). On the WTA market-
side, each seller was given a certificate of one ton of carbon offset she could keep, in 
which case trees were planted in her name, or sell. If she decided to sell the certificate 
on the offer she stated (≤ EUR 15), no trees were planted. Subjects ignored that the 
cost of offsetting one ton of carbon in a five-year period was EUR 15, which enabled 
to plant 36 trees
13
. 
 The parameters – recapitulated in the table below – of the experiments are the 
following: (i) 31 to 37 subjects participated per experiment; (ii) subjects were 
recruited among the voluntary students from the École Polytechnique
14
; (iii) the good 
put in auctioning was a certificate of one ton of carbon offset; (iv) none information 
on price was provided; (v) subjects received an initial balance of EUR 15 or a 
certificate of one ton of carbon offset as an endowment; (vi) ten trials per experiment 
were unfolded, one of which was randomly selected as the binding trial; and (vii) 
BDM, SPA and NPA auction mechanisms were tested. 
                                                 
13
 In accordance with the system of reference applied by the non-governmental organization. 
14
 Multi-cultural elite undergraduate students in science and engineering, salaried by the French 
Government. Their curriculum includes economics courses. 
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Comments on the experimental protocol: our goal is to question auction 
mechanisms‟ influence on the gap between WTP and WTA, and not to divulge the 
gap itself, for we consider it as an established fact, so we decide to put an upper-
bound on the sellers‟ choices in order to monitor which of the three market settings 
best replies to the early disparity. The bounds and endowments definitely create an 
anchoring effect, but there is no reason that it affects differently the three incentive-
compatible mechanisms. Then, we publicly suggested to the subjects that revealing 
truthful preferences is a neutral strategy which will not penalize them. At last, we 
pooled all performed rounds in the measurement of the gap. 
 
Market environment BDM SPA NPA 
Auctioned goods CO2 offset certificate CO2 offset certificate CO2 offset certificate 
Initially endowment EUR 15 EUR 15 EUR 15 
Sellers‟ bound EUR 15 EUR 15 EUR 15 
Number of trials 10 10 10 
Retail price information None provided None provided None provided 
Optimal responses explained Suggested Suggested Suggested 
Practice round performed Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Subject participation Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary 
Number of subjects 37 34 31 
 
The Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (BDM) 
 
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) introduce a mechanism under which 
buyers (respectively sellers) simultaneously state the highest (respectively lowest) 
amount they are willing to pay (respectively accept) for the good. In our experiment, 
each buyer and seller was asked to give, for each of the ten trials, independently and 
privately, her WTP or WTA by marking an "x" on a recording sheet that listed price 
intervals, such as in the following illustration. The price intervals ranged from EUR 
1–15, in increments of EUR 0.5. After collecting recording sheets from buyers and 
sellers, the monitor randomly selected one price from the list. If a buyer was willing 
to pay at least the random price for the certificate of one ton of carbon offset, she 
bought the item at that price. Otherwise, she did not buy the item. If a seller was 
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willing to accept a price lower than or equal to the random price for the certificate of 
one ton of carbon offset, she sold the item at that price. Otherwise, she did not sell the 
item. 
 
 I will buy (sell) I will not buy (sell) 
If the price is EUR 0.0 -- -- 
If the price is EUR 0.5 -- -- 
If the price is EUR 1.0 -- -- 
If the price is EUR 1.5 -- -- 
…   
If the price is EUR 14.0 -- -- 
If the price is EUR 14.5 -- -- 
If the price is EUR 15.0 -- -- 
 
The random price, all bids and offers, and the number of buyers and sellers 
willing to buy and sell at the random price were made public after each trial. At the 
end of the experiment, one of the trials was randomly selected as the binding trial for 
the take-home pay.  
 
The second-price auction mechanism (SPA) 
 
Under the Vickrey (1961) second-price auction, bidders and offerers operated 
simultaneously. Buyers were asked to record, for each of the ten trials, privately and 
independently, the maximum they were willing to pay for the certificate of one ton of 
carbon offset. In this case, buyers wrote a numerical value on the recording sheet. The 
monitor collected values and, after each trial, made all bids public, as well as the 
identification number of the highest bidder and the market-clearing price (second 
highest bid). The monitor gave each seller a certificate of one ton of carbon offset. 
For each trial, sellers wrote their minimum WTA to sell the certificate. After each 
trial, the monitor publicly diffused all offers, the identification number of the lowest 
offerer and the market-clearing price (second lowest offer). Like with BDM, after the 
tenth trial, the monitor randomly selected one of the trials as the binding trial for the 
take-home pay for both buyers and sellers. 
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The random nth-price auction mechanism (NPA) 
 
The random nth-price auction is conducted as follows (bidders and offerers 
operate simultaneously): (i) for each trial, each bidder submits a bid (resp. an offer) 
on a recording sheet; (ii) all bids are ranked from lowest to highest, all offers are 
ranked from highest to lowest; (iii) the monitor selects a random number  2,n N  
with N the number of bidders; (iv) the 1n  buyers who made the highest bids buy the 
certificate of one ton of carbon offset at the nth-price and the 1n  sellers who made 
the lowest offers sell the certificate of one ton of carbon offset at the nth-price. The 
value of n, all bids and offers, the buying and selling price, and the number of buyers 
and sellers willing to buy and sell at the random price, are made public after each 
trial. Once again, after the tenth trial, the monitor randomly selects one of the trials as 
the binding trial for the take-home pay for both buyers and sellers. 
 
The BDM, SPA and NPA mechanisms are incentive-compatible. It is not in a 
buyer‟s interest to understate her WTP; if the random buying price falls between the 
stated WTP and the true WTP, the buyer foregoes a beneficial trade. It is also not in a 
buyer‟s interest to overstate true WTP; if the random buying price is greater than the 
true value but less than the stated value, the buyer is required to buy the good at a 
price greater than her true WTP. The reasoning is identical for the seller. 
A complementary remark on NPA can be made. Contrary to SPA, subjects 
have
 
a nonnegative probability of winning the auction, which engages off-margin 
bidders and offerers who usually consider that they will be excluded from the market. 
As well, the endogenously determined market-clearing price prevents bidders and 
offerers from using the random market-clearing price as an indicator. 
 
2.3. The results 
 
Table 2.1. presents the summary statistics of the experimental results under 
BDM, SPA and NPA. In all experiments, bidding behavior in the initial trial does 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics of the BDM, SPA and NPA mechanisms 
 
H0: Mean WTP – Mean WTA = 0; H1: Mean WTP – Mean WTA < 0 
a
 t-test: reject H0 at the 5% level 
Auction Value measure 
 
Trial 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
             
BDM WTP Mean          6.18             7.11             7.82             8.11             8.29             8.66             8.39             8.71             8.82              8.61    
 N=19 Median          5.00             5.50             6.50             6.50             7.00             7.00             7.00             7.50             7.50              7.50    
  Variance       12.51          15.52          15.39          15.43          15.09          15.86          15.27          14.62          14.37            17.74    
 WTA Mean       10.53             9.47             9.56             8.42             8.92             8.69             9.53             9.19             8.67              8.06    
 N=18 Median       10.00          10.00          10.00             8.75             9.50             9.75          10.00          10.00             9.75              8.25    
  Variance          6.07          12.34          18.03          18.60          20.95          21.53          19.75          16.86          17.79            20.97    
 Ratio of mean WTA/WTP           1.70             1.33             1.22             1.04             1.08             1.00             1.13             1.06             0.98              0.94    
 t-test of meansa     –3.85         –1.46         –0.83         0.27         0.06         0.46         –0.39         0.09         0.58         0.91    
             
SPA WTP Mean          3.47             3.91             4.69             5.43             5.68             5.71             6.01             6.50             5.46              6.59    
 N=17 Median          3.00             4.10             5.00             5.60             5.80             6.05             7.00             7.00             7.00              7.00    
  Variance          9.64             6.68             5.52             5.42             6.15             7.71             8.86          14.50          12.56            10.04    
 WTA Mean       10.66             8.74             8.47             9.07             8.59             9.82             9.40             8.32             9.52              9.23    
 N=17 Median       10.00             9.00             8.00             9.00             7.00          10.00             8.00             8.00             8.00              8.00    
  Variance       16.60          19.56          14.03          22.27          20.72          29.45          29.44          32.86          26.44            30.86    
 Ratio of mean WTA/WTP           3.07             2.23             1.81             1.67             1.51             1.72             1.57             1.28             1.75              1.40    
 t-test of meansa      –5.28         –3.41         –3.06         –2.35         –1.78         –2.30         –1.78         –0.59         –2.21         –1.20    
             
NPA WTP Mean          3.97             3.98             4.77             4.93             4.77             5.19             6.18             6.12             6.85              6.72    
 N=15 Median          2.50             4.00             5.00             5.12             5.14             5.01             7.00             6.50             7.00              7.26    
  Variance       12.67             6.92             4.83             4.30             5.40             6.33             5.81             6.54             7.77            10.03    
 WTA Mean       10.75          10.52          10.29          10.22             9.86             9.05             9.17             9.14             9.23              9.37    
 N=16 Median       10.50          10.00             9.74             9.65             8.77             8.50             8.49             8.35             8.09              8.50    
  Variance       10.19             6.99             6.32             9.46          10.31          13.75          16.67          13.30          14.08            20.64    
 Ratio of mean WTA/WTP           2.71             2.64             2.16             2.07             2.07             1.74             1.48             1.49             1.35              1.39    
 t-test of meansa      –5.06         –6.45         –6.21         –5.17         –4.60         –2.87         –1.90         –2.10         –1.40         –1.33 
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not contradict the endowment effect: the mean offer WTA
15
 is significantly 
greater than the mean bid WTP
16
. Still, with experience gained through repetitive 
auctioning under the BDM mechanism, WTA  offers decrease and WTP  bids 
increase over time
17
. The WTA / WTP  ratios thus decline throughout the ten 
trials, falling from 1.70 in trial 1 to 0.94 in trial 10 (see Fig 2.1.), which 
corresponds to WTP  increase of 39% and WTA  decrease of 23%. Concerning 
variances, we notice that the dispersion around the mean increases for both WTP  
(42%) and WTA  (245%) from trial 1 to trial 10. In trials 4–10, a t-test shows that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that WTP  and WTA  come from the same 
distribution at the <0.05p  level. Under BDM, value measures are not statistically 
different, signifying that the disparity fades away. 
Under NPA and SPA, the mean selling price exceeds the mean buying 
price for all ten trials. This also holds for the median bids. We observe similar 
starting and ending values of the welfare indices. The WTA / WTP  ratios remain 
above one, ranging from 1.35 to 2.71 under NPA, and from 1.28 to 3.07 under 
SPA (see Fig. 2.1.). Bids respectively increase by 69% and 90%; offers decrease 
by 13% in both experiments. The dispersion around WTP  follows a different path 
under NPA and SPA. The dispersion around WTA  amplifies under both auction 
mechanisms from trial 1 to trial 10 (NPA: 103%; SPA: 86%). On the contrary, the 
dispersion around WTP  remains quasi-stationary under SPA (4%) but decreases 
under NPA (–21%) throughout the trials, which suggests a degree of 
homogenization between the bids. In all trials, we reject the null hypothesis that   
WTP  and WTA  are equal at the 5% level of a t-test. However, we point out that 
ratios decrease over time approaching the value of one in latter trials. 
 
                                                 
15
 The over-bar signifies mean value. 
16
 This is also confirmed by the analysis of the medians. 
17
 Though they never reach the outside market price, i.e. the upper bound of EUR 15, such as in 
Bohm et al. (1997).  
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Fig. 2.1. WTA / WTP  disparity from trial 1 to trial 10 
 
Let us now take a further insight in our results and those of the mug 
experiments from Shogren et al. (2001). At first sight, we obtain contradictory 
results. In our experiment, the gap disappears under BDM, whereas in theirs, 
BDM is the only mechanism unable to remove the early gap.  
Our findings show that repetitions under the BDM mechanism can remove 
the endowment effect, as long as it steers people‟s behavior. Likewise, they 
suggest that the auction mechanism per se can account for the conflicting 
observations, as we clearly observe different paths of equalization of WTP  and 
WTA . We introduce an innovative tool to study the path of gap removal: the 
exponential regression on the WTA / WTP  ratios.  
An exponential regression is of a form axy be  with x  the variable along 
the x-axis, y  the regressed values of WTA / WTP , a  the amplitude of the 
decrease (or speed of convergence to equality) and b  the y-intercept of regression. 
The function is based on the function linear regression, with the y-axis 
logarithmically scaled. R-square gives information on the exponential relationship 
between ratios. 
We apply this method to Shogren et al.‟s (2001) mug experiments (see 
Fig. 2.2.) and to our experiments (see Fig. 2.3.). The exponential regression is 
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used for two reasons: first, it allows observing phenomena with rapid variations, 
such as in our experiments; second, it allows observing the decrease path to 
equality, that is, the way ratios tend to one. We try to unearth the mechanism able 
to remove the gap as quickly as possible, whatever the initial ratio. We can thus 
consider the highest coefficient of decrease as the highest speed of convergence to 
welfare indices‟ equality (see Table 2.2.). 
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Fig. 2.2. Exponential regression of WTA / WTP  disparity 
from Shogren et al.’s (2001) mug experiments 
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Fig. 2.3. Exponential regression of WTA / WTP  disparity 
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Shogren et al.‟s (2001) data from BDM provides no exponential 
relationship between sequential ratios, but ours does. Although the y-intercept of 
regression starts with the same value (both 1.5), the gap disappears in our 
experiment (illustrated by the speed of convergence –0.04) but stays stationary in 
the mug experiment (null speed of convergence). 
We find in both data that NPA provides the best exponential relationship 
between ratios (respectively 2 0.95R   and 2 0.96R  ) and the highest speed of 
convergence to equality (respectively –0.08 and –0.12) in time. Under SPA, the 
exponential relationship between ratios (respectively 2 0.61R   and 2 0.63R  ) 
and the speed of convergence to equality (respectively –0.06 and –0.09) are 
significant but lower. Sudden leaps of increase of the WTA / WTP  ratio under 
SPA – due to off-margin bidders – explain the differences in 2R  with regard to 
NPA. It is worthwhile noticing that SPA comes out as the "worst" active market 
mechanism even though it is frequently used in experimental environments to 
reveal agents‟ preferences. Under BDM, our experiment and Shogren et al.‟s 
(2001) experiment both obtain the lowest results in terms of exponential 
relationship
18
 and speed of convergence to equality. Therefore, the orderings of 
convergence in our experiments and those of Shogren et al.‟s (2001) are alike. 
 
Table 2.2. Exponential regression statistics 
 
Auction Regression statistics Our experiments 
Shogren et al.’s  
mug experiments 
BDM Speed of convergence (a) –0.04 –0.00 
 y-intercept of regression (b) 1.5 1.5 
 R-square 0.69 0.00 
SPA Speed of convergence (a) –0.06 –0.09 
 y-intercept of regression (b) 2.5 1.9 
 R-square 0.61 0.63 
NPA Speed of convergence (a) –0.08 –0.12 
 y-intercept of regression (b) 2.9 2.8 
 R-square 0.95 0.96 
                                                 
18
 The low exponential factor with the BDM is partially explained by the initial smaller difference 
between WTP and WTA. 
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If the initial gap is due to the choice of the market mechanism, then the 
choice of BDM is appropriate, for it produces the smallest initial gap. But, if we 
are to urge the auction mechanism able to rapidly deflate an excessive initial 
WTA / WTP  gap in a market-clearing price setting, we suggest the use of NPA 
which involves most of the bidders in the auctioning. Indeed, as for the model of 
exponential regression, the BDM mechanism would not have equalized the 
welfare indices if the starting ratio were more of SPA or NPA‟s magnitude. This 
appears all the more sound, provided the BDM mechanism is a passive market-
like setting with only minor adjustments in bidding behavior
19
. Indeed, NPA 
applies competitive pressure to the participating bidders. A bidder cannot avoid 
acting strategically since her best bid depends on the competing bids. By bidding 
more aggressively, the bidder improves her chances of winning the auction. As far 
as SPA is concerned, the unevenness in the decrease of the gap jeopardizes its 
robustness. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
 
Our results support the standard thesis that market mechanisms can 
remove or at least sturdily reduce the initial disparity between WTP and WTA. 
However, some points need to be clarified.  
Let us first focus on the specificity of the good in sale. Under NPA and 
SPA, the number of traded tons of carbon offset in a period is independent of the 
bids and offers submitted by the subjects. In any case, in SPA, one ton of carbon 
offset is bought and sold; in NPA, 1n  tons of carbon offset are bought and sold. 
As a result, free-riding is likely to occur, since a subject‟s bid cannot affect the 
total public good provision while it affects her payment (buying a certificate is 
costly). On the contrary, under BDM, subjects‟ choices affect the total provision 
of public good. Indeed, if a seller chooses a minimum selling price higher than the 
randomly selected price, she will keep her certificate and one more ton of carbon 
                                                 
19
 See footnote 7 in Shogren et al. (2001). 
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will be offset. The same reasoning applies for buyers. Put differently, subjects 
know they can influence the amount of carbon offset under BDM as their 
probability of winning the right to buy one certificate is independent of other 
bidders: the higher the private bid, the higher the chances that a ton of carbon is 
offset. 
This difference between BDM on the one side and NPA and SPA on the 
other side allows identifying two distinct motivations for funding the public good. 
First, there is "the public good motivation": a subject wants to buy or keep a 
certificate because it allows offsetting one ton of carbon for the community. 
Second, there is "the private good motivation": a subject wants to buy or keep a 
certificate because she wants to own a certificate and be associated to the 
offsetting even though this does not change the number of tons of carbon offset 
(she either wants to derive a warm-glow from altruism or wants to gain social 
status through the public good funding). Individuals often provide more public 
goods than traditional economic theory predicts. Public goods are then considered 
as impure public goods, which are products or services that combine both public 
and private benefits. 
In BDM, both motivations for funding the public good are present, 
whereas in NPA and SPA, only the private good motivation is present. Let us 
consider s  – the mean value of all bids (WTP) and offers (WTA) – as the mean 
value of the public good. After computation, we observe that s  over the ten 
rounds is strictly higher with BDM (8.57) than with SPA (7.26) or NPA (7.63). 
Locally, at the last period, the values are respectively 8.34, 7.91 and 8.09. These 
results indicate that the private good motivation is extreme compared to the public 
good motivation, i.e. subjects are mainly paying for enjoying warm-glow or being 
identified as contributors of the carbon offsetting. If we take s  of BDM as a 
benchmark value of the public good, the surplus of the BDM value compared to 
SPA and NPA values corresponds to the value of the public good motivation 
which lies in the interval  0.94, 1.31 . Since the public benefit for an individual is 
negligible, individuals mostly derive some private benefit from the public good. 
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These results are thus consistent with microeconomic analysis, where the private 
benefit governs the decisions of economic agents.  
Contrary to the observations where repeat-play public good games produce 
declining contribution over time (see Andreoni (1988) and Caldas et al. (2003)), 
s  is increasing in our experiments. As a matter of fact, if we regress s  with the 
number of periods, we obtain a small but strictly positive correlation coefficient 
(BDM: 0.18; SPA: 0.13; NPA: 0.15). In standard public good games, the fall is 
motivated by free-riding and discouragement of high type players to pursue alone 
the provision of public good. We propose two explanations for the rise we 
observed. First, the funded public good does not only concern the subjects but the 
population outside the experiment. Therefore, the free-riding attitude of some 
participants does not alter subjects‟ motivations since they do not specifically 
contribute for these free-riders (while they do in public good games). Second, as 
already mentioned, the private good motivation outperforms the public good 
motivation, which also explains the absence of the usual decline in subjects‟ 
bids
20
.  
For all these reasons, we decide to focus on the private value dimension of 
the public good in the following discussion.  
Contrary to NPA or SPA, the initial gap under the BDM mechanism is 
closer to one in both Shogren et al.‟s (2001) and our experiments. As WTA  is 
similar under the three auction mechanisms in the first trial, this observation 
comes from a high starting WTP  under BDM, i.e. shorter distance to cover from 
bids to offers. Given that BDM and NPA both share the properties of incentive-
compatibility and the possibility for every bidder to offset a ton of carbon, the 
explanation could come from the unambiguous distribution of prices and payoffs 
under the BDM mechanism, whereas under NPA there is ambiguity in view of the 
unknown bids of the opponents (see Sarin and Weber (1993)). 
Another explanation could come from the theory of disappointment 
aversion. In a recent article, Horowitz (2006b) relates that under BDM an 
                                                 
20
 One could argue that bids increased because of the house money effect. However, Clark (2002) 
finds no evidence of it in a public good experiment. 
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individual may report a higher value than the true one, simply because she is more 
disappointed from not receiving the good than from receiving it at a relatively 
high price, which induces her to report a higher bid to increase the chance of 
winning the auction. This could explain why the bids under BDM started higher 
earlier than the bids under NPA and SPA; subjects knew from the very beginning 
that they were bidding against a market-clearing price issued from a known 
ceiling market-clearing price. 
Let us also mention a proposition from Milgrom and Weber (1982) that 
could be spoken for our results. The authors state that common uncertainty about 
the value of a good creates affiliated private values, especially in case of 
unfamiliar goods. This is because early trials send information from which high-
bidders induce low-bidders to revise their preferences and increase their bids, the 
logic being that there are some common but unknown characteristics of the item 
released with bids. Our experimental protocol does not permit to validate or 
invalidate this hypothesis, but we can specify that all subjects received the same 
amount of information on the nature of the unfamiliar good before the auction 
took place
21
. Although the mimesis phenomenon could explain rising low bids 
under SPA and NPA just after the start-off, our BDM experiment shows higher 
early bids; therefore, the logic of common uncertainty could only relate to the 
latter bidding rounds. Moreover, the dispersion around the mean from trial 1 to 
trial 10 increases in all experiments, partly refuting the argument of affiliated 
private values. The only case of dispersion fall that could challenge independent 
values‟ validity deals with WTP  in the NPA mechanism. 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
 
We examined three mechanisms that could rectify the initial gap between 
WTP and WTA in the trading of a public good. From simple observations of the 
disparity ratios, we observe different results from Shogren et al. (2001) and can 
                                                 
21
 The market price effect, implied by affiliated private values, disappears when bidders receive 
nonprice information about the good before the experience is conducted (List and Shogren 1999). 
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conclude either that their findings – which suggest the validity of SPA and NPA 
in valuing private goods – are local, or that the public goods are subject to a 
different bidding behavior. 
We think that under a quasi-market setting such as the BDM mechanism 
subjects understood the fact that they could influence the level of the public good 
and behaved accordingly. In active markets with endogenous market-clearing 
prices such as NPA, no subject could influence the level of the public good which 
acted as a disincentive to augment the level of public good. Our results show a 
disparity dropped with repetition under the three mechanisms, suggesting that the 
economic theory of rationality within markets operates. And yet, the theory 
implies a perfect equality between WTP and WTA, which seems not to be 
guaranteed when funding a public good. Research must deal with this.  
Value measures approached equality principally for the reason that bids 
considerably increased throughout trials. Since offers moderately decreased in 
time, signifying a modest remedy to loss aversion, we could think of markets as 
systems which lift the subjects‟ regret not to acquire the good. Two-sided market 
value would then be somewhere between the behavioral exaggerations of loss 
aversion and disappointment aversion. These unforeseen questions necessitate 
further research. 
In addition, more experimental research on private and public values of a 
public good should be conducted. For example, we could identify more accurately 
the private good and public good motivations by explicitly insisting on the fact 
that bids cannot affect the size of the provision of public goods in NPA and SPA. 
As well, we could conduct experiments where subjects would be purposely 
deprived from any proof of having financed the public good; that way, we could 
distinguish between the desire to finance the public good and the desire to be 
identified by others as a generous contributor to the public good. 
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2.7. Appendix 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. You are not 
allowed to speak to your neighbors during the experiment. 
 
All human activities release greenhouse gases, including CO2, that provoke the 
global warming. This warming endangers the planet, its inhabitants, its 
ecosystems and biodiversity. One way to fight against global warming is to plant 
trees. The key elements are the following: the forested surfaces are a carbon trap; 
young forests store much more carbon than old forests, for trees absorb CO2 as 
they grow; forests preserve plant and animal biodiversity.  
 
An NGO has launched a project of carbon offsetting by funding the reforestation 
projects. The purpose is to offset carbon emissions by buying off your own 
emissions. The compensation is acknowledged by a certificate of one ton of 
carbon offset. 
 
During your education at the École Polytechnique ParisTech, you have received 
and printed, and will certainly do it over in the future, number of documents 
required for your schoolwork; it is also the case with your consumption of energy 
(such as light, heating, power supply for computers, etc.) Because you are 
contributing to the emissions through your consumption of paper and energy via 
your indirect demand for their manufacturing and distribution, we want to value 
your willingness to buy off your CO2 emissions.  
 
To this end, we will use a mechanism of purchasing and selling certificates of one 
ton of CO2 offset, such as the ones we currently hold in our hands. 
 
In couple of weeks, we will get in touch with you by email to inform you about 
the number of offset tons of CO2 according to your decisions. 
 
We will now conduct an experiment. As you came into the class, some of you 
were designated as sellers while others were designated as buyers. Indeed, each of 
you randomly drew a number which decided between buyer and seller. Please 
keep this number until the end of the experiment: it will serve us to track you on 
the information cards. In the end of the experiment, during the imbursement, 
please give us back your numbers.   
 
Only one trial will be binding. We will repeat the experiment ten times. After the 
tenth trial, the youngest person in the room will randomly draw a number between 
1 and 10, which will designate the binding trial. 
 
Please feel free to interrupt us and ask any question you might have in mind. 
 
Without further delay, we are going to read you the instructions concerning the 
conduct of the experiment. Let us start with those of you who are buyers. 
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BDM MECHANISM 
 
Buyers 
 
You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a 
certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The 
bid you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the 
certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf (acknowledged by your name 
on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please fill in the following table and mark an "x" for each 
price at which you are (and are not) willing to buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your maximum bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in 
ascending order. We randomly select one price from the price list, which becomes 
the displayed price. You buy a certificate if your bid is higher than or equal to the 
displayed price. 
 
Example: We randomly draw EUR 6. Since your bid is higher than or equal to 
EUR 6, you buy the certificate and pay EUR 6. 
 
  I will buy I will not buy 
If the price is EUR 0 x  
If the price is EUR 0.5 x  
If the price is EUR 1.0 x  
… …  
If the price is EUR 8.5 x  
If the price is EUR 9 x  
If the price is EUR 9.5  x 
…  … 
If the price is EUR 14.0  x 
If the price is EUR 14.5   x 
If the price is EUR 15.0   x 
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. 
Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of 
CO2 offset enables you to buy the certificate if your value is higher than the 
displayed price, and prevents you from buying otherwise. 
 
Sellers 
 
You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an 
auction in order to sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. 
The offer you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell 
the certificate with your name on, no ton of CO2 will be offset. 
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To submit an offer, please fill in the following table and mark an "x" for each 
price at which you are (and are not) willing to sell the certificate. 
 
Rules: your minimum offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in 
descending order. We randomly select one price from the price list, which 
becomes the displayed price. You sell a certificate if your offer is lower than or 
equal to the displayed price.  
 
Example: We randomly draw EUR 10. Since your offer is lower than or equal to 
EUR 10, you sell the certificate and earn EUR 10. 
 
  I will sell I will not sell 
If the price is EUR 15.0 x   
If the price is EUR 14.5 x   
If the price is EUR 14.0 x  
… …  
If the price is EUR 5.0  x   
If the price is EUR 4.5 x  
If the price is EUR 4.0    x 
…    … 
If the price is EUR 1.0    x 
If the price is EUR 0.5    x 
If the price is EUR 0.0   x 
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. 
Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of 
CO2 offset enables you to sell the certificate if the displayed price is higher than 
your value, and prevents you from selling otherwise. 
 
RANDOM NTH-PRICE AUCTION 
 
Buyers 
 
You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a 
certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The 
bid you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the 
certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf (acknowledged by your name 
on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please specify on the information card the price at which 
you are willing to buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in ascending order. 
We randomly select a number between 2 and n (n being the total number of bids). 
In other words, we randomly draw one of the bids and look at its rank. If your bid 
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is contained in n–1 highest bids, you buy a certificate at the displayed price: the 
nth price. 
 
Example: twenty bids are submitted. We randomly draw seven, that is, the 
seventh-highest bid in the increasing order. You buy a certificate at a displayed 
price (seventh-highest bid) if your bid is contained in the six highest bids. 
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. 
If your bid is randomly drawn, your bid becomes the displayed price imposed to 
the n–1 highest bidders. Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your 
own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to buy the certificate if your value 
is higher than the displayed price, and prevents you from buying otherwise. 
 
Sellers 
 
You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an 
auction in order to sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. 
The offer you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell 
the certificate with your name on, no ton of CO2 will be offset. 
 
To submit an offer, please specify on the information card the price at which 
you are willing to sell the certificate. 
 
Rules: your offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in descending 
order. We randomly select a number between 2 and n (n being the total number of 
offers). In other words, we randomly draw one of the offers and look at its rank. If 
your offer is contained in n–1 lowest offers, you sell a certificate at the displayed 
price: the nth price. 
 
Example: twenty offers are submitted. We randomly draw six, that is, the sixth-
lowest offer in the decreasing order. You sell your certificate at a displayed price 
(sixth-lowest offer) if your offer is contained in the five lowest offers. 
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. 
If your offer is randomly drawn, your offer becomes the displayed price imposed 
to the n–1 lowest offers. Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your 
own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to sell the certificate if the price is 
higher than your value, and prevents you from selling otherwise. 
 
SECOND-PRICE AUCTION 
 
Buyers 
 
You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a 
certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The 
bid you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the 
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certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf (acknowledged by your name 
on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please specify on the information card the price at which 
you are willing to buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in ascending order. If 
your bid is the highest, you buy a certificate at a displayed price: the second-
highest bid. 
 
Example: ten bids are submitted. The highest bid is EUR 13. The second highest 
bid is EUR 11. The bidder who proposed EUR 13 buys the certificate and pays 
EUR 11.  
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. 
Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of 
CO2 offset enables you to buy the certificate if your value is higher than the 
displayed price, and prevents you from buying otherwise. 
 
Sellers 
 
You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an 
auction in order to sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. 
The offer you submit can range between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell 
the certificate with your name on, no ton of CO2 will be offset. 
 
To submit an offer, please specify on the information card the price at which 
you are willing to sell the certificate. 
 
Rules: your offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in descending 
order. If your offer is the lowest, you sell a certificate at a displayed price: the 
second-lowest offer. 
 
Example: ten offers are submitted. The lowest offer is EUR 5. The second lowest 
offer is EUR 7. The seller who proposes EUR 5 sells her certificate and earns 
EUR 7.  
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. 
Since you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of 
CO2 offset enables you to sell the certificate if the displayed price is higher than 
your value, and prevents you from selling otherwise. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Endogenous Market-Clearing Prices 
and Reference Point Adaptation 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When prices depend on the submitted bids, i.e. with endogenous market-clearing 
prices in repeated-round auction mechanisms, the assumption of independent private 
values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into 
question; even if these mechanisms provide active involvement and market learning. 
In its orthodox view, adaptive bidding behavior imperils incentive-compatibility. We 
introduce a model which shows that bidders bid according to the anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic, contingent on a sequential weighting function, which neither 
ignores the incentive-compatibility constraints nor rejects the posted prices issued 
from others‟ bids. By deviating from their anchor in the direction of the public signal, 
bidders operate in a correlated equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: auctions, incentive-compatibility, rank-dependence, reference point, 
heuristic, bounded rationality, correlated equilibrium 
JEL classification: C73, D44, D81, D83 
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"Verum esse ipsum factum
22
." 
Giovanni Battista Vico. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
To know how much an individual is willing to pay for some item or for the 
provision of public services, and to assess how individuals would behave in the 
real world, economists now learn from experiments of repeated-round auctions. In 
this way, experimental auctions have been used to examine economic issues such 
as the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept (Kahneman 
et al. 1990, Shogren et al. 1994, Shogren et al. 2001a) or preference reversals 
(Cherry et al. 2003, Cox and Grether 1996). 
In the presence of an active market, rational behavior ensues from 
repetition. In experimental repeated-round auctions, individuals repeatedly bid for 
the same good. One of the arguments supportive of repeating auctions is that 
practice allows bidders to learn about the auction format and form values in a 
market-like setting, which improves the accuracy of value estimates (Alfnes and 
Rickertsen 2003, Hayes et al. 1995, Lusk et al. 2001). Plott (1996) formulated the 
discovered preference hypothesis which says that preferences converge to the 
same underlying preferences – respectful of expected utility – regardless of the 
market mechanism. These underlying preferences are discovered after bidders 
repeatedly take decisions, receive feed-back on the outcomes of their decisions, 
and are given incentives to discover which actions best satisfy their preferences. 
Discovered preference hypothesis suggests an equality of mean bids across 
rounds. Since anomalies to standard theoretical requirements are the results of 
bidders‟ irrationality, only later market trials reveal the true preferences. 
Experimentalists want individuals to reveal their preferences truthfully. 
Therefore they use incentive-compatibility constraints, where truthfully 
announcing private information is an optimal strategy for all individuals 
participating in the auction mechanism. Incentive-compatibility is dependent on 
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 The true itself is made. 
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the restrictive assumption that individuals have independent private values. In 
strategic interactions under incomplete information, different types of bidders – 
such as high- or low-value types – select from a menu of strategies. In principle, 
incentive-compatibility forbids the possibility that a given type of bidder mimics 
the behavior of other types and adjusts her bids to theirs. 
One of the critics against the incentive-compatibility is the argument of 
uncertainty (Horowitz 2006a). After an individual reports her bid, she faces 
uncertainty over her chances to win the auction and over the final cost she will 
incur. On the assumption that the absence of affiliation is verified, repeating 
auctions in experiments reduces the uncertainty faced by bidders, because 
repeated-rounds provide market feedback from which they learn their preferences 
and produce reliable value estimates. 
Knetsch et al. (2001) find that bids are influenced by the choice of auction 
mechanism. They show that willingness-to-pay (WTP) bids submitted in the later 
rounds of a second-price auction are significantly higher than those submitted in 
the later rounds of a ninth-price auction. Shogren et al. (2001a) report that mean 
WTP bids increase in repeated second-price and random nth-price auctions, but 
not in a repeated BDM mechanism (the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, 
described later on). Lusk and Rousu (2006) find that the BDM mechanism is less 
accurate than NPA (random nth-price auction, described later on) in generating 
bids consistent with true values and recommend the use of endogenous clearing-
price mechanisms when estimating nonmarket goods and services. Indeed, under 
BDM, the price is determined separately from the bids, preventing interactions 
between bidders plus providing poor market learning. As such, bidders have no 
opportunity to perform in a competition that normally imposes discipline on their 
bidding behavior (Bohm et al. 1997). Ergo market anomalies and violations of 
economic theory are fostered (Lusk and Rousu 2006, Lusk and Shogren 2007). 
Still, only a default of interaction makes the independence of bids certain, as the 
probability of winning does not depend on others‟ preferences. Shogren and Hays 
(1997) assert that “the repeated signals sent by the endogenous market price 
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contaminate individual bids into unreliable and unreasonable beacons of true 
preferences”. 
Under BDM, the distribution of clearing prices is often known in advance. 
When the price distribution is fixed in reference to the common endowment, the 
ambiguity of the potential price disappears. On the contrary, under NPA, the 
distribution of prices depends on what her opponents are ready to pay for the 
good. The nth highest bid will be linked to the highest value. A bidder thus bids as 
if she held the highest private value conditional on her subjective estimation of the 
distribution of her opponents‟ private values; she assesses her opponents and their 
expected valuations for the good. As a result, a complementary issue on 
uncertainty appears: uncertainty over the bids of opponents. Of course, bidders 
should always bid sincerely because the randomness of the market-clearing price 
prevents them from fixing on a stable cost such as with BDM (Shogren et al. 
2001b), but they are counter-incited to chase other bidders‟ true valuations. 
Several previous experimental studies advocate that affiliation between 
private values is factual. List and Shogren (1999) unearth affiliation between 
naïve bidders for new goods and influence of posted prices. Similarly, Bernard 
(2005) finds affiliation, loss of information about bidders‟ initial values and 
recommends the use of single-round auctions. Indeed, if the object of the 
experiment is to elicit actual preferences and to test them for consistency, price 
information is a potential source of contamination (Cubitt et al. 2001). Cox and 
Grether (1996) discover that bids are positively correlated with previous market-
clearing prices. Although it can simply prove interaction between the learning 
processes of different subjects, it can also be the result of imitation. Knetsch et al. 
(2001) and Cubitt et al. (2001) also report experimental results which imply that 
bids are influenced by observations of past prices and by expectations of future 
prices. They argue that the provision of price information in repeated auctions 
induces cross-subject contamination. This is all the more unsurprising, for posted 
prices are the norm, unlike bargaining (Hanemann 1994). 
In this chapter, we relax the assumption of private values‟ independence in 
the repeated-round auctions such as BDM and NPA, when the market-clearing 
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prices are made public at the end of each round. Instead of using game-theory 
learning models, we introduce a behavioral model that shows that bidders bid 
according to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic which neither ignores the 
rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints, nor rejects the posted prices 
issued from others‟ bids. Bidders simply weight information at their disposal and 
adjust their discovered value using reference points encoded in the sequential 
price weighting function. The general hypothesis is that selection among strategies 
is adaptive, in that a decision maker will choose strategies that are relatively 
efficient in terms of effort and accuracy as task and context demands are varied. 
For unfamiliar choices, individuals make up a decision rule at the moment they 
need to use it (Bettman 1988). Of particular interest is the finding that under time 
constraints, some heuristics are more accurate than a normative procedure such as 
expected value maximization (Payne et al. 1988). In fact, real people are cognitive 
misers: they tend to choose in the simplest way possible (Hanemann 1994). Put to 
the test, our model shows that bidders and offerers are sincere boundedly rational 
utility maximizers. Still, they act rationally even if they operate inside a correlated 
equilibrium. Instead of handling affiliation of values after market prices are 
revealed
23
, we prefer to speak in terms of reference point adaptation and posted 
prices‟ weighting mechanisms. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the auction 
mechanisms. Section 3.3 deals with the interactions among bidders and the 
incentive compatibility constraints. Section 3.4 presents a method for adjusting 
reference points according to a sequential price weighting function. Section 3.5 
examines the empirical validity of such a model. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Auctions and incentive-compatibility 
 
The BDM mechanism (Becker et al. 1964, Shogren et al. 1994) and the 
random nth-price auction (Shogren et al. 2001) are two market based mechanisms 
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90 
often used in experiments. Determination of the market clearing-price and the 
expected payoff, which ensues from the market price, is different in the two 
mechanisms. In theory, they perform the same. In practice, this assertion no 
longer holds true. 
Under BDM, an individual reports a bid for a good; a price is then 
exogenously and randomly drawn from a price list. If the individual bids above 
the price, she receives the good and pays the drawn price. If the individual bids 
below the price, she does not receive the good and pays nothing. The mechanism 
is regarded as a quasi-market mechanism, its market price being exogenously 
determined.  
Under NPA, the market price is endogenously determined. The mechanism 
works as follows (see Shogren et al. 2001, List 2003): each bidder submits a bid; 
all bids are rank-ordered; a number between 2 and n (n being the number of 
bidders) is randomly selected as a market-clearing price; a unit of the good is sold 
to each of the 1n  highest bidders at the nth-price drawn from the bids. Because 
of the endogenous market price, NPA is considered to be a full-active market. 
Following the induced value payoff theory, whatever the auction 
mechanism, an individual faces the following payoff rule: 
 
 if <
0        if 
i i
i
v p p b
p b



 
 
where iv  is bidder i‟s value, ib  her bid, and p  the market price. Whenever 
optimal bidding arises with i ib v , an auction mechanism is said to be incentive-
compatible. Put differently, an auction is truth-telling when the individual pays a 
price independent from what she bids. As Lusk and Shogren (2007) point out, the 
incentive to value truthfully can easily be proved.  
When the individual i bids, she is ignorant of the price she will pay. So she 
draws an estimate of the price from the probability density function  if p  with 
support ,p p    and the cumulative distribution function  iF p  where 
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,ib p p


    corresponds to the bid. The rational individual submits a bid that 
maximizes her expected payoff which corresponds to her expected utility iu , 
which is twice continuously differentiable and increasing
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The first integral describes the expected payoff for random prices below 
her bid (where she expects a positive surplus). The second integral describes the 
expected payoff for random prices between her bid and the maximum possible bid 
(where she expects a loss). The maximum over ib  occurs when the derivative of 
 iE u  with respect to ib  is null: 
 
 
    0i i i i i i
i
E u
u v b f b
b

  

               [2] 
 
where  0 0iu  . When i ib v , the probability distribution that the individual‟s 
bid equals the price is strictly positive or we assume positive support on ,p p   . 
The individual maximizes her expected utility when she bids her true value. 
In BDM, the market-clearing price is drawn from a uniform distribution 
with the probability density function  f p  and a cumulative distribution function 
 F p . Bidders have different values but face the same price which is modeled as 
the mean of the price distribution in the support of ib . The probability of winning 
the auction given i‟s bid is  iF b . Taking her bid as given, the price that i expects 
to pay conditional upon winning is: 
 
                                                 
24
 Assumptions that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 
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 
 
 
<
ib
i
i
f p
f p p b p dp
F b
                [3a] 
 
 Then her expected utility is her expected payoff: 
 
 
 
 
 
ib
i i i
i
f p
E v p dp F b
F b


 
  
  
              [3b] 
 
In NPA with n bidders, one of the bidders‟ values, from the uniform 
distribution
25
 with PDF  g v  and CDF  G v , is independently drawn at random 
and set as the market price. Conditional on iv  being the nth value, the chance that 
a bid from the opponents is drawn as the n-order statistic is  1n n . The 
probability of winning given i‟s bid is  iG b . Taking her bid as given, the price 
that i expects to pay conditional upon winning is: 
 
 
 
 
1
<
ib
i
i
g vn
g p v b v dv
n G b
 
  
  
              [4a] 
 
 Her expected utility is her expected payoff: 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ib
i i i
i
g vn
E v v dv G b
n G b


 
  
  
             [4b] 
 
The BDM and NPA are proved to be incentive-compatible (Kahneman et 
al. 1990, Shogren et al. 2001b). Lusk et al. (2007) analyze the cost of 
misbehaving or deviating from truthful bidding in terms of foregone expected 
earnings, and show that suboptimal bidding has equivalent effects for BDM and 
NPA. For a uniform distribution of values, the incentive to bid their value is 
                                                 
25
 This time, the distribution comes from others‟ bids, not from a price list. 
93 
identical for both high- and low-type individuals, engaging all bidders to valuate 
truthfully. 
Let *i  be individual i‟s optimal payoff, which is achieved when an 
individual submits a bid equal to her value. Consider a bidder with a valuation 
slightly above or under iv . The deviation is profitable only if deviating is costless. 
The expected cost of deviating from i ib v  to i i ib v   , with > 0i , is given by 
ˆ
i : 
  
  *ˆ , , , ,i i i i i i i i i i iE v b E v v E v v                            [5] 
 
Equation [5] represents the expected loss of an individual who does not bid 
her true value. It is a non-negative number that equals zero when 0i  . For both 
the BDM and NPA, the derivative of the expected cost of deviating with respect to 
i  at the point where i iv b  yields: 
 
 ˆ
0
i i
i
i v b
E 





                 [6] 
 
Equation [6] states that only bidding sincerely is costless. If a bidder 
deviates and bids above her value, she may increase her chance of winning the 
auction, but her payoff will be negative even if she wins the auction. If a bidder 
deviates and bids under her value, she loses the auction and has zero payoff, 
which means that she loses the chance of winning the auction with some positive 
payoff. It is useful to think of the magnitude of deviation at the disposal of the 
bidder, which is the difference between her value and the highest bid. This would 
be the amount by which she could reduce her bid and still take part to the trades, 
or increase her bid to augment her chances of winning without supporting 
negative payoffs, once the distribution of high bids is known. 
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In spite of the theoretical incentive-compatibility equivalence between 
elicitation mechanisms that employ endogenous and exogenous clearing prices, 
empirical evidence suggests that the two approaches generate divergent results. If 
the market price is based upon the preferences of other bidders, the risk of 
deviating from truthful bidding comes out. It is hard to distinguish between 
refining and copying, not only for experimentalists but for bidders too. 
 
3.3. Interactive incentive-compatibility 
 
Standard game models prescribe dominant strategies. Each individual has 
beliefs about the types of other individuals, how each individual values the good, 
and these beliefs are independent rational expectations, so the individuals‟ bidding 
strategies are constrained not to evolve. Indeed, incentive-compatibility requires 
that truth telling is best averaged over the types of other bidders in the auction. 
Incentive-compatibility constraints guarantee that it is optimal for the 
bidder to make a bid (send a signal to announce her type) truthfully. Let us 
consider two bidders 1,2i   with unit demands, which are ex ante identical. Their 
valuations 1v  and 2v  are independent, that is, each bidder‟s beliefs about the type 
of the other bidder are independent of the other bidder‟s belief distribution. Let 1b  
and 2b  denote the outcomes of the bidders‟ strategies 1  and 2 . The auction 
mechanism specifies the probability  1 2,if b b  that the good is carried by i at price 
 1 2,ip b b . Let  
*
1   and  
*
2   denote Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in 
the auction mechanism. For bidder 1, the rationality constraint is that, for each 1v  
and for each 1b  belonging to the support of  
*
1 1v : 
 
     *2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2, , 0v vE E v f b b p b b                   [7] 
 
The rationality constraint ensures that the bidder is willing to participate in 
the auction only in the case of nonnegative payoffs, since withdrawing from the 
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auctioning gives her null expected payoff. The probability distribution can be 
understood in different ways. Provided that bidder 1 controls 1b  but not 2b , we 
can think of a bidder as choosing a conditional probability distribution  1 1 2f b b , 
where 2b  has some exogenous probability distribution. Another interpretation is 
that  1 1 2,f b b  is the result of a very complicated information mechanism by 
which the bidder learns and updates her beliefs about 2b . Finally, it can be 
understood as bidder i‟s actions over time. 
The incentive-compatibility constraint is such that, for each 1v , each 1b  in 
the support of  *1 1v  and each deviation 1bˆ : 
 
           * *2 22 2 2 21 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2ˆ ˆ, , , ,v vv vE E v f b b p b b E E v f b b p b b                    [8] 
 
The left-hand side of the constraint is the expected payoff if she reports her 
true bid 1b , and the right-hand side of this constraint is the expected payoff if she 
deviates and reports 1bˆ . The idea here is that when bidder 1 bids 1bˆ  instead of 1b , 
her payoff changes but the resulting probability distribution over 2b  does not 
change, since she cannot control 2b , and hence she gets a different expected 
payoff. The incentive-compatibility constraint asserts that her expected payoff 
from honesty is not less than her expected payoff from deviating, i.e. by deviating 
she cannot gain more. The same applies to bidder 2. If the two bidders announce 
untruthful types  1 2ˆ ˆ,b b , the probability of winning the auction is: 
 
        * *1 1 2 21 2 1 2,
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,i iv vf b b E f b b                     [9] 
 
The expected price is: 
 
96 
        * *1 1 2 21 2 1 2,
ˆ ˆˆ , ,i iv vp b b E p b b                   [10] 
 
The incentive-compatibility constraint ensures that a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium for both bidders is to announce the truth ( 1 1vˆ v  and 2 2vˆ v ). 
Regardless of how  1 2,if b b  occurs, if it violates the incentive-compatibility 
constraint, the bidder is not maximizing her expected payoff.  
Hausch (1986) asserts that an individual has an incentive to underbid in 
sequential auctions, i.e. to provide misleading information about her valuation of 
the good in the first round to deceive her opponents, in order to secure winning in 
the second round. Jeitschko (1998) demonstrates that bidders face a trade-off 
between increasing the probability of winning the early auction and increasing 
expected payoffs in the later auction. As a corollary, bidders place lower bids in 
the early auction, because they are aware of the learning effects. 
However, there is a strong information requirement. Each bidder must 
know the distribution of types of all the other bidders as well as the ability to 
determine the Nash strategies of every other bidder in the auction. In practice, 
equilibrium computation is usually infeasible. Moreover, the distribution over the 
possible types of n individuals in repeated-round auctions is complex and makes 
the space of types go of hand. One could calculate the equilibrium, but in the 
absence of common knowledge of type space and prior beliefs, it is unlikely to 
expect it (Saran and Serrano 2007). As a consequence, it is pragmatic to stress that 
individuals observe how others value the good, and some kind of equilibrium 
emerges (Boutilier et al. 2000)
26
. 
Theorists assume incentive-compatibility in the strict case of independent 
private values, which means that the individual‟s value is independently drawn 
from a commonly known distribution. In this case, the individual has only a prior 
on her signal. The setting of independent private values is reasonable for domains 
in which individuals‟ valuations are unrelated to each other, depending only on 
their signals. But when the bidder‟s valuation depends on both her signal and 
                                                 
26
 Recent literature shifts the analysis to the ex post equilibrium so any type space fits.  
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others‟ signals, those signals are likely to be affiliated: a phenomenon known as 
affiliated values pioneered by Milgrom and Weber (1982)
27
. For example, if a 
signal from an individual is a high value, this will increase the probability that 
other individuals will have high signals as well. As a consequence, a higher value 
for one bidder makes higher values for other bidders more likely (Kagel 1995). 
Values are drawn from an affiliated distribution if the posted price – which serves 
to signal the relative value of the good – shifts bids‟ distribution. Corrigan and 
Rousu (2006) make a distinction between bid affiliation and value affiliation, and 
prefer the bid affiliation as a broader concept. According to them, positive 
correlation between bids may not be caused by positive correlation between 
values: experimentalists observing bids, bid affiliation is a more relevant concept. 
When individuals actively interrelate, such as under NPA, they cannot 
circumvent estimating the probability distributions over maximal bids of other 
bidders and their chances of winning the auction given their true value. If the 
individual observes that others‟ bids are higher than her own, she learns she has 
little chance of winning the auction. In this case, the literature shows that 
individuals tend to submit higher bids afterwards (Fox et al. 1998, Cummings and 
Taylor 1999, List 2001). Likewise, Corrigan and Rousu (2006) experimentally 
find that posted prices have a statistically and economically significant impact on 
bids submitted in subsequent rounds. Furthermore, according to their study, the 
bidder‟s propensity to increase her bid is independent of her initial bid. 
Individuals combine their own signal with the signals received from 
others, which creates affiliation between values or bids (Klemperer 1999). For that 
reason, their value is given by: 
 
i i ji j
v t t 

                  [11] 
                                                 
27
 Let  
1
, ...,
n
x x x  be the vector of signals observed by the bidders. Let there be another vector 
of signals containing information important to value the good. Bidders‟ values for the good are 
affiliated if  ,
i i
v u s x . Otherwise, that is 
i i
v x , bidders‟ values of the good are privately and 
independently distributed. 
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where it  is bidder i‟s signal, jt  is j‟s signal,   is the weight assigned to i‟s signal 
and    the weight assigned to j‟s signal, with   . It is non-realistic to believe 
that individual i ignores others‟ signals. Her private value does not remain 
independent thus  0,1  . Finally, the individual does not bid her true value, and 
her over- or underbidding depends on the magnitude of  . Since the individual 
does not know other bidders‟ signals, she forms expectations on them. 
Learning preferences by repeating bidding is part of the methodological 
consensus. However, learning may also provoke unintended effects that challenge 
stricto sensu the constraints of incentive-compatibility. The reasoning is quite 
intuitive. An individual is given an initial endowment she uses as a reference to 
submit her bid. She reveals her value upon her preferences and this initial amount. 
Provided that a randomly selected round is chosen as the binding round in 
experimental repeated-round auctions, the individual bids in reference to the same 
endowment at the beginning of each round. In theory, this cannot compromise the 
property of demand-revealing. Nevertheless, she is told all the bids and the market 
price before submitting her bid in the next round, and revealing their distribution 
provokes an adaptive bidding behavior. Indeed, the individual extracts 
information on value perception from price formation in the auction, and price 
posting makes her update her values iteratively without fear of deviation. 
It is hard to believe that the process by which an individual maximizes her 
expected utility is one of assigning an independent value to the good after market 
information has been revealed. Assuming independent distributions implies that 
the individual is assumed to reason as if the bids for subsequent rounds were 
issued from independent beliefs. In other words, such a basic bidder is insensitive 
to strategic implications of varying i  in [5] and to the information content of t  in 
[11]. Indeed, even if signals are mostly irrelevant to the payoffs, it is hard to 
exclude the possibility that they may find themselves into the equilibrium, which 
suggests existence of a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974). Moreover, 
Bayesian rational players play a correlated equilibrium as long the Harsanyi 
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common prior assumption is verified (Aumann 1987)
28
. We think that the 
individual builds a bidding policy by which her bid is conditioned on the outcome 
of earlier rounds. Henceforth, the uncertainty is over opponents‟ bids. With an 
endogenous market-clearing price, the individual forms beliefs on the unknown 
distribution of the highest bid according to others‟ preferences. Her uncertainty 
over the parameters of this distribution is reflected by her prior distribution over 
the probability space of bid distributions. But, the use of equilibrium to describe 
the uncertainty relies on the existence of a type space as common knowledge, 
which is an important limitation. 
 
3.4. The behavioral model 
 
Consider dynamic settings where bidders interact repeatedly. We call a 
rule of behavior an adaptive heuristic. Invariably making the same choice is a sort 
of heuristic but not an adaptive one, since it is not responsive to a situation. At 
each stage, a bidder plays a strategy which is optimal against the distribution of 
the past actions of other bidders. Adaptive heuristics are boundedly rational 
strategies
29
. However, in the long run, such simple strategies yield highly 
sophisticated and rational behavior (Hart 2005). 
Now consider an individual who is aware of the strategic implications 
inbuilt in the auction, such as the effects of varying expectations on the adjacency 
of potential opponents‟ values to hers. We believe that instead of using a single 
bidding policy at every round, individuals use the distribution of bids they‟ve 
observed at earlier rounds to update their bidding policy and their estimate of the 
true distribution of high bids. Their bidding strategy in the next round is based on 
the updated distributions and all individuals play a Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian 
                                                 
28 Common prior only requires the bidders‟ mutual beliefs on the fundamentals of the interaction 
be elicited, like expected payoffs entailed by the possible actions. 
29
 Learning dynamics are levels of full rationality, whereas evolutionary dynamics are completely 
irrational actions. Adaptive heuristics are in-between. 
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manner
30
. If the individual updates her bidding policy based on past observations, 
her true bids at early rounds are not reflective of the bids she submits at latter 
rounds, which means she is learning based on observations drawn from a 
nonstationary distribution. It has been shown that myopic learning models such as 
fictitious play – which is an adaptive heuristic – converge to a stationary 
distribution despite the initial nonstationarity (Fudenberg and Levine 1998). In a 
fictitious play, the individual is enabled to learn if she can realistically win the 
auction given her true value. She learns by observing the history of past bids – 
prior to the beginning of the next round – and forms a belief about her opponents‟ 
bids in the next period. She believes that her opponents are using a stationary 
strategy which is the empirical distribution of past bids, and thus updates her 
beliefs, her best reply and bid, computing a new bidding policy based on earlier 
outcomes. Although truth-telling is theoretically proved to be optimal, computing 
optimal bids as best replies defies the assumption of true valuation
31
. 
Instead of using these learning models, let us introduce a descriptive 
behavioral model based upon reference point adaptation. We introduce a parallel 
model to rank-dependent expected utility, because we consider agents to derive 
utility from changes in wealth relative to their reference point. If an agent 
perceives her payoff to be higher than the reference point, she perceives a gain; 
and perceives a loss, otherwise. We exploit the idea of linear and non-linear 
probability weighting and propose a sequential information weighting because we 
assume that strategic bidders convert objective linear weighting into subjective 
nonlinear decision weights. 
In this case, let us assume that bidders adjust their starting values. 
Anchoring-and-adjustment is a heuristic that influences the way individuals 
intuitively assess probabilities. According to this process, individuals start with a 
                                                 
30
 In the long run, irrational behavior can lead to Bayesian rationality (Aumann 1987).  
31
 Shlomit et al. (1998) analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are 
determined before the first round and do not vary in time. When each player uses a fictitious play 
learning scheme, the equilibrium vector of bids is the same as in a one-shot auction with the types 
of players being common knowledge. However, their players are too basic for they do not attempt 
to learn their opponents‟ types or to hide their own types. 
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reference point (the anchor) and make adjustments to it to reach their estimate
32
 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In the case of repeated one-shot auctions, their 
true value is a reference point that bidders discovered in time, i.e. people use 
practice rounds to refine their values with regard to their vague or naïve start. 
Deviation from true value is then an adjustment from the self-generated anchor in 
order to win the auction in the late rounds. When bidders long to increase either 
their payoffs or their probability of winning the auction, given that a rational agent 
is programmed to maximize her payoff, deviating can be considered rational. 
The reference point is formed after observing the last posted price. The 
bidder thus makes her bid in 1i   according to ir . Depending on whether 1>i ip r  
or 1<i ip r , she scales her bid up and down, respectively. The adaptation of the 
reference point corresponds to the following phase diagram: 
 
 
 
Arkes et al. (2008) term the adaptation of the reference point the rule 
where bidders shift their reference point in the direction of a realized outcome. If 
the reference point is 0r  and the price is 1p , the difference between 1p  and 0r  
should be equal to the difference between 2p  and 1r , or 1 0 2 1p r p r   . This is 
standard rationality. It is due to the linear shape of the utility function where 
bidders are indifferent to rank-dependence. We term this the uniform or linear 
adaptation of the reference point. If the utility function v  is linear, the reference 
point is a weighted average of posted prices. With 0 0p r  as the anchor in a 
fictitious period 0i  , the next bid is formulated along with: 
 
                                                 
32
 Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) have also considered the anchoring-and-adjustment process to 
describe how people make judgements under ambiguity; their adjustment is made according to 
some probability p which could come from any distribution. 
0 0r p 1r 2p 2r1p
1 0p r 2 1p r 0   0  
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1
1 n
i i ii
r w p
i 
                 [12] 
 
The expected gain of deviating or adapting the reference point from 1 1b v  
to 1 1
ˆ ˆb v , conditional on 2b  is given by 1ˆ : 
 
 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2ˆ ˆˆ , , , ,E b b v E b b E b b                        [13] 
 
There are several competing notions of rationality, and one among them is 
the correlated equilibrium, which has the advantage of being reasonable, simple 
and is guaranteed always to exist. The rationality constraint says that a bidder has 
no reason to bid in case of null payoff. Since losing in auctioning means absence 
of payoff, increasing the probability of winning the auction and consequently the 
chance of earning some positive payoff by deviating is rational. In parallel, a 
rational bidder seeks to maximize her payoff which is the difference between her 
value and the cost of the item. If by deviating, a bidder increases her expected 
payoff with some extra gain, she is acting rationally. 
In terms of interactions between two players, the deviation of player 1 is 
such that, for all 1b  and 1bˆ  in  1 1v  and all 2 2ˆ,b b  in  2 2v :  
 
           2 22 2 2 21 1,2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1,2 1 2 1 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,v vv vE E v f b b p b b E E v f b b p b b                  [14] 
 
If joint distribution 1,2f  with  1 2 1,2 1 2ˆ ˆ, 1v v f b b    is a correlated strategy, 
equilibrium is achieved when no player ignores the public signal, which is to 
make an expected gain from deviating with some positive probability, given that 
others follow this rule as well. This implies that deviating is worthwhile only if a 
public signal such as a posted price recommends doing so and all submit to it 
because the suggested strategy is the best in expectation. The right hand-side 
expression is when player 1 is the only one not to follow the recommendation 
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issued from the public signal and chooses some bid 1b  instead of 1bˆ , provided the 
endogeneity of the market-clearing price. 
 
Proposition 3.1.: When bidders follow the public recommendation leading them 
to rationally deviate from their anchor, there exists a correlated equilibrium. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
The incentive-compatibility constraint ensures that truthful bidding 
maximizes utility. Let us now consider this point. Following the work on rank 
dependent expected utility (Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000) and reference point 
adaptation (Arkes et al. 2008, Baucells et al. 2008), we introduce a model of 
sequential decision analysis. First, let us recall the existing decision theoretic 
background. 
According to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), 
people weight outcomes when they choose between lotteries. Let 
 1 1 2 2 1 1, ; , ;...; , ; ,n n n np p p p      be a lottery that yields outcome ip  with 
probability i . A lottery can be defined as a set of n outcomes  1 2 1, ,..., ,n np p p p  
with respective probability  1 2 1, ,..., ,n n    . The rank-dependent expected utility 
of this lottery is a junction between the value or utility function  v   and the 
weighting function w : 
 
   1 1 2 2 1 1 1, ; , ;...; , ; ,
n
n n n n i ii
v p p p p v p w                 [15] 
 
where  
 
   1 11 1
i i
i i iw w w 

                [16] 
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 in particular  1 1w w  . The weighting function w  is increasing with  0 0w   
and  1 1w  . It is a function of the cumulative distribution at i  and 1i  . If w  is 
an identity transformation and corresponds to a positive linear transformation of 
v , the rank-dependent expected utility theory is equivalent to the expected utility 
theory. In this case, bidders are considered rational: they have linear or uniform 
preferences for money, separately from the rank position. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) rather take  w   as nonlinear, that is, a monotonic s-shaped function, 
which implies deviations from linearity and irrationality because of insensitivity 
to or misperceiving of mean probabilities. That takes the form as follows: 
 
 
  
1
1
w

  


 

 
              [17] 
 
for 0< <1 . This one-parameter specification gives more weight to the worst and 
best events so  >i iw    for i close to 1 or n. 
By analogy, we assume that bidders weight all the sequential information 
at their disposal to build their bidding strategy, in particular their anchor and the 
posted market-clearing prices. Bidders start with an outcome 0 0p r  which is 
their original reference point and which corresponds to their subjective and asocial 
valuation of a good. Put differently, their first reference point is their value after 
the practice rounds: a true value issued from discovered preference hypothesis. In 
repeated-round auctions, bidders are told the market-clearing price – which can be 
endogenous to the bids – before submitting their next bid, so all posted prices 
correspond to subsequent outcomes of the outcome set. 
Instead of ordering outcomes from worst  1i   to best  i n  as in 
cumulative prospect theory, we assume that bidders sort the outcomes backwards, 
from the latest to the anchor, according to 1i n ip p   , with i being the rank of the 
round. Posted prices arrive following the sequence of rounds. Therefore, the price 
vector is sequentially sorted. By analogy to the probability weighting function 
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(Einhorn and Hogarth 1985, Tversky and Wakker 1995), we assume a sequential 
price weighting function, such that bidders give a weight of 1/n to each price, with 
n the length of the price sequence. We define the sequential rank-dependent 
function. 
 
Definition 3.1.:    W A W B  whenever A B . If W  is additive, i.e. 
     W A B W A W B    for all disjoint outcomes A  and B , then it is a 
weighting measure. A sequential price weighting measure is a strictly increasing 
function    : 0,1 0,1w   with  0 0w   and  1 1w  . A weighting measure W  
on P , with P  the outcome space, is a function whose components are included in 
 0,1  such that   0W    and   1W P  .  
 
Bidders rank prices following the mirror reflection. Henceforth, the 
sequential sorting is:    1 2 1 1 2 1, ,..., , , ,..., ,n n n np p p p p p p p  . Ranks are then 
accumulated such that: 
 
 1 2 1
1 2 1
, ,..., , : , ,...,1 ,1n n
n n n
   
 
  
 
            [18] 
 
where 1/n corresponds to the weight of the latest posted price, and the last 
increment corresponds to the weight of the anchor. A sequential weighting 
function is introduced to transform the ranks into cumulative decision weights: 
 
          1 2 1 1 2 1, ,..., , : , ,..., 1 , 1n nw w w w w w w w
n n n
   
      
       
      
        [19] 
 
Following [16], the weighting factor is an increment between two rounds
33
: 
                                                 
33
 Uniform or linear weighting results as a special case, and we have 
     1 1w i n w i n w n    for all i. 
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   1
1
:i i i
i i
w w w w w
n n
  
   
      
   
, 1,...,i n            [20] 
 
The cumulative prospect theory suggests an s-shaped weighting function 
that overweighs extreme outcomes which occur with small probabilities and 
underweighs average outcomes which occur with high probabilities. In lieu of this 
point, we assume that bidders overweight the beginning and the end of time 
series
34
. Indeed, one reference point in the context of stock investment is the 
starting point which enjoys a privileged role (Spranca et al. 1991). As well, 
investors partially update their reference point after a stimulus is presented to a 
price between the purchase price and the current price, but they do it incompletely 
(Chen and Rao 2002)
35
. 
The sequential weighting function presented in Fig. 3.1. is s-shaped: it is 
steep near 0 and 1 and mild in-between. Thus, a low interval  0,1 n  and a high 
interval  1 1 ,1n    have more impact than a middle interval  1 ,1 1n n   . 
To compute her next bid, the bidder takes into account a reference point, 
and adjusts her estimates upon the weighted sequential price vector. If the posted 
price is higher than her latest reference point, she revises her value and her bid 
upwards to increase her chance of winning the auction, given that she learns that 
she earns a null payoff with her previous bid: where she does not maximize any 
utility. This could simply mean that she has a higher reservation price for a good 
than the bid she posted in the first round. If the posted price is lower than her 
latest reference point, she will revise her value and her bid downwards in order to 
                                                 
34
 We are drawn to the s-shaped decision-weighting function partly because of convenience to 
represent some non-linear weighting. 
35
 Another reference point used by individuals is the historical peak (Gneezy 2005) and 
expectations about future outcomes (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). 
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augment her payoff, as she learns that she can deviate and still take part to the 
trades: where she maximizes her expected gain and accordingly her utility
36
. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. The sequential price weighting function 
 
As we can see, introducing the sequential price weighting function 
modulates the linear or uniform adaptation of the reference point. In point of fact, 
w  is s-shaped, so the latest posted price and the anchor will most impact the 
valuation of the reference point. Their respective weights amount  1w n  and 
  1 1 1w n  . The rest is distributed among the in-between, that is, 
    1 1 1w n w n  .  
This model lies between evolutionary dynamics and adaptive heuristics. In 
the evolutionary literature, inertia means that the bidder will invariably repeat a 
bid in 1i   she used in i. If her bid is sincere, it implies that she is always bidding 
truthfully. In our case, she will adjust her bid in the direction of the last posted 
price, and an adaptive rule based on the posted prices has an important component 
of heuristics. Since we are dealing with posted prices issued from others‟ bids, 
                                                 
36
 Aumann has argued that rationality should be examined in the context of rules rather than acts, 
i.e. rules of behavior that are better to other rules. 
0 1 
    1 1 1w w n 
   1 0w n w
    1 1 1w n w n 
1 n  1 1 n
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linear or uniform weighting supposed to reveal rationality (Van de Kuilen 2009) 
no longer holds. Bidders with well-defined preferences exploit the market 
mechanism to discover their true preferences. If their preferences satisfy standard 
theoretical requirements, the discovered preference hypothesis implies that 
irrationality is the results of individuals‟ errors, and these can be reduced by 
market experience. However, only later market trials can reveal their true 
preferences. According to this rationale, when the bidder has discovered her value, 
moving from it becomes irrational. In fact, because the bidder has discovered her 
preferences, adjusting her bid upon posted prices cannot be considered rational, 
for truth-telling is rational and affiliating private values on public signaling is not. 
Although we accept the model of discovered preferences, because we consider it 
to reveal the anchor, we believe that bidders can partially adapt their reference 
point according to posted prices and still be sincere. 
We thus model the concept of inertia as high weighting of the anchor, 
which stands for truthful bidding and high regard to freshly discovered 
preferences. Adjustment means adaptive rule based on adaptation of the reference 
point in the direction of the posted price. It helps a bidder to maximize her 
expected payoff, which is after all the only purpose that matters to rationality. 
From the above, the two components simply suggest that sincere bidders are 
boundedly rational. Once a bidder has discovered her preferences, she is 
considered insincere only if she scales her references point upon the posted prices 
issued from others‟ bids with uniform sequential weighting, i.e. null inertia, where 
her anchor – a result of discovered preferences hypothesis – would be drowned by 
the sequence of posted prices. The following proposition comes into existence. 
 
Proposition 3.2.: A bidder is truth-telling inasmuch as she behaves as a 
(boundedly rational) utility maximizer
37
, i.e. so long as she bids pursuant to the 
sequential s-shaped weighting function. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
                                                 
37
 This can be connected to the equation [11] where   .  
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The correlation between bids comes from the commonly observed history 
of play and each bidder‟s actions are determined by the history. Uniform 
weighting means that at round i each bidder knows the history of the repeated 
one-shot auction; that is, each bidder uniformly considers all prices that were 
posted in all previous rounds. We consider bidders to be sincere if they have 
limited memory and confine their reference point adaptation to their anchor and 
the latest posted price. S-shaped weighting mechanism reflects such a bidding 
strategy. 
Our model predicts that different-type bidders will pursue a similar rule as 
they get into interactions via endogenous market-clearing prices, no matter what 
their anchors are. Of course, preferences are no longer invariable in time due to 
the local weighting function, but this guarantees the high weight given to freshly 
discovered preferences. Besides, bidders still seek to maximize their expected 
payoff. Although bidders would orthodoxically be regarded as irrational, this 
model shows that sincere bidders are just boundedly rational. 
 
3.5. The empirical study 
 
Let us now test the empirical relevance of the sequential weighting 
function. We reprocess the home-grown data from the BDM and NPA 
experimental auctions on the carbon offset (regarded as an unfamiliar good) 
realized by Dragicevic and Ettinger (2009). We analyze the five – out of ten – last 
rounds because we consider bidders and offerers to have discovered their 
preferences after a sufficient number of practice rounds. If bidders or offerers are 
to deceive and compute their bids or offers insincerely, they reasonably do it from 
this point of time. 
Under BDM, the market-clearing price is exogenously and randomly 
chosen from a price list, so the value of the good is worth any market-clearing 
price. If every posted price is uniformly weighted, subjects are naïve. Under NPA, 
the market-clearing price is endogenously and randomly chosen, so the value of 
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the good is worth anybody‟s value participating in the auction. If every posted 
price is uniformly weighted, subjects are insincere because they are copying 
others‟ values. 
As shown in equations 21 and 22, we correspondingly compute the 
following theoretical bids: 
 
 1 1
1 n
i m ii
b b p
i


                [21] 
 11 1
1 2 1
1
n
i h m i h ni
n n
b b p p
n n n
  


  
    
 
            [22] 
 
We estimate bids and offers of the subsequent round according to the 
uniform and s-shaped reference point adaptations previously explained. We use 
one-parameter specification factors 0.61m   for moderate weighing and 
0.69h   for high weighting from Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
38
.  
 
Table 3.1. Unitary sequential weight coefficients 
 
 Round estimate Uniform weighting S-shaped weighting 
 
Anchor In-between Last Price Anchor In-between Last Price 
10th (5–8)39       0.102            0.102          0.102          0.425           0.102         0.115  
Normalization       0.167            0.167          0.167          0.449           0.107         0.121   
       
9th (5–7)       0.122           0.122          0.122          0.448            0.122          0.138   
Normalization       0.200            0.200          0.200          0.471          0.128          0.145   
       
8th (5–6)       0.153            0.153          0.153          0.483            0.153          0.173   
Normalization       0.250            0.250          0.250          0.503           0.159         0.180   
           
7th (5–5)       0.203            0.203          0.203          0.540            0.203         0.230   
Normalization       0.333           0.333          0.333          0.555           0.209         0.236    
                                                 
38
 We rather use linear  1 n  instead of power  1 n

 factoring, because the anchor gets 
underweighted otherwise. 
39
 (. – .): in-between rounds.  
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics of the uniform and s-shaped theoretical estimates 
 
  WTP bids WTA offers 
Auction mechanism nth round 7 8 9 10 7 8 9 10 
          
BDM First bid or offer (5th round)        8.29           8.29           8.29           8.29           8.92           8.92           8.92           8.92    
 Last posted price (n – 1)         1.50           5.00           6.50         13.50           1.50           5.00           6.50         13.50    
 Average real bid or offer        8.39           8.71           8.82           8.61           9.53           9.19           8.67           8.03    
       Average bond between two rounds        0.32        0.11      –0.21       –0.35      –0.56      –1.05 
 Uniform bid or offer average estimate        7.92           7.20           7.06           8.15           8.13           7.35           7.18           8.25    
       Average bond between two rounds      –0.72      –0.14        1.09         0.78      –0.17        1.07 
       t-test* of bonds between two rounds                7.24        1.34      –3.87                   1.19         –0.49         –5.02    
       Average SSE40 (uniform residual)       7.10         10.39         12.19         12.77         10.87         12.81         12.96         13.83    
 S-shaped bid or offer average estimate        7.88           7.53           7.47           8.24           8.23           7.85           7.77           8.53    
       Average bond between two rounds      –0.35      –0.06        0.77       –0.38      –0.08        0.76 
        t-test* of bonds between two rounds               5.04           0.98         –2.98                    0.08         –0.69         –4.11    
       Average SSE (s-shaped residual)       3.85           5.49           6.62           7.33           6.56           7.17           5.90           7.04    
          
NPA First bid or offer        4.77        4.77        4.77        4.77        9.86           9.86           9.86           9.86 
 Last posted price (n – 1)        1.50           8.51           7.84           7.03         10.00           5.00           5.88           7.96    
 Average real bid or offer        6.18           6.12           6.85           6.72           9.17           9.14           9.23           9.37    
       Average bond between two rounds      –0.06           0.73      –0.12       –0.03        0.09        0.14 
 Uniform bid or offer average estimate        4.14           5.33           5.83           6.04           9.11           8.09           7.65           7.71    
       Average bond between two rounds        1.19           0.50           0.21                 –1.02         –0.44        0.07 
       t-test* of bonds between two rounds      –2.41          0.67         –0.60                3.19           2.06           0.09    
       Average SSE (uniform residual)       7.78           5.06           6.64           7.92         10.80           9.90         12.36         19.62    
 S-shaped bid or offer average estimate        4.37           5.21           5.50           5.60           9.39           8.64           8.37           8.42    
       Average bond between two rounds        0.84        0.29        0.10       –0.76      –0.26        0.05 
        t-test* of bonds between two rounds        –1.77           0.50         –0.40              2.66           1.42           0.10    
       Average SSE (s-shaped residual)       6.41           4.22           5.84           6.14           8.66           6.56           7.27         14.81    
 
* H0: The difference between experimental and theoretical average bonds is zero at 5% significance.  
                                                 
40
 SSE: the sum of the squares of the residuals. 
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We normalize the sequential weights to one (Table 3.1.) in order to compute 
the reference point from which the bid or offer is figured out and to compare it to the 
real bid or offer (Table 3.2.). We study both the (insincere) uniform weighting and the 
(sincere) s-shaped weighting. 
Table 3.2. presents the summary statistics of the uniform and s-shaped 
theoretical estimates and their comparison to the experimental results of trials 7–10. 
The WTP market-side is analyzed as follows. If the real bid is greater than or equal to 
the theoretical bid, the bidder overbids regarding her reference point. If the real bid is 
lower than the theoretical bid, the bidder underbids regarding her reference point. 
When the bidder overbids, she values the good more than what her reference point 
suggests. She increases her chances of winning the auction but decreases her expected 
payoff regarding her true value. If the uniform residual is higher than the s-shaped 
residual, the bidder is considered insincere. The WTA market-side is analyzed as 
follows. If the real offer is greater than the theoretical offer, the offerer overoffers 
regarding her reference point. Otherwise, she underoffers. When the offerer 
underoffers, she values the good less than what her reference point suggests. She 
increases her chances of winning the auction but decreases her expected payoff 
regarding her true value. If the uniform residual is higher than the s-shaped residual, 
the offerer is considered insincere. 
 Our first investigation reveals that within BDM, only 26% of offerers and 
22% of bidders stick to their discovered value. Within NPA these figures even 
collapse to 13% for both offerers and bidders, making the auctioning tactical until the 
last round. Let us now see whether agents‟ strategies are based upon market-clearing 
prices by looking at the average bonds in bids and offers between two rounds. Given 
that we believe that agents incorporate public signals into their bidding and offering 
strategies, we analyze the impact of posted prices on their bids and offers, i.e. their 
freshly discovered preferences. We thus look at Student‟s t distribution between 
experimental and theoretical data and regard whether they fit. With NPA and under 
both adaptation weightings, the theoretical bonds in bids and offers are not 
significantly different from the real bonds in bids and offers. The t-test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the theoretical bonds in offers and the real bonds in offers 
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come from the same distribution at the <0.05p  level. With BDM, under both 
adaptation weightings, the theoretical bonds in offers are not significantly different 
from the real bonds in offers. We do not reject the null hypothesis that the theoretical 
and experimental data are equal at the 5% level of a t-test. On the contrary, the 
theoretical bonds in bids are significantly different from the real bonds in under both 
adaptation weightings. Here we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of a t-test. 
The estimated distribution does not fit very well with the real BDM bidding 
distribution. 
Let us now compare the residuals. In the first place, we examine the average 
WTA estimates. Under BDM, although the average real offers are overoffered, we 
notice that the average s-shaped SSE (6.67; 24% of residuals less than 1) is lower 
than the average uniform SSE (12.62; 4% of residuals less than 1), showing that the 
offerers are sincere and weight their anchors heavily. Under NPA, even if the average 
real offers are overoffered, the average s-shaped SSE (9.33; 33% of residuals less 
than 1) is lower than the average uniform SSE (13.17; 30% of residuals less than 1), 
which suggests truthful offering. Yet, the values of the two weighting mechanisms 
are close, which is unsurprising since the market-clearing prices are issued from the 
offers. We see that the difference between refining and imitating is thin but real. 
Secondly, we observe the average WTP bids. Under BDM, we can see that the 
average s-shaped SSE (5.82; 41% of residuals less than 1) is lower than the average 
uniform SSE (10.61; 30% of residuals less than 1), showing that the bidders weight 
their anchors enough to remain sincere, even though the average real bids are overbid. 
Under NPA, in spite of the fact that the average real bids are overbid, the average s-
shaped SSE (5.65; 23% of residuals less than 1) is lower than the average uniform 
SSE (6.85; 18% of residuals less than 1), which also suggests truthful bidding. Again, 
the thin difference between the two weighting mechanisms shows that bidders take 
into account the posted prices not to behave insincerely but to increase their expected 
payoff. 
We then regress on the first bid and the list of posted prices, which allows us 
to obtain respective  -factors from equations 21 and 22 and compare them to those 
of Tversky and Kahneman. The least squares regression results are presented in Table 
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3.3. All estimates are significant, i.e. all p-values amount less than 0.001, and all R-
squares are higher than 0.9. Despite the fact that they are comparable, we find that 
each one of the market-sides has its own  . We do not identify m  in s-shaped 
weighting because the factor oscillates around zero and is not significant; therefore, 
bidders and offerers simply weight the anchor and the last posted-price, which proves 
their sincerity as well as the relevance of our descriptive model. As one notices, the 
regression factors we used to compute theoretical estimates are higher than those 
usually elicitated in the gain and loss perception. However, they are in accordance 
with experimental data surpassing our predictions. 
 
Table 3.3.  -factors statistics 
 
 estimate41 Uniform weighting  S-shaped weighting 
 
 
BDM NPA  BDM NPA 
Bidders 1.18 (0.02) 1.24 (0.03)  1.24 (0.03) 1.16 (0.06) 
Offerers 1.19 (0.02) 1.17 (0.03)  1.15 (0.03) 1.21 (0.07) 
 
 Let us now discuss about the implications of the differences between the 
uniform and s-shaped estimates and the real bids or offers. Because market-clearing 
prices are exogenously determined under BDM, even though the risk of a uniform 
reference point adaptation exists, it does not compromise the incentive-compatibility. 
In experiments, bidders and offerers are foreseen as sincere. At worst, they are naïve, 
for it is irrational to run after luck. On the WTA market-side, the average s-shaped 
SSE is lower than the average uniform SSE, indicating that offerers are sincere: they 
refine their values in time. We observe the predominance of the s-shaped weighting 
on the WTP market-side as well. Finally, we denote that the average SSE is higher on 
the offerers‟ side than on the bidders‟ side. This is due to loss aversion of three out of 
eighteen offerers, who systematically proposed a ceiling WTA. When we ignore 
them, the average SSE is similar between both market-sides. 
                                                 
41
 Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Because market-clearing prices are endogenously determined under NPA, not 
only does the risk of a uniform reference point adaptation exist, but it compromises 
the incentive-compatibility of the market mechanism. Bidders and offerers are 
foreseen as potentially insincere. On the WTA market-side, the average s-shaped SSE 
is lower than the average uniform SSE, suggesting that the offerers are sincere. 
Furthermore, the average SSE is higher on the offerers‟ side than on the bidders‟ side. 
This can be explained by loss aversion of two out of sixteen offerers, who proposed a 
ceiling WTA in each round, and by one offerer who had no stable strategy. When we 
ignore them, the average SSE remains above the SSE of the buyers‟ market-side, but 
is similar to the average SSE of the BDM sellers‟ market-side. We also observe lower 
average s-shaped SSE on the WTP market-side, which illustrates sincere bidding. The 
NPA average buyers‟ SSE is the lowest, all auction mechanisms and market-sides 
taken into account. 
At last, we notice that average WTP estimates, under both auction 
mechanisms, are beneath the average real bids: the real bids and offers are always 
higher than what the model suggests. Given that the bidders and offerers were 
confirmed to be sincere, we believe this is due to the reference point adaptation 
overstated by the combination of regret and competitive pressure. Indeed, theory of 
disappointment aversion (Horowitz 2006b) says that a bidder reports a higher value 
than the true one, simply because she is more disappointed from not receiving the 
good than from receiving it overpriced
42
. Let us recall that the WTP and WTA value 
measures approach equality more by virtue of the steady increase of the buyers‟ bids 
than the weak decrease of the sellers‟ offers. When we proceed to the computation of 
the NPA s-shaped estimates on the WTP market-side, but consider the posted prices 
issued from the offers instead of the bids, not only do we obtain an average SSE of 
4.17 but also average WTP estimates almost equal to the real bids
43
. This unexpected 
result can stand for a high influence of the sellers‟ clearing prices on the bidders‟ 
                                                 
42
 An alternative formulation of joy-of-winning was tested by Goeree et al. (2002) but they find that it 
does not add anything to the explanation of overbidding. 
43
 This cannot hold with BDM, because the market clearing price is the same for both market-sides and 
because it is exogenously and randomly drawn from a known list. 
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reference point adaptation. It can also mean that the WTA posted prices – unlike the 
WTP posted prices – incorporate a behavioral effect of loss aversion combined with 
competitive pressure, which works as a catalyst, from the very beginning. The 
magnitude of disappointment aversion and loss aversion would then be similar, and a 
way to verify it is to call to mind the likeness of  -factors between bidders and 
offerers. The excess in these values could be the quantitative measure of the 
competition‟s pressure. 
To end this section, let us verify if it is worthwhile deviating such as 
suggested by rational deviation. We compute the percentage of expected bidders and 
offerers who win some positive payoff by sticking to their anchor, and the percentage 
of expected bidders and offerers who win some positive payoff by deviating from 
their anchor according to the last market-clearing price. We then do the same 
computation on real payoffs obtained by not deviating and deviating from the anchor. 
The results presented in Table 3.4. show that deviating pays, since both expected and 
real deviating gainers outnumber. 
 
Table 3.4. Comparison between extra expected and real winners from deviation 
 
per cent BDM WTP BDM WTA NPA WTP NPA WTA 
Extra expected deviant 
gainers 2.63 4.17 10.00 10.94 
Extra real deviant 
gainers 0.00 2.78 3.33 3.13 
 
Second, we measure up the average expected payoffs with and without 
deviation with real payoffs with and without deviation. The results are presented in 
Table 3.5. We observe that deviating is in general gainful, for only BDM offerers are 
penalized for having moved from their anchor (they get a negative payoff on average) 
which is unsurprising in view of the fact that the exogenous market-clearing price 
makes it inevitably a naïve strategy. Within NPA, adjusting the discovered value 
upon posted prices paid in both expected and real scenarios. 
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Table 3.5. Comparison between extra expected and real gains from deviation 
 
on average BDM WTP BDM WTA NPA WTP NPA WTA 
Extra expected gain 
from deviation 0.13 –0.36 0.72 0.09 
Extra real gain 
from deviation 0.13 –0.22 0.26 0.08 
 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
 
The validity of incentives for truthful value revelation is questioned whenever 
someone‟s probability of winning depends on the moves of others, such as with 
endogenous market-clearing price auctions. Still, should this imply that results 
obtained from experiments in the random nth-price auction have no meaning because 
of the risk of uniform reference point adaptation? It amounts to saying that 
experimentalists have to choose between the absence of market learning under BDM 
and the risk of dependence of private values that exists under NPA. 
In repeated-round experimental auctions, the private-value-independence 
assumption behind the incentive-compatibility may be unrealistic and malapropos. 
When bids get correlated, the observed bid for a good after a round impacts the 
estimated price of the good at the next round. Individuals then revise their beliefs to 
reflect this information. With endogenous market-clearing prices, we believe that 
bidders start their valuation with a naïve anchor – their first reference point – and then 
adjust their value using market reference points encoded in the sequential price 
weighting function. They sort prices from present to past and weight these prices 
using an s-shape function. 
Although quite simple and sometimes looked upon with a critical eye, our 
behavioral model underlines the validity of incentive-compatibility of both the BDM 
and NPA auction mechanisms. Contrary to conventional models, it shows that 
accounting for posted prices without rejecting the incentive-compatibility enables to 
differentiate sincere from insincere bidding or offering. Until some proper method 
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enables to distinguish learning from affiliating, we believe incentive-compatibility 
need not be excluded in presence of reference point adaptation, as long as one verifies 
the heavy weighting of the anchor. We thus suggest a different form of rationality 
within incentive-compatibility constraints where the correlated equilibrium plays a 
key role.  
Nevertheless, the nature of the market-clearing price plays a significant role. 
When it is endogenous, i.e. issued from the bids of offers instead of drawn from a 
uniform price list, subjects tend to fix it and refine their reference point according to 
it, even if it is randomly chosen. In detail, our results suggest that bidders tend to 
overstate their bids as if posted prices were of the WTA level, because these 
incorporate lifting behavioral effects. Accordingly, market discipline and competition 
seem not only to reveal preferences and to moderate early loss aversion, but also to 
unveil belated disappointment aversion and competitive pressure which can arise 
when buyers interactively value an unfamiliar nonmarket good. This avenue of 
research requires more attention. 
Instead of condemning behaviors that tie in and considering the NPA 
mechanism as a lesser evil, we believe that the good approach is to investigate 
conditions under which incentive-compatibility constraints can be remade. In this 
case, the notion of truth, which is undeniably contingent on human perception, 
convention, and social experience, should be reformulated. Our model is one attempt.  
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3.8. Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. 
 
Let us give evidence through a numerical example that deviation in repeated-
round auctions, in terms of adaptation of the reference point, is preferable. 
Suppose an initial reference point value r . The last posted price amounts 1r  . 
The bidder faces an equiprobable trend of the value, i.e. bullish 1r   or bearish 
1r  . She can update her reference point according to the last posted price. 
Updating a reference point equals to the average differential such as: 
 
 
     1 0.5 1 0.5 1
3
r r r r r r
v
       
  
 
Let us now compare cases with and without adaptation of the reference point. In 
spite of the last posted price, the reference point is not updated and remains at r . 
In this case, the expected value is: 
 
1 1
( 1) 0.5( 1 ) 0.5( 1 ) 1 1 0.5
2 3
v r r r r r r
 
              
 
 
 
The reference point is updated to 1r   due to the last posted price. In this case, 
the expected value is: 
 
 
1
( 1 1) 0.5( 1 1) 0.5( 1 1) 2 0 1 1
3
v r r r r r r                  
 
One can directly see that <v v , which implies a larger expected payoff by 
reference point updating, or rationally deviating. Therefore, adaptation of the 
reference point is preferred to the current state of affairs. 
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Consider the following payoff matrix with a mixed strategy. Now suppose a third 
trusted party posts the market-clearing price which reveals some public signal.  
Each player has an incentive to rationally deviate instead of sticking to her anchor 
with some positive probability, if the public signal instructs to do so, by learning 
she has no chance of winning any positive payoff. While each player wants to 
deviate and to increase her expected payoff, she hopes that the other player does 
not act alike, as her payoff can depend on the bid of the other player: illustrating 
the endogeneity of the market price. Therefore, we have: 
 
 Each player discovers alone her preferences and thus her expected payoff  .  
 A player deviates to increase her expected payoff to 1   if she finds out that 
her expected payoff is close to zero, but she hopes that the other player does 
not move from her own anchor; conversely, she expects a payoff of 2   if 
she stays while the other player deviates. 
 The market price comes from the bids. When a player follows the market price 
or v p , she risks a null payoff because v p   , explaining the absence of 
payoff in the last cell where all bids converged. 
 
 stay deviate 
stay   ,   2  , 1   
deviate 1  , 2   0 , 0 
 
The third party only tells each player what she is supposed to do. There is a 
correlated equilibrium if no player refuses to follow the instruction. So if the row 
player receives the signal „deviate‟ given she has no chance to win some positive 
payoff, she has no incentive not to follow, because she can make a positive payoff 
by deviating from her anchor, which is better in expectation. The row player 
assigns a positive conditional probability of 0.5 to each of the two pairs of signals 
(stay, deviate) and (deviate, deviate). If the column player follows the same rule, 
the (uncorrelated) expected payoff of the mixed strategy equilibrium by:  
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- staying is:      
1 1 1
2 2 2 1
2 2 2
            
- deviating is :      
1 1 1
1 0 1 0.5 0.5
2 2 2
           
 
The expected payoff must be positive, that is, the row player‟s expected gain of 
staying must verify >1 , whereas her expected gain of deviating must verify 
> 1  . Therefore, she is better-off by deviating, meaning that she is better-off by 
seeking the higher expected payoff. The game being symmetrical, the column 
player has no incentive not to follow her instruction either.  We know that a player 
will never refuse to follow the recommendation resulting from the public signal in 
case of higher expected payoff.  
 
If we now look at the correlated equilibrium, as there is necessarily one, it yields 
probabilities of ⅓ to each combination that yields some positive outcome. In this 
case, the expected payoff verifies   greater than ⅓, which in return weakly 
dominates the strategy of staying (sticking to the anchor). Provided that expected 
payoffs are increased, each player takes the public price into account, making the 
decisions correlated and bids follow the same trend, which induces „affiliation of 
values‟ in view of the standard rationality.                
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. 
 
Then, let us show that a bidder who updates her reference point is sincere if she 
assigns a high weight on the anchor or she is subject to high inertia. Suppose a 
low-type bidder value and posted market-clearing prices issued from high-type 
bidders, such that market prices are greater than the anchor. For the purpose, let us 
once again take a numerical example. Assume a weight of 0.69 for the anchor and 
the last posted price and a weight of 0.61 for the in-between, after the losses and 
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gains factors in Tversky and Kahenman (1992). Assume there are five rounds at 
stake. 
 
With an unnormalized uniform weighting, we obtain the following cumulative 
weighting: 
 
last price in-between posted prices anchor
1 1 1 1 1 1
0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 0.102 0.610
           
               
           
  
 
 
As one can see, each round receives an equal weight, which means that the anchor 
is drowned in time by the sequence of posted prices. 
 
With an unnormalized s-shaped weighting, we obtain the following cumulative 
weighting: 
 
 
last price in-between posted prices anchor
1 1 1 1
0.69 0 0.61 1 0.61 1 0.69 1
6 6 6 6
0.115 4 0.102 0.425 0.947
            
                  
            
    
 
 
This graphical representation corresponds to the example of cumulated ranks on 
the x-axis and accumulated weight on the y-axis: 
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As we can see, the anchor, i.e. the right-hand side of the graph, receives the 
highest weight. If the asocial valuation gets a high weight on the topic of the value 
refinement in time, the bidder‟s valuation is not fully captured by the sequential 
market-clearing prices. Regarding our low-type bidder, the risk of deviating from 
her anchor, while she updates her reference point, is lower with the s-shaped 
weighting than with the uniform weighting.                
 
 1 6  5 6
 0.69 1 6 0
 1 0.69 5 6
 0.61 4 6
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Competitive Private Supply of Public Goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter compares guilt alleviation and competition for social status in the private 
provision of a public good. When agents are intrinsically impulsed, that is, they 
mostly provide the public good in order to alleviate their guilt, they tend to free-ride. 
In contrast, when agents are extrinsically impulsed and compete for social status, 
their provisions become strategic complements. In the latter case, the aggregate level 
of the public good increases as the disparity between agents‟ incomes shrinks. 
Injecting competition for social status into utility functions increases provisions to a 
public good, and hence its aggregate level. Market competition thus creates incentives 
to overcome the free-riding issue. 
 
Keywords: public good private supply, guilt relieving, social status, competition, 
income transfer 
JEL Classification: A13, C7, H41 
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"Guilt is the price we pay willingly 
for doing what we are going to do 
anyway." Isabelle Holland 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The voluntary offset market enables agents to pay for their negative 
externalities issued from carbon emissions by investing in projects that reduce 
emissions or sequester carbon, such as tree planting or renewable energy. The 
reduction of carbon emissions is a public good because, once provided, agents can 
enjoy the benefits devoid of rivalry, without excluding anyone from its consumption.  
Some people believe that the voluntary offset market is inefficient. One of the 
arguments put forward is that offsetting validates polluting behavior. Likewise, 
offsetting is said to operate like charities: voluntary supplies never provide enough 
public good because of the free-rider incentive. And when private arrangements 
finance a public good, free-riding on other people‟s provisions is rational. 
However, free-riding is limited to some extent because agents who purchase 
offsets may also derive private benefits. Olson (1965) advances the hypothesis that 
free-riding can be overcome through social incentives. According to him, agents do 
not privately supply a public good for its direct material benefit, but to achieve social 
objectives like prestige or respect; this would explain why individuals do less free-
riding than what the economic theory suggests. Following this rationale, Hawkes et 
al. (1993) show that in ancient times hunters and gatherers tended to share their 
resources because the cost of exclusion from the group – where every agent prefers a 
supplier to a consumer as a neighbor – was too high to risk, thus making resources a 
public good. 
This impure approach of pro-social behavior has been modeled by Andreoni 
(1990) who justifies private provisions in terms of warm-glow or joy-of-giving. Our 
approach differs from Andreoni‟s and rejoins Olson‟s, for we consider social status 
gained by agents who privately supply a public good from its relative perspective. As 
a matter of fact, supplying to the public good can generate benefits of guilt relief – 
which we find more convincing than warm-glow – and/or social status. In the first 
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case, agents want to feel better about themselves, because they want to recover self-
esteem after producing a public bad. If an agent feels guilty, because she believes she 
bears responsibility for carbon excesses, then guilt alleviation through carbon 
offsetting is a private benefit derived from the supply of the public good. Despite the 
private benefit, the motivation for it is internal. It is thus an intrinsic incentive. Since 
guilt arousal is positively related to donation intention (Hibbert et al. 2007), guilt 
alleviation has positive impacts on environmental awareness. Then, agents compete 
to be formally acknowledged as being the most concerned about the public good. 
This prosocial behavior can be due to social pressure and norms and corresponds to 
an extrinsic incentive. An agent who offsets receives a proof acknowledging her 
provision to the public good. She thus sends a signal to make other agents aware of 
her polluting abatement. Following this rationale, producers will also promote their 
offsets as part of their corporate social responsibility policy (Kotchen 2009). 
People have a preference for showing altruism in situations that facilitate 
broadcast opportunities, and the provision of a public good is certainly one such 
situation (Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). De facto, what type of incentives should be 
introduced to increase private provisions? Are competitive settings such as auctions a 
good solution to the inefficient provision of a public good? Do agents become more 
generous by guilt or by craving for social status? 
If high status brings with it high earnings, then status seeking behavior can be 
explained as a part of economic behavior (Ball and Eckel 1998). According to 
competitive altruism, despite the dearness of being publicly generous, agents can 
promote their generosity as potential exchange partners, reaping the benefits later on 
(Roberts 1998). Agents also refuse transactions that are in their best economic interest 
when they feel they are an insult to their dignity (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). 
Experimental literature has confirmed the role of individual status as an incentive 
affecting market outcomes (Ball et al. 2001) and donors (Duffy and Kornienko 2005). 
Because of the rivalry and excludability in social hierarchy, agents have to compete 
before attaining some desired social status: if an agent desires to be the first or among 
the first in some venture, she might have to make the most efforts to reach her goal. 
Making the most efforts means that she has knowledge of her challengers and of the 
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efforts she has to invest. In this case, how does competition influence an agent‟s 
voluntary supply of a public good? Competitive mechanisms, such as contests, have 
shown to increase the voluntary provision of a public good (Kolmar and Wagener 
2008). 
This chapter investigates how competition influences private provisions of the 
public good when agents are stirred by an intrinsic impulse, meaning that they mainly 
maximize utility from guilt relief, as opposed to when they are stirred by an extrinsic 
impulse, suggesting that they mainly maximize utility from social status. Our public 
good game unveils several results: first, we find that when status seeking dominates 
guilt relief, private provisions become strategic complements: an attribute which 
increases the aggregate level of the public good. Then, we prove sufficient conditions 
for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. At last, when agents behave 
according to their best-response functions, we find that the aggregate level of the 
public good depends on the disparity between agents‟ incomes, which – depending on 
the nature of the provisions – induces a particular income transfer policy. 
We give a basic account of the social status function and present the public 
good game in Section 4.2. We provide a model of logarithmic best-response functions 
and describe explicit properties of a Nash equilibrium in Section 4.3. Concluding 
comments are given in Section 4.4. 
 
4.2. The public good game 
 
Let us first introduce the social status function. Consider n agents who 
produce the public good by devoting some of their endowment w into the public good 
g . Following Frank (1985), let us suppose that each agent cares about her social 
status with respect to the other 1n  agents.  
 
Definition 4.1.: The social status function is a continuously differentiable function 
 ,i i is s g g  where ig  is the provision of agent i, ig  is the provision of other 
agents. The level of the provision to the public good determines social status. If 
 f g  is the density function for g values which determines the social status of the 
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agents and 0g  is the smallest provision to the public good g among the n agents, then 
an agent with 0 < ng g  will have a social status function such that: 
  
   
0
g
n
g
s g f g dg              [1] 
 
where  f g  increases as g  moves towards the maximum value of its domain. 
 
Let us consider two agents i and j, with j i . Let iw  be agent i‟s endowment, 
let ix  denote her consumption of the private good, let G be the aggregate level of 
public good and let ig  account for her provision to the public good. The aggregate 
level of public good is the sum of the two agents‟ provisions i jG g g  . Agent i‟s 
social status is determined by her relative contribution i i js g g 
44
. Agents have 
preferences represented by the following utility function: 
 
 , ,i i i iu u x G s             [2] 
 
Considering agent j‟s provision jg  as exogenous, agent i maximizes her 
utility by solving the following program: 
 
 
,
max , ,
i i
i i i
x g
u x G s  subject to i i ix g w   and 0ig         [2'] 
 
Let us now determine the Nash equilibrium of the public good game. Each 
agent‟s best-response function fully specifies her equilibrium strategy. This strategy 
involves choosing a level of private supply to the public good, the private supply of 
the other agent being exogenous. We first analyze the best response functions of each 
                                                 
44
 According to Auriol and Renault (2008), social status is a scarce resource: increasing an agent‟s 
status requires that another agent‟s status decreases. 
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agent. We thus study the two motives for contributing to the public good: to relieve 
guilt and to acquire social status. 
 
Assume the marginal utility from the provision to the public good to be:  
 
 , , i i ii i i
i i
u u u
H x G s
G s x
  
  
  
          [3] 
 
The first term denotes the marginal utility from the public good. The second term 
represents the marginal efficacy of social status. The last term is the marginal fall in 
the consumption of private goods. We then make three assumptions on H .  
 
A1: 
2 2 2
2
0i i i i
i i i i i
H u u u
x x G x s x
   
   
     
         [4] 
 
A1 says that an increase of income increases the marginal utility of the supply of the 
public good. The assumption is referred to as the normality assumption because it is 
satisfied if we assume that both private and public goods are normal with respect to 
income. It simply says that agent i‟s demand for the public good increases with 
income and her demand for private goods does not decrease with income. 
 
A2: 
2 2 2
2
0i i i i
i i i
H u u u
G G G s G x
   
   
     
         [5] 
 
A2 states that the marginal utility of the public good decreases with G. As a matter of 
fact, if the level of the public good increases independently of agent i‟s supply, there 
is no incentive to contribute to the public good. This is a formal foundation for the 
free-riding issue. Considering negative externalities, it simply means that any agent 
can compensate for the damage caused, and all agents can profit from its reparation. 
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A3: 
2 2 2
2
0i i i i
i i i i i
H u u u
s s G s s x
   
   
     
          [6] 
 
A3 implies that an increase in social status creates negative incentives: the agent 
tends to reduce her supply to the public good, because she no longer has to compete 
for social status. 
 According to the previous assumptions and following the work on warm-glow 
by Andreoni (1990), we now consider that individuals obtain guilt relief and social 
status from their private supply of the public good. Following the first order 
condition, agent i‟s best response, that is,  ,i i ir w g , is to have ig  such as: 
 
 , , 0i i i i j i jr H w g g g g g               [7] 
 
A Nash equilibrium of the public good game is a couple of strategies * *,i jg g  such that 
each strategy is the best response to the other agent‟s strategy:  
 
 * *,i i i jg r w g  with j i            [8] 
 
Let us now look at the second order condition to see whether contributing to 
the public good does in fact maximize an agent‟s function. The second order 
condition is satisfied for: 
 
0i i i i
i i i i
dH H H H
dg G s x
  
   
  
           [9] 
 
The sign of the differential implies a diminishing marginal utility of the public good 
as the agent supplies the public good. Negativity depends on three terms. The first 
term measures the outcome of any provision to the public good on the marginal utility 
of the public good. This is our indicator of free-riding. The second term values the 
outcome of a shift in the social status on the marginal utility of the public good. It 
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allows us to study the interactions between the aggregate level of the public good and 
social status in the utility function. The third term assesses the impact of a decrease in 
private goods‟ consumption on the marginal utility of the public good. 
Let us now consider the effect of agent j‟s supply on the marginal utility of 
agent i‟s supply:  
 
i i i
j i i
dH H H
dg G s
 
 
 
          [10] 
 
This effect is ambiguous, for the first term is negative while the second one is 
positive. The first term denotes a typical free-riding issue: an increase of agent j‟s 
provision reduces agent i‟s incentive to contribute; except that the second term 
denotes status seeking, thus an opposite effect, as social status decreases with agent 
j‟s supply. Indeed, agent i suffers from the reduction in the level of public good due 
to carbon emissions, thus any private provision that increases the public good also 
increases agent i‟s utility. Provided that any supply removes her feelings of guilt, she 
can free-ride on others‟ provisions and allocate all her endowment to the private 
goods instead. This is a counter-incentive to supply the public good. In parallel, agent 
i suffers from status loss in social hierarchy every time others supply the public good. 
Therefore jg  is also an incentive to contribute in order to maintain the level of social 
status. 
The sign of the best-response function slope of agent i is: 
 
i ji
j i i
dH dgr
g dH dg


 
          [11] 
 
The sign depends on which effect prevails: guilt relieving or status seeking. 
According to the terms of Bulow et al. (1985), if free-riding dominates social 
hierarchy or >0i jr g  , we are in the presence of strategic substitutes, and strategic 
complements vice versa. Despite the fact that in standard public good games (even in 
the presence of an impure public good) the only effect at stake is free-riding and 
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public good provisions are always strategic substitutes: injecting competition for 
social status converts the provisions into strategic complements in some cases. 
A Nash equilibrium is a set of provisions that satisfies the aggregation of 
supplies. Let us prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. For a 
Nash equilibrium between agents to exist, one must verify: 
 
 , 1,1i j j i
i i j j
dH dg dH dg
dH dg dH dg
 
 
        [12] 
 
The slopes of the best-response functions are bounds within the interval  1,1 . The 
binding conditions are sufficient for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4.1.: If [12] is satisfied, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
Let us now see what happens when the policy of income transfer is instituted. 
Consider the ratio which confronts the two motives involved in the public good‟s 
supply. The expression returns to an intrinsic impulse coefficient such as: 
  
   2
i i
i
i i i i
H x
H x H s

 

    
         [13] 
 
The numerator measures the marginal utility of the public good and stands for 
the intrinsic (contrite) impulse of guilt relief to supply the public good. It depends on 
agent i‟s income and thus on her opportunity loss when she doesn‟t purchase the 
private goods. Here, agent i is indifferent between consuming her own supply or 
benefiting from agent j‟s supply of the public good. In Andreoni‟s terminology, this 
phenomenon means pure altruism or selflessness of agent i. Here, we consider the 
numerator as a measure of free-riding on others‟ provisions. 
 138 
The denominator represents the influence of social status on the marginal 
utility of the public good and stands for the extrinsic (social) impulse of status 
seeking to supply the public good. Just as with the numerator, it depends on agent i‟s 
income, but it depends on social status above all, that is, marginal utility of the public 
good derived from her own provision (analogue to Andreoni‟s impure altruism). 
Given that status is acquired by relative provisions, the effect of social status counts 
twice. First, consuming more of the x‟s decreases agent i‟s provision to the public 
good and thus her social status; second, more of jg  implies lower social status for 
agent i, all else being equal. For those reasons, the intrinsic impulse coefficient is 
inversely proportional to status seeking. 
 
Proposition 4.2.: An income transfer from agent j  to agent i , such that 
0i jdw dw    increases G  if and only if >i j  .  
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
Agents are unwilling to perfectly substitute their provisions to offset a 
transfer. If >i j   then agent i can be considered to be less status seeking than agent 
j. Hence, the policy of income transfer will increase (decrease or not change) the 
aggregate level of the public good if and only if the income gainer is less status 
seeking than (more status seeking than or equally status seeking than) the income 
loser. This proposition is comparable to that of Andreoni, but our interpretation is 
different. In fact, since competition for social status encourages agents to supply the 
public good, only an increase in income will motivate the lower income agent to 
supply more
45
, for it enables her to compete for social status. Without transfer, her 
position discourages her to race for social status and she can only relieve her guilt. 
The direct consequence is free-riding on other agents‟ provisions. Another way of 
understanding the proposition is: since the higher income agent proves – with a 
                                                 
45
 For example, OECD (2007) suggests monetary transfers in benefit of low income households when 
imposing environmental taxes. 
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higher level of supply which reflects higher income – to be more extrinsically 
impulsed, she does not have to contribute more to the public good. She is in no doubt 
to hold the social status ex ante. 
Our model is a way-out to Andreoni‟s impure altruism and warm-glow giving. 
What he calls pure altruism, we identify as guilt relief and free-riding, while his 
impure altruism corresponds to our willingness to compete for social status, which is 
observable via any non-anonymous donation. The model is thus an alternative and a 
more realistic way to explain prosocial behavior. 
 
4.3. The explicit logarithmic model 
 
4.3.1. The program 
 
Following the model by Kumru and Vesterlund (2008) and Munoz-Garcia 
(2008), agents have preferences represented by the following separable nonlinear 
utility function: 
 
     , , ln lni i i i i i iu x G s x G s           [14] 
 
where i jG g g   and i i js g g  . Private goods are included in the first term, while 
provisions are included in the second term which is nondecreasing in ig . The latter 
measures utility derived from guilt relief based on the aggregate level of the public 
good G  and social hierarchy is  which are separable. 
We assume that individuals originate guilt relief from their private supply of 
the public good. Agent i‟s preferences when she provides the public good by ig  are 
defined by: 
 
 i i jg g   for j i           [15] 
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The expression denotes the utility that agent i gets from supplying to the 
public good and the aggregate level of the public good scaled by a specific index 
0i  . The aggregation of provisions corresponds to the public good dimension of 
the utility function. We assume that some willingness to relieve guilt is stated by 
either agent
46
. For example, either agent could relieve guilt with a single symbolic 
coin when participating in charity auctions. 
Agent i gets utility from social status when she provides the public good by 
ig
47
. Her status is given by the distance between her provision and that of agent j‟s 
such as: 
 
 i i jg g   for j i           [16] 
 
Agent i enhances her status in the social hierarchy if her provision 
outdistances agent j‟s; otherwise, her social status deteriorates. The status is scaled by 
a specific index i , with 0i  , which measures agent i‟s willingness to acquire 
social status. When agents provide identical provisions, the term vanishes. In the 
equilibrium, agent i knows whether she acquires social status through her private 
supply of the public good ( ig > jg ). The explicit maximization program is then: 
 
        
,
max , , , ln ln
subject to ,  0
i i
i i j i i i i j i i j
x g
i i i
u x g g s w g g g g g
x g w g
       
 
  
    [17] 
 
The first term represents the utility derived from the consumption of private 
goods ix . The second term corresponds to the utility that agent i obtains from her 
supply of the public good. Agent j‟s provision is both a strategic substitute and a 
strategic complement of agent i‟s utility. As a strategic substitute, two obvious 
                                                 
46
 Social comparison theory suggests that individuals have a need to compare themselves to individuals 
whom they deem are similar to them (Goethals 1986). 
47
 A status-based model of market competition has already been introduced by Podolny (1993). 
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interpretations come out. First, agent i suffers from the public good diminishment due 
to carbon emissions, thus any private provision that increases the public good also 
increases agent i‟s utility indexed by i . Second, since any provision removes her 
feelings of guilt, she can free-ride on others‟ provisions and allocate all her 
endowment to the consumption of the private goods. To consider agent j‟s provision 
as a strategic complement is to consider that agent i suffers from status loss in social 
hierarchy every time agent j provides the public good. Therefore, agent j‟s private 
provision decreases agent i‟s utility. 
 
4.3.2. Reaction functions 
 
Now suppose both agents decide to submit their provisions to the public good. 
Given jg , differentiating  u   with respect to ig  gives ir , agent i‟s best-response 
function: 
 
 
1
,
2 2
i
i i j i j
A
r w g w g   if max ,i ij
i i
w w
g
A A
 
  
 
      [18] 
 
where i ii
i i
A
 
 



.  
 
Whether ir  is constrained depends on the level of jg . For small values of jg , 
agent i  allocates a part of her income to the supply of public good. For sufficiently 
high values of jg , agent i can supply either nothing or her full income. Whichever 
occurs depends on the sign of i i  .  
 
Corollary 4.1.: The difference between i  and i  determines whether provisions are 
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
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When >i i   or 0iA  , ir  is the best-response only when j i ig w A , which 
is a nonnegative number. If agent j surpasses this threshold, agent i has fairly no 
incentive to make positive provisions. In point of fact, even a quasi-null level of ig  
(nonnegative by definition) enables agent i to maximize her utility by allocating her 
income to more private goods while alleviating her guilt through agent j‟s provisions. 
We could think of an individual who pays tribute to the collective high efforts in 
providing the public good while ending up self-pleased by giving a single coin. 
When i i   or 0iA  , agent i is equally concerned by guilt alleviation and 
social hierarchy. This time, ir  is equal to  ½ iw  for  0,jg   . Her provision is 
always the half of her income, but she has no incentive to contribute more than that. 
This is the behavior of an autonomous agent who disregards the provisions of the 
opponent. We could think of an individual who invariably contributes to the public 
good in order to alleviate her guilt – because some moral obligation incites her to do 
so –, but who does not discredit the positive spillover on her social rank, even if she is 
not centered upon the social ranking matter. This agent is either blind or denies the 
possibility of acting as a free-rider. 
At last, when <i i   or 0iA  , ir  holds if j i ig w A  , otherwise i ir w  and 
agent i allocates her full income to the supply of the public good. Provisions are then 
strategic complements: every time agent j increases her supply, agent i has an 
incentive to increase her supply to stay in the race for the social status up to the point 
where her full income is spent. 
According to the foregoing results, Fig. 4.1. illustrates the best-response 
functions which meet at the bisection line, observed from symmetric cases 
i j     and i j    . Each best-response function – initiated from the 
reference point which is the opponent‟s null provision – is v-shaped, i.e. separated 
into two segments following opposite slopes. 
The black straight lines depict agent i‟s best-response functions. The grey 
straight lines depict agent j‟s best-response functions. We have three cases: (i) when 
the intrinsic impulse dominates >0A , their best-response functions decrease in their 
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opponents‟ provisions and the public good is weakly provided, for respective 
provisions are less than 2, 2i jw w ; (ii) when the extrinsic impulse dominates <0A  
their best-response functions increase in their opponents‟ provisions and the public 
good is highly provided, equilibrium provisions‟ exceed 2, 2i jw w ; (iii) when 
impulses are identical 0A  ,  equilibrium provisions are 2, 2i jw w . 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Agents i’s and j’s best-response functions 
 
Let us now differentiate ir  with respect to i  to observe the elasticity of the 
best-response function vis-à-vis guilt: 
 
 
2
< 0
i ji
i i i
gr 
  

 
 
         [19] 
 
The derivative i ir    is strictly negative and agent i‟s best-response function 
decreases in i , for all jg . Since the benefit from the consumption of the public good 
is negligible and contributing to the public good is an opportunity cost by cause of 
less consumption of ix , agent i has no incentive to provide the public good so agent j 
0 
gj 
45° 
j jw A
i iw A
2jw
2iw
>0A
0A 
<0A
gi 
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could ease her guilt. In the same way, agent j‟s provision is a substitute to her own, 
which encourages her to free-ride. As a result, as i  goes up, agent i decreases her 
provision. The same reasoning applies to agent j. 
 
Corollary 4.2.: Agent i‟s best-response function decreases in i  . 
 
Let us now differentiate ir  with respect to i  to observe the elasticity of the 
best-response function vis-à-vis social status: 
 
 
2
> 0
i ji
i i i
gr 
  


 
          [20] 
 
The derivative i ir    is strictly positive and agent i‟s best-response function 
increases in i , for all jg . As i  goes up, agent i is emulous and considers agent j‟s 
provision a threat to her status in the social hierarchy, which makes her increase her 
provision. In consequence, the higher i , the higher the agent i‟s provision. The same 
reasoning applies to agent j. 
 
Corollary 4.3.: Agent i‟s best-response function increases in i .  
 
4.3.3. The equilibrium 
 
At a Nash equilibrium  * *,i jg g  each agent‟s provision is her best response to 
the other‟s. We first consider an interior equilibrium where both agents‟ provisions 
are strictly positive but inferior to their incomes: *0 i ig w  , 
*0 j jg w  . At such 
equilibrium, provisions amount:  
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*
*
2
4
2
4
i j j
i
i j
j i i
j
j i
w A w
g
A A
w A w
g
A A




 
 
                 [21] 
 
where i ii
i i
A
 
 



 and 
j j
j
j j
A
 
 



.  
 
In this case, the aggregate level of the public good in equilibrium, that is, 
* * *
i jG g g  , amounts: 
 
   *
1
2 2
4
j i i j
i j
G A w A w
A A
     
       [22] 
 
As one can detect, when agents apply their best-response functions, the 
aggregate level of the public good depends on the relative distance between the social 
status and guilt relief indices. 
 
Corollary 4.4.:  When iA  increases, (i) the equilibrium provision of agent i 
decreases; (ii) the aggregate equilibrium quantity of public good decreases; (iii) and 
the equilibrium provision of agent j increases (decreases) if  0jA   . 
 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
A policy of income transfer from agent j to agent i such that 1i jdw dw    
impacts the aggregate quantity of public good: 
 
j ji i
i j
i j i j
g gg g
dG dg dg
w w w w
     
        
         
      [23] 
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That is: 
 
1
4
i j
i j
dG A A
A A
   
        [23'] 
 
where 
  
2
i j j i
i j
i i j j
A A
   
   

 
 
 
 
Corollary 4.5.: At interior equilibrium, an income transfer from agent j to agent i 
increases (decreases) the aggregate level of the public good if and only if 
 > < 0i j j i    . 
 
In equilibrium, when 0i j    and each agent is indifferent between her 
supply and the other‟s supply, we have 0dG   which is the standard result of 
neutrality obtained by Warr (1983).  
Let us now consider corner solutions with either null or full-income 
provisions. In corner equilibria, in case of strategic substitutes, one of the agents 
provides a null supply. In the case of strategic complements, one of the agents 
allocates her full income to the public good supply. If we analyze income transfers at 
the corner equilibria in the symmetric case, Figs. 4.2. and 4.3. depict provisions with 
respect to the income inequality. The x-axes denote agents‟ shares of total income: 
 i i jw w w ,  j i jw w w . The y-axis represents the aggregate level of the public 
good. The total income is fixed. The broken black curve represents the provision of 
agent i while the broken grey curve represents the provision of agent j. The broken 
grey curve decreases while the broken black curve increases as the transfer between 
agents j and i occurs. The equality arises at 0.5. The solid black curve illustrates the 
sum of provisions, i.e. the aggregate level of the public good. 
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Fig. 4.2. Income transfer with strategic substitutes 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Income transfer with strategic complements 
 
In the case of strategic substitutes (the standard scenario in public good 
games), where guilt relief prevails, the aggregate level of the public good decreases as 
the incomes‟ disparity shrinks. Indeed, at a corner solution, the lower income agent 
invariably free-rides on the supply of the higher income agent. If the income is 
transferred from the lower income agent to the higher income agent, the latter should 
0 0.5 
G 
0 0.5 
1 
1 
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*
jg
*
ig
 
 148 
allocate the extra income into the public good supply
48
 and the aggregate quantity 
should increase. This is a similar result to Theorem 5 from Bergstrom et al. (1986) 
who show that equalizing income by transferring income from contributors to non-
contributors will decrease the equilibrium supply of the public good, in the case of a 
pure public good ( 0i   in our case). 
In the case of strategic complements (the novel scenario in public good 
games), where status seeking prevails, the aggregate level of the public good 
decreases as the agents‟ income disparity grows. This time, the lower income agent 
allocates her full income to the supply of public good in order to gain social status, 
thus saturating her supply capacity, whereas the higher income agent contributes less 
than her full income. An income transfer from the higher income agent to the lower 
income agent should increase the quantity of public good, because the lower income 
agent should allocate the money transfer to the provision of the public good. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. The aggregate level of provisions 
 
                                                 
48
 For example, this suggests that cutting taxes on the higher income agent and raising taxes on the 
lower income agent may increase private supply. 
Aj 
Ai 
G 
–1 
1 
0 
–1 
0 
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At last, Fig. 4.4. shows the aggregate provisions to the public good in view of 
iA  and jA , in both interior and corner equilibria. The kinks in the slope correspond to 
corner equilibria. When < 0iA , agent i‟s provision is a strategic complement, and 
strategic substitute otherwise. G decreases with iA . 
 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
 
When agents privately provide a public good, agents profit from donations to 
alleviate their guilt. Because guilt relief entails opportunity costs, agents refuse to pay 
for others‟ guilt or simply profit from efforts of the others, and this leads to free-
riding and weak provision of the public good: a phenomenon amply covered by the 
economic literature. 
The private provision of the public good is stimulated by the private benefit of 
the public good such as obtaining some social status, which ex post seems intuitive. 
In the case where provisions become strategic complements, a policy of income 
transfers from the higher income agent to the lower income agent should increase the 
aggregate level of the public good. Its purpose would be to activate the competition 
for social status, which increases the public good‟s level and thus social welfare.  
Our model can stand for the wanting theoretical background which explains 
why agents under-react to the income transfer, that is why lower income agents over-
contribute and higher income agents under-contribute, in both experiments from Chan 
et al. (1996) and Maurice et al. (2009). Indeed, neither has considered contributions 
as strategic complements. Maurice et al. (2009) suggest the anchoring phenomenon 
explains their results, but we prefer the social status phenomenon as a way to explain 
pro-social behavior. Besides, Chan et al. (1996) themselves conclude that the 
explanation for experimental results might be in a model where agents react to their 
competitors. Their intuition meets up with ours. 
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Therefore, status (market) competition in the form of auctions can be an 
answer to free-riding
49
. Our results could explain the institution of charity auctions, 
honor rolls of donors and the construction of socially responsible finance indices. 
More generally, it could relate to why institutions make use of agents‟ willingness to 
demonstrate their generosity if not their apparent selflessness. To some extent, our 
model could be an illustration of the theory of crowding out of intrinsic motivations 
by extrinsic incentives. Further work consists in verifying the relevancy of these 
findings with field data. 
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4.6. Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1. 
 
First,  * *,i jg g  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if *ig  is a fixed point of the function:  
  , ,i j j ix r r x w w  and  * *j i jr g g .  
 
Second, if  1,1i
j
r
g

 

 and  1,1j
i
r
g

 

,   , ,i j j ix r r x w w  has a unique fixed 
point and  
 
,
i j
j ji i
i jj i
i j
dH dH
dg rr dg
dH dHg g
dg dg

 
  
             
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. 
 
Consider the ratio which measures the relative incentives to contribute to the public 
good:  
 
i i
i i
i
i i i i ii i
i i ij i
dH H
dx x
H H H H HdH dH
G s G s xdg dg
 



                   
                                     
 
 
First of all, it is worth writing i  according to the partial derivative of the reaction 
function ir :  
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2
1
i i i
i i i
i
i i i i i
i i j i j
H H r
x x w
H H H H r
x s g g g

  
  
  
            
                         
 
 
The income transfer corresponds to 0i jdw dw   . At the unique equilibrium 
 * ,i jG w w , agent i ‟s provision satisfies  * *,i j i ir g w g  and differentiation of this 
relation gives  
 
* *i i
i j i
j i
r r
dg dg dw
g w
 
 
 
.  
 
Since * * *j idg dG dg  , we have  * * *i ii i i
j i
r r
dg dG dg dw
g w
 
  
 
. That is: 
 
* * *
1 1 1
i ii
j ji
i i i i
i i i
j j j
r rr
g gw
dg dG dw dG dw
r r r
g g g

 
 
   
  
  
  
,  
 
A similar expression holds for *jdg  and summing both expressions gives:  
 
 *1
1 1
i j
j i
i i j j i j i
i j
j i
r r
g g
dG dw dw dw
r r
g g
   
  
        
  
    
,  
 
Because of [12], the first factor of the left hand side is positive thus: 
 
* 0 i jdG                   
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Proof of Corollary 4.1. 
 
Given jg , differentiating  u   with respect to ig  gives best-response 
*
ig . At an 
interior solution the first order condition is satisfied:  
 
   
1
0.i i
i i i i j i i j
w r r g r g
 
 

  
   
 
 
Therefore,       i i i i i i j i i jw r r g r g         , and  
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 1
,
2 2 2 2
i i
i j i i j i i j
i i
r g w w g w A g
 
 

   

 
 
This equation holds if the right hand side is between 0  and iw  which is the case if 
j i ig w A  when 0iA   (i.e. i i  ) and j i ig w A   when 0iA   (i.e. i i  ). 
When  =0i i  ,  ½i ir w  for any 0jg  . The same reasoning applies to agent 
j.                
 
Proof of Corollary 4.4. 
 
At an interior equilibrium, the two following equations are satisfied:  
 
* *
* *
2
2
i i j i
j i j j
g A g w
A g g w
  

 
 
 
where  , 1,1j ji ii j
i i j j
A A
  
   

   
 
.   
 
The aggregation of provisions amounts:  
 155 
 
1
2
2 21 1
2 24 4
i i i i j
j j j j ii j i j
g A w w A w
g A w w A wA A A A
        
                 
 
 
And the total provision is:  
 
   *
1
2 2
4
j i i j
i j
G A w A w
A A
     
 
 
When 0i j    and agents are exclusively intrinsically impulsed 
 
 *
2 2 1
4 1 3
i i j j
i j
w w w w
G w w
  
  

           
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